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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines a number of specific efforts by the United Nations to offer and 
administer development aid to newly independent and ‘underdeveloped’ countries from the 
Global South during the decades following World War Two. Broadly, this thesis casts light 
on the competitive nature of postwar international development. In doing so, it examines 
development as a contest, whereby, the United Nations sought to stake out a claim to its share 
of the global development process during the 1950s and early 1960s. Crucially, this thesis 
sets this struggle against the backdrop of the increasing demand for development aid that 
accompanied the advent of mass decolonization in Africa by 1960. Consequently, this gave 
rise to a heightened competition over what type of aid best suited newly independent 
countries and who should administer it. Here, this study demonstrates how the UN contended 
with both bilateral and multilateral aid options outside the Organization, as well as, the 
challenges associated with providing development aid to countries that requested non-
colonial assistance yet jealously guarded their newly acquired sovereignty.  
Finally, it was through the UN’s belief in its development directive, its unique ‘brand’ 
of aid and the value of its operational pursuits that it added a crucial dimension to the 
development discourse of the period. At the UN, this resulted in the expansion of the UN’s 
development reach and development becoming a primary, if not the chief focus of the 
Organization during the First UN Development Decade of the 1960s. At the same time, it was 
during the postwar decades that the Organization helped to give development a global quality 
through a concerted effort towards the internationalization of development aid. Altogether, 
this thesis extends the boundaries of the study of postwar development by demonstrating how 
the UN functioned as an important autonomous institution and actor as it promoted economic 
and social development through multilateral development aid. Furthermore, this study 
challenges traditional interpretations of the UN that depict the Organization as solely a 
foreign policy tool of its member states or as an Organization predominantly concerned with 
peace and security issues during this era.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Nearly a year into his tenure as Secretary-General of the United Nations, during a 10 
February 1954 press conference, Dag Hammarskjold responded to a question about sizeable 
staff reductions at the Organization by launching into his vision for the ‘proper direction’ of 
the international institution going forward. He explained that one main directive was the 
UN’s role in the economic, political and cultural development of underdeveloped countries. 
He continued:  
The reason why I feel that this is properly a United Nations activity and 
something which is quite essential is that I do not see any instrument other 
than the United Nations which can channel the things that can be provided—
know-how, and so forth—by the more highly developed countries. In the long 
run, that operation cannot be pursued by any national Government as well as it 
can be pursued by the United Nations. There is no other international 
organization or group of organizations which can do exactly the same job.1  
 
Hammarskjold’s statement signaled developments already taking place at the UN, but 
even more so foreshadowed future changes and pursuits of the Organization. In many ways, 
this thesis is an examination of the extent to which the UN attempted to live up to the 
standard and execute the strategy expressed by Hammarskjold.2 In doing so, it offers a UN-
centered analysis of the Organization’s thinking and practices by exploring various means, or 
case studies, by which the UN attempted to offer or channel development aid to newly 
independent and so-called ‘underdeveloped’ countries during the decades following World 
War Two. The aim of this study is to investigate the following questions: what factors 
motivated the UN to exert its development directive? To what extent did the UN attempt to 
frame and direct the debate on economic development aid to underdeveloped countries? By 
                                                          
1 Transcripts of Press Conference, 10 February 1954, in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., Public 
Paper of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Volume II, Dag Hammarskjold, 1953-1956 (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1972), 221-22. 
2 As a point of clarification, the term ‘United Nations’ has been used to refer to the member states that make up 
the Organization, its major forums like the General Assembly and Security Council or the institution itself—the 
Secretariat and the Office of the Secretary-General. Unless otherwise stated, when referencing the UN 
Organization this thesis is referring to the UN Secretariat and the Office of the Secretary-General. Member 
states and forums will be referred to by name. Additionally, in recognition of the dominant vernacular of the 
period under review, the phrase ‘underdeveloped countries’ will be used to refer to states from the Global South, 
which are now referred to as ‘developing countries’, ‘emerging economies’ or ‘least developed countries’. 
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what means did the UN try to offer development aid to newly independent countries of the 
Global South? Similarly, to what extent did the coming of mass decolonization, which 
swelled the ranks of the UN with member states from the Global South, affect the 
Organization’s development agenda? What was the reaction and role played by the United 
States, which from the UN’s founding held sway over the Organization and dictated much of 
its agenda? What were the steps taken by and at the UN to ultimately make development the 
Organization’s primary focus? In answering these questions this thesis contributes to the 
discussion of the unique nature of UN development aid during the postwar decades.  
Crucially, this thesis makes a number of specific arguments as well as contains 
several new interpretations and findings. It makes clear just how important the UN was as an 
autonomous institution and actor, from the late 1940s onwards, as it promoted its brand of 
development aid. This thesis explores the myriad of factors that motivated those within the 
Organization to exert the UN’s development aid mandate. These range widely and include 
more altruistic factors like the desire to live up to the principles found in the UN Charter, 
which pledged the Organization’s services for ‘the economic and social advancement of all 
peoples’. More specifically the Charter also foresaw the UN as a means to promote ‘higher 
standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic progress and development’ 
and find solutions to ‘international economic, social, health, and related problems’.3 Yet, 
what also comes through is a desire at the UN to prove its own worth coupled with a 
perspective that UN aid programs were better than alternative aid options. Speaking more to 
the latter two motives, this thesis specifically casts light on the competitive nature of postwar 
international development. However, it does not reduce development to strictly a Cold War 
competition set alongside the space race or arms race, nor strictly as a competition between 
the haves and the have-nots—although these perspectives certainly have merit. Instead, the 
                                                          
3 See the Preamble and Chapter IX, Article 55 of the UN Charter: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.  
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thesis examines development as a contest, whereby, the United Nations sought to stake out a 
claim to its share of the global development process during the 1950s and early 1960s.  
This contest is set against the backdrop of—and further motivated by—an increased 
demand for development aid that accompanied the advent of mass decolonization in Africa in 
1960. This, consequently, gave rise to a vigorous debate over what type of aid best suited 
newly independent countries and who should administer it. Here, this study demonstrates 
how the UN contended with both bilateral and multilateral aid options outside the 
Organization, as well as, the challenges associated with providing development aid to 
countries that requested assistance yet jealously guarded their newly acquired sovereignty. 
However, that is not to say there were no instances of cooperation between the UN and key 
member states over the issues relating to multilateral development aid. In fact, this thesis 
highlights many of those instances where the common, albeit wide-ranging goal of 
developing underdeveloped countries resulted in a confluence of interests and undertakings at 
the international level. 
It was through the UN’s belief in its development directive, its unique ‘brand’ of aid 
and the value of its operational pursuits that the UN added a crucial dimension to the 
development discourse of the period. It also utilized various existing doctrines of 
development, like modernization theory, to pursue its goal of gaining and maintaining 
relevance in the development arena. At the UN, this resulted in the expansion of the 
Organization’s development reach and development becoming a primary, if not the chief 
focus of the international institution heading into the First UN Development Decade of the 
1960s. At the same time, it was during the postwar decades that the Organization helped to 
give development a global quality through a concerted effort towards the internationalization 
of development aid. In doing so, this thesis extends the boundaries of the study of postwar 
development.  
12 
 
Historiography 
Histories of development efforts undertaken during the second half of the twentieth 
century have, by and large, failed to extend the study of development to include the United 
Nations and its Specialized Agencies. Since historians have taken up the task of re-examining 
postwar economic and social development,4 much of the resulting scholarship has 
predominantly focused on the influence of both American foreign policy and social science 
on this process.5 The earliest of these studies took a wide look at development from a 
theoretical or policymaking framework while the most recent have started to examine 
development at an operational level. Likewise, when tracing development aid’s pre-history 
scholars have chosen to study postwar development as a derivative of any number of Western 
antecedents—colonialism, the culmination of Enlightenment ideals, turn-of-the-century 
progressivism or New Deal activism applied globally.6 From this perspective, postwar 
modernization appears to have been primarily an American or Western undertaking.7 
                                                          
4 Nick Cullather, ‘Development? It’s History,’ Diplomatic History, 24, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 641-653. 
5 For a recent selection see, Michael Adas, Dominance by Design: Technological Imperatives and America’s 
Civilizing Mission (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2006); Nick Cullather, The Hungry 
World: America’s Cold War Battle Against Poverty in Asia (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University 
Press, 2010); David Ekbladh, The Great American Mission: Modernization and the Construction of an 
American World Order (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009); Jamey Essex, Development, 
Security, and Aid: Geopolitics and Geoeconomics at the U.S. Agency for International Development (Athens, 
Georgia: University of Georgia Press, 2013); Thomas C. Field, Jr., From Development to Dictatorship: Bolivia 
and the Alliance for Progress in the Kennedy Era (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2014); Nils 
Gilman, Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2007); Michael E. Latham, Modernization as Ideology: American Social Science and ‘Nation 
Building’ in the Kennedy Era (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000); 
Michael Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution: Modernization, Development, and U.S. Foreign Policy from the 
Cold War to the Present (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2011) and Amanda Kay McVety, 
Enlightened Aid: US Development as Foreign Policy in Ethiopia (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
6 For development scholarship that reflects these views see, Joseph Morgan Hodge, Triumph of the Expert: 
Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies of British Colonialism (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University 
Press, 2007); Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution; Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From Western 
Origins to Global Faith, 4th Ed. (London and New York: Zed Books, 2014) and James C. Scott, Seeing Like a 
State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition have Failed (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale 
University Press, 1998). 
7 There are several important recent studies that look at development as a joint effort of Third World states and 
the US. For example, in many ways Bradley Simpson’s, Economists with Guns: Authoritarian Development and 
US–Indonesian Relations, 1960–1968 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008) is as much about the 
Indonesians ‘doing development’ as about American efforts to develop Indonesia. See also, Gregg A. 
Brazinsky, Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy (Chapel Hill, 
North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press, 2007) and Edward Miller, Misalliance: Ngo Dinh 
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According to development historian Corinna Unger, this has led to an incomplete depiction of 
postwar modernization that neglects international and transnational approaches to this 
process. She contends that development thinking was less insular than current studies suggest 
since, after 1945, the United Nations and its related organizations in particular, ‘provided 
important forums for the evolution of development thinking as well as for the discussion and 
transfer of modernization discourses and practices.’8  
Recently, efforts by historians to broaden the boundaries of postwar modernization 
studies have made way for new histories of development.9 These works look beyond the state 
and to international institutions as ideal case studies for analyzing transnational debates and 
development discourses. Representing the vanguard of this turn was Akira Iriye’s Global 
Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary 
World. Iriye makes the case that since the late nineteenth-century international organizations 
were more effective than nation-states in reflecting transnational concerns and fostering 
human interdependence. Another seminal piece of scholarship dedicated to examining the 
longue durée of international organizations ability to design and implement development 
practices is Richard Jolly’s, et. al. UN Contributions to Development Thinking and Practice. 
This study provides the first comprehensive effort to chart the impact the UN had on 
improving human standards of living during the second half of the twentieth century. Craig 
N. Murphy in The United Nations Development Programme: A Better Way?, takes a similarly 
positive view that when it came to development practices, the UN took the lead. Equally 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Diem, the United States, and the Fate of South Vietnam (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 
2013).   
8 Corinna Unger, ‘Histories of Development and Modernization: Findings, Reflections, Future Research,’ H–
Net, Clio–online (2010), 7–8. This view is also expressed in David D. Engerman and Corinna R. Unger, 
‘Introduction: Towards a Global History of Modernization,’ Diplomatic History 33, no. 3 (June 2009): 377 and 
Joseph M Hodge, ‘British Colonial Expertise, Postcolonial Careering and the Early History of International 
Development,’ in Andres Eckert, Stephan Malinowski and Corinna Unger, eds., Journal of Modern European 
History, Special Issue on ‘Modernizing Missions: Approaches to ‘Developing’ the Non-Western World after 
1945,’ 8, no. 1 (2010): 24-46.   
9 For two examples that frame development in an international Cold War context see, David Engerman, et. al., 
eds., Staging Growth: Modernization, Development, and the Global Cold War (Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2003) and Arne Odd Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the 
Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
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important is Amy Staples’ The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and World Health Organization Changed the World, 1945-1965. 
Staples tracks the pre-history of these UN Specialized Agencies, examining how each played 
a substantial role in defining development throughout the twentieth century. Staples is, 
however, less inclined to label the development efforts of these institutions as successes or 
failures.10 Other international histories of development have likewise broken new ground—
most notably studies on the World Bank and its role in postwar development.11  
Altogether, the study of the economic and social impact of the UN is a relatively 
recent trend in UN historiography. Classic studies tended to focus on the Organization’s 
founding and its institutional developments thereafter,12 while operationally, the emphasis has 
                                                          
10 Akira Iriye, Global Community: The Role of International Organizations in the Making of the Contemporary 
World (Berkley: University of California Press, 2002); Richard Jolly, et. al., UN Contributions to Development 
Thinking and Practice (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2004); Craig N. Murphy, The United 
Nations Development Programme: A Better Way? (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006) and Amy 
L.S. Staples, The Birth of Development: How the World Bank, Food and Agriculture Organization, and World 
Health Organization Changed the World, 1945–1965 (Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 2006). 
Alongside Jolly’s work are a number of other publications produced by the ‘UN Intellectual History Project’ 
based at the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies of The City University of New York. From 1999-
2010, the project turned out seventeen publications and seventy-nine oral history interviews. Many of the 
authors, including Jolly, were former UN officials and therefore some of the works read as at least semi-official 
institutional histories. For the UN Intellectual History Project see: http://www.unhistory.org/. The volumes that 
relate most directly to the topic of economic development and development aid are: Olav Stokke, The UN and 
Development: From Aid to Cooperation (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2009); John Toye and Richard 
Toye, The UN and Global Political Economy: Trade, Finance and Development (Bloomington, Indiana 
University Press, 2004) and Michael Ward, Quantifying the World: UN Ideas and Statistics (Bloomington, 
Indiana University Press, 2004).  
11 See, Michele Alacevich, ‘The World Bank and the Politics of Productivity: the debate on the economic 
growth, poverty, and living standards in the 1950s,’ Journal of Global History 6 (2011): 53-74; Michele 
Alacevich, The Political Economy of the World Bank: The Early Years (Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press, 2009); Eric Helleiner, ‘The Development Mandate of International Institutions: Where Did it 
Come From?,’ Studies in Comparative International Development 44 (2009): 189-211 and Patrick Sharma, ‘The 
United States, the World Bank, and the Challenges of International Development in the 1970s,’ Diplomatic 
History 37, no. 3 (June 2013): 572-604. See also, Digambar Bhouraskar, United Nations Development Aid: A 
Study in History and Politics (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007); David Webster, ‘Development advisors 
in a time of cold war and decolonization: the United Nations Technical Assistance Administration, 1950-59,’ 
Journal of Global History, 6 (July 2011): 249-272 and Daniel Maul, ‘“Help Them Move the ILO Way’: The 
International Labor Organization and the Modernization Discourse in the Era of Decolonization and the Cold 
War,’ Diplomatic History 33, no. 3 (June 2009): 387-403.   
12 See, Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, FDR and the Creation of the UN (New Haven, Connecticut: 
Yale University Press, 1997); Evan Luard, The United Nations: How it Works and What it Does, 2nd Ed. (The 
Macmillan Press: Basingstoke, 1994); Ruth B. Russell, A History of the United Nations Charter (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution, 1958) and more recently Dimitris Bourantonis, The History and Politics of UN 
Security Council Reform (London: Routledge, 2005); Leon Gordenker, The UN Secretary General and 
Secretariat, 2nd Ed. (London: Routledge, 2010); Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and 
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been predominately on the peace and security functions of the UN or its political 
diplomacy.13 (The historiographical section on the Congo Crisis from Chapter Four will also 
bear this out). Meanwhile, historians have long viewed the UN as a component of the Cold 
War narrative—if not a tool of the Great Powers.14 Histories of the UN’s second Secretary-
General, Dag Hammarskjold—a central figure in this study—similarly focus on 
Hammarskjold’s landmark activities in the peace and security fields namely during the Suez, 
the Lebanese and Congo crises.15 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
the Ideological Origins of the United Nations (2009) and Daniel Plesch, America, Hitler and the UN: How the 
Allies Won World War II and Forged a Peace (London: I.B.Tauris, 2010).   
13 See, Geoff Berridge and Anthony Jenning, eds., Diplomacy at the UN (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985);  
Inis L. Claude, Swords into plowshares: the problems and progress of international organization, 4th Ed. (New 
York: Random House, 1971); Leland M. Goodrich and David A. Kay, The Process of International 
Organization (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1973); Alan James, Peacekeeping and 
International Politics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990); Stanley Meisler, United Nations: The First Fifty Years 
(New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995); H.G. Nicholas, The United Nations as a Political Institution, 5th Ed. 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1975); Connor Cruise O’Brien, The United Nations: Sacred Drama 
(London: Hutchinson, 1963); Adam Robert and Benedict Kingsbury, eds., United Nations, Divided World: The 
UN’s Role in International Relations, 2nd Ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); Geoff Simons, The 
United Nations, A Chronology of Conflict (New York: Macmillan, 1994); Nigel D. White, Keeping the Peace: 
The United Nations and the Maintenance of International Peace and Security, 2nd Ed., (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1997); Robert S. Wood, ed., The Process of International Organization (New 
York: Random House, 1971) and more recently Philip Cunliffe, Legions of Peace: UN Peacekeepers from the 
Global South (London: Hurst, 2013); Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2002); Norrie MacQueen, The United Nations, Peace Operations and the Cold War, 
2nd Ed. (New York: Pearson Longman, 2011); Norrie MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the International System  
(New York: Routledge, 2006); Norrie MacQueen, United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960 (New 
York: Pearson Education Limited, 2002) and Ramesh Thakur, The United Nations, Peace and Security: From 
Collective Security to the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 
14 H.W. Brands, Cold Warriors: Eisenhower’s Generation and American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988); Maxwell Seymour Finger, American Ambassadors at the UN: people, politics and 
bureaucracy in making foreign policy (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1988); Ilya V. Gaiduk, Divided Together: 
The United States and the Soviet Union in the United Nations, 1945-1965 (Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson 
Press Center, 2012); June Grasso, ‘Cold War politics and Mongolia: The Kennedy Administration and 
Mongolia’s entrance to the United Nations,’ Diplomacy & Statecraft 7, no. 3 (1996): 688-703; Erick Vagn 
Jensen and Thomas Fisher, eds., The United Kingdom—The United Nations (London: Macmillan, 1990); 
Edward C. Luck, Mixed Messages: American Politics and International Organization, 1919-1999 (Washington 
DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1999) and Caroline Pruden, Conditional Partners: Eisenhower the United 
Nations and the Search for a Permanent Peace (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 1998). 
15 Manuel Frohlich, Political Ethics and the United Nations: Dag Hammarskjold as Secretary-General (London, 
Routledge, 2008); Michael G. Fry, ‘The United Nations Confronts the United States in 1958’ in Wm. Roger 
Louis and Roger Owen, eds., A Revolutionary Year: The Middle East in 1958 (London: Tauris, 2002); Robert 
S. Jordan, ed., Dag Hammarskjold Revisited: The UN Secretary-General as a Force in World Politics (Durham, 
North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1983); Peter B. Heller, The United Nations Under Dag 
Hammarskjold, 1953-1961 (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 2001); Joseph P. Lash, Dag Hammarskjold, 
Custodian of the Brushfire Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1961); Wm. Roger Louis, ‘The UN and the Suez 
Crisis: British Ambivalence Towards the Pope on the East River’ in Wm. Roger Louis, ed., Ends of British 
Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez and Decolonization Collected Essays (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006); 
Brian Urquhart, Hammarskjold (London: Bodley Head, 1973) and Mark W. Zacher, Dag Hammarskjold’s 
United Nations (Study in International Organization) (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971). A notable 
exception discussed later in the thesis is Jeff King and A.J. Hobbins, ‘Hammarskjold and Human Rights: the 
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Yet as UN histories continue to diversify,16 the possibilities for research remain 
plentiful since, as Glenda Sluga has argued, looking beyond the state through the study of 
international institutions allows global historians to revisit and resuscitate established topics 
while examining them from new perspectives.17 Elsewhere, she and Sunil Amrith note how 
the UN has the ability to ‘enrich diverse historiographies’ as recently demonstrated in the 
arena of the historical study of human rights.18 Crucially therefore, they place the UN and its 
various sub-organs firmly at the center of both the international and transnational themes of 
new historical scholarship. Moreover, they specifically see the Organization’s interventions 
to deal with the problem of social and economic development as an area in which UN sources 
have opened up broad new questions regarding the role of the UN and relations between 
North and South.19 This thesis aims to address these issues further by examining various 
interlocking episodes, described below, that highlight the UN’s effort to intervene and take 
up the challenge of social and economic development on a global scale.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Deflation of the UN Human Rights Programme 1953-1961,’ Journal of the History of International Law 5 
(2003): 337-386. For a more personal portrait of the Secretary-General see, Dag Hammarskjold, Markings 
(Translated from the Swedish by Leif Sjöberg and W.H. Auden) (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966); Roger 
Lipsey, Hammarskjold: A Life (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2013) and Roger Lipsey, 
‘Dag Hammarskjold and Markings: A Reconsideration,’ Spiritus 11, no. 1 (Spring 2011): 84-103. For 
Hammarskjold’s tragic death see, Susan A. Williams, Who Killed Hammarskjold?: The UN, the Cold War and 
White Supremacy in Africa (London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers, 2011). For the most recent evaluation of 
Hammarskjold still mostly focused on peace, security and diplomacy but also his intellectual legacy and 
religious values see, Carsten Stahn and Henning Melber, eds., Peace Diplomacy, Global Justice and 
International Agency: Rethinking Human Security and Ethnics in the Spirit of Dag Hammarskjold (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2014).  
16 Thomas G. Weiss and Sam Davis, eds., The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007) is an especially notable indication of this development as its covers aspects of the UN 
from a multitude of angles.   
17 Glenda Sluga, ‘Editorial – the transnational history of international institutions,’ Journal of Global History, 
11, no. 2 (2011), 222. Iriye makes a similar claim in, Akira Iriye, ‘Internationalizing International History’ in 
Thomas Bender, ed., Rethinking American History in a Global Age (Berkeley, California: University of 
California Press, 2002), 49.  
18 Sunil Amrith and Glenda Sluga, ‘New Histories of the United Nations,’ Journal of World History 19, no. 3 
2008: 257-260. Amrith and Sluga cite: Carol Anderson, Eyes off the Prize: The United Nations and the African 
American Struggle for Human Rights, 1944-1955 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Marika 
Sherwood, ‘“There Is No Deal for the Blackman in San Francisco”: African Attempts to Influence the Founding 
Conference of the United Nations, April—July 1945,’ International Journal of African Historical Studies 29, 
no. 1 (1996): 71-94. For more recent scholarship see: Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of 
Humanitarianism (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2011); Michael Barnett and Thomas G. Weiss, 
eds., Humanitarianism in Question: Politics, Power, Ethics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2008) 
and Anne Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2011).  
19 Amrith and Sluga, ‘New Histories of the United Nations,’ 252-253, 261-269.  
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Outline 
This thesis is organized chronologically, from the creation of the first development 
aid program at the UN in 1949 to the culmination of the UN’s largest aid program that took 
place in the midst of the Congo Crisis during the early 1960s. This approach has the 
advantage of accentuating the evolution of UN development aid in the decade leading up to 
the so-called ‘First UN Development Decade’ of the 1960s. However, each chapter can also 
stand alone as a case study on a specific facet or method of UN development aid as the 
summaries below will show. Given that this thesis centers on the UN competing for its share 
of the global development effort, it gives more weight to periods of more intense competition. 
Therefore, Chapter One spans an entire decade, from 1949 to 1959, whereas the rest of the 
thesis narrows in on the period from 1959 to 1961. The latter period is a pivotal juncture 
where the UN sought to reach out and meet the needs of newly independent states during an 
era of mass decolonization as it transitioned to ultimately making development its primary 
focus.  
The goal of my first chapter is to explore the UN’s development directive that 
stemmed in part from the UN Charter, which promised the Organization would undertake the 
promotion of ‘higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic 
progress and development.’20 This mandate became more of a focus as the Organization’s 
attention shifted from the global North to the Global South during the course of the 1950s. 
More directly, this chapter analyzes the two earliest branches of UN development aid. The 
first is the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance (EPTA). Created in 1949, it served as 
the flagship technical assistance program for the UN and the most fully multilateral source of 
economic aid available to underdeveloped countries through the 1950s. Complementing the 
work of the EPTA, the UN Special Fund, which came into existence in January 1959, 
centered on the concept of ‘pre-investment’ aid. The aim of both programs was to spur long-
                                                          
20 See Chapter IX, Article 55 of the UN Charter: http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/.  
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term economic growth by either transferring knowledge to underdeveloped areas by way of 
EPTA experts or to make investment more attractive, feasible and effective in 
underdeveloped countries by helping with the ‘spadework’ of larger investment projects 
through the Special Fund.  
 In examining how these two programs were ‘sold’ to both donor and recipient 
countries—and as a way to avoid the pit-falls of writing a dry institutional history—this 
thesis discusses the roles played by significant personalities within the UN Secretariat who 
were instrumental in developing and expanding the EPTA and the Special Fund. This list 
includes Secretary-General Hammarskjold, along with David Owen, Executive-Director of 
the EPTA and Managing Director of the Special Fund, Paul Hoffman. Much of this chapter 
examines how these individuals viewed and attempted to promote these programs as a 
distinct and ideal type of development aid. This was all the more necessary since both 
programs obtained their respective operational budgets completely through voluntary 
donations from UN member states and could only operate in a given country at the request of 
the recipient government. In this way, these programs offered an alternative to bilateral 
postwar aid programs, whose creation was sparked, in large part, by President Harry S. 
Truman’s famous 1949 Point Four speech that called on America to aid underdeveloped 
countries. 
Finally, perhaps the most important contribution that Chapter One makes to the 
growing scholarship on postwar development efforts is its analysis of how architects of UN 
aid framed certain UN development schemes, in particular the Special Fund, within a wider 
debate on development taking place. More specifically, this chapter examines the extent to 
which Paul Hoffman utilized rhetoric from a development discourse known as modernization 
theory. Two MIT economists, Walt W. Rostow and Max Millikan, popularized this theory 
during the mid to late 1950s. In short, modernization theory glorified scientific, industrial, 
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and technological progress, as the means to achieve economic, social and political (ie. 
democratic) transformation within a society. The theory enjoyed widespread favor during the 
early 1960s, (Rostow even became a top adviser to President John F. Kennedy), yet historians 
have depicted the theory nearly exclusively as an American foreign policy tool.21 In short, 
this thesis will argue that in this case, the UN successfully made use of modernization 
principles to appeal to potential donor and recipient countries interested in investigating the 
benefits of pre-investment aid offered by the Special Fund. In this way, it shows how the 
modernization impulse not only predated the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations but also 
was not exclusively a US foreign policy tool. Altogether then, the two branches of UN grant 
aid, the EPTA and the Special Fund, displayed the Organization’s ability to navigate 
conflicting interests, expand beyond its peace and security functions and lay the foundation 
for its brand of development aid, all the while contributing to the development discourse of 
the era.  
Chapter Two begins with the emergence of an effort led by Secretary-General 
Hammarskjold to assess and respond to the tide of newly independent and underdeveloped 
African countries, sixteen of which gained their independence and joined the UN in 1960 
alone. The reality of political independence for these African states overlapped with the 
desire that de facto sovereignty should rightly and swiftly follow de jure. Hammarskjold 
witnessed this desire firsthand during his six-week continent-wide tour of Africa in early 
1960. Thus, the first half of this chapter examines the central role the Secretary-General 
played in shifting the Organization’s attention towards Africa and the economic and social 
development of the continent through much of the rest of 1960. In an effort to fulfill the 
needs expressed to him by various African leaders, Hammarskjold paid increasing attention 
                                                          
21 See especially, Adas, Dominance by Design; Ekbladh, The Great American Mission; Gilman, Mandarins of 
the Future; Mark H. Haefele, ‘Walt Rostow’s Stages of Economic Growth: Ideas and Action’ in Engerman, et. 
al., eds., Staging Growth; Latham, Modernization as Ideology and Latham, The Right Kind of Revolution. 
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towards what he classified as ‘a case for [the] internationalization of aid.’22 Nevertheless, this 
effort did not occur in a vacuum. Competing interests arose in what would become, during 
the course of 1960, a scramble to control development aid to newly independent Africa. 
Hammarskjold responded to the scramble by successfully promoting the expansion of the 
existing development aid machinery of the United Nations, namely the aforementioned EPTA 
and the UN Special Fund. By doing so, Hammarskjold was motivated by a hope to win over 
the continent by establishing a precedent for multilateral aid in the region.  
For all the supposed benefits of technical assistance and pre-investment aid, what 
newly independent African states really sought in 1960 was capital—a type of Marshall Plan 
for Africa. Thus, much of the second half of this chapter highlights the intense competition 
between the UN, plus the majority of its member states and a small group of powerful donor 
states who squared off over the question of creating a multilateral capital development fund. 
This section specifically focuses on a passionate debate that took place at the UN during the 
summer and fall of 1960 over the call to establish a billion dollar global finance facility that 
could provide major capital financing for underdeveloped countries on easier terms compared 
to those offered through the World Bank. This lending method is known as soft loan 
financing. By 1960, the debate matched a proposed soft financing agency attached to the 
World Bank, known as the International Development Association (IDA), against a 
comparable program proposed by the UN known as the Special United Nations Fund for 
Economic Development (SUNFED). Most Western governments including Washington 
backed the IDA, while the Afro-Asian bloc at the UN supported the creation of SUNFED. 
Scholarship on this topic tends to write-off SUNFED as a failed enterprise as early as 1957 to 
the neglect of the rigorous and renewed debate that took place on the eve of mass 
decolonization in Africa. For his part, Hammarskjold sought to carve out a role for himself in 
                                                          
22 Transcript of Press Conference, 18 February 1960, in Andrew W. Cordier and Wilder Foote, eds., Public 
Paper of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations, Volume IV, Dag Hammarskjold, 1958-1960 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1974), 542. 
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either program, yet ultimately believed the billions allocated by any new financing agency 
would be ‘better billions’ if administered by an organization like the UN.23 In the end, the 
culmination of the debate showed how the growth of the competition over development 
assistance to Africa was due to the hothouse atmosphere of the United Nations forums and 
the policies pursued by Secretary-General Hammarskjold. Altogether, it was the surest sign 
yet of the Organization’s pivot towards making development the primary function of the UN. 
 Chapter Three highlights one additional area where the UN sought to compete for an 
expanded share in global development aid—namely in the area of food aid. More 
specifically, this chapter begins by examining a growing debate over the nature and purpose 
of food aid. It then concentrates on how, through the establishment of the UN World Food 
Program (WFP) in 1961, key international institutions like the UN and the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), redefined and redirected food assistance by transforming 
food aid into development capital for underdeveloped countries. Simply put, the UN’s goal 
was to emphasize a more recipient–centered utilization of food aid for economic 
development. Crucially, this approach challenged two prevailing impulses of the first half of 
the twentieth century—and especially the 1950s. First, that the primary purpose of food aid 
for donor countries was to dispose of, or dump, surplus agricultural stock. Second, that the 
primary function of food aid for recipient countries was hunger alleviation. Reinforcing these 
principles was an enormous American food aid program developed in 1954 called Public 
Law 480 (PL 480) that dominated the food aid landscape from its inception until the coming 
of the World Food Program.  
As with pervious chapters, this chapter highlights key figures who shaped the 
evolving transnational debate taking place over food aid in the early 1960s—a debate that 
included members of the UN Secretariat, the FAO, agricultural economists and 
                                                          
23 Transcript of Press Conference, 4 February 1960, in Cordier and Foote eds., Volume IV, 534-35. 
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modernization theorists alike. Through this process, the foremost development economist at 
the UN, Hans W. Singer, joined with the FAO Director–General B.R. Sen and Secretary-
General Hammarskjold in an attempt to re-conceptualize food aid and de–emphasize specific 
national interests in favor of more reciprocity between donor and recipient countries. For 
Singer especially, food aid fitted into what he called the ‘new look’ of development aid.24 
Much like with the EPTA, the Special Fund and SUNFED, Singer argued food aid was an 
arena in which the UN served as a far better mechanism for brokering negotiations over 
development assistance than any one country by itself and, therefore, where the UN deserved 
a larger share of coordinating the work. This chapter will focus on Singer’s efforts in early 
1961, when he headed an expert committee asked to construct a report that explicitly made 
the connection between food aid and economic development and the UN’s future role in the 
process. Perhaps surprisingly, Singer, like Hoffman, relied on many hallmarks of 
modernization theory as a justification and means to expand food aid even though he is 
credited with being the intellectual founder of the theory’s antithesis—dependency theory. 
Nevertheless, Singer pursued a strategy of using elements of modernization theory as a means 
to advance and justify the cause of pursuing food aid at the UN.   
Perhaps more than in the other chapters of this thesis, this study on the nature and 
purpose of postwar food aid highlights the crucial role played by Washington—namely the 
Kennedy Administration. In this case, instead of competing with each other over the 
allocation of development aid, the aims of the Administration and the UN coalesced. Over the 
course of 1961, this ultimately resulted in a shift in thinking for the Kennedy Administration, 
away from PL 480’s focus on surplus disposal of US agricultural commodities and towards 
the use of its surpluses as a means to promote economic development. Ultimately, this 
                                                          
24 Hans Singer, ‘Significant Recent Trends in the Economic Work of the United Nations’ in Richard N. Swift, 
ed., Annual Review of the United Nations Affairs, 1960–1961 (New York: Oceana Publications, 1960), 83-84. 
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coincided with the establishment of the UN World Food Program later in 1961, which was in 
large part championed by the US.  
Finally, my last two chapters together provide one of the best case studies available to 
examine what UN historian Christopher O’Sullivan has called the ‘first test’ the UN faced 
over decolonization—the Congo Crisis of 1960-65.25 These chapters show more of the 
operational arm of the UN and the challenges it faced in administering the UN brand of 
development aid established during the previous decade. The complex and multifaceted 
nature of the Congo Crisis and the UN aid mission made it necessary to divide this topic into 
two chapters while also focusing on the first eighteen months of the crisis. Chapter Four 
covers the first six months, from just before Congo’s independence in June 1960 until the end 
of the year. Chapter Five examines the period from January 1961 until the end of that year. 
The decision to end the in-depth analysis of the UN Civilian Mission at the end of 1961 is 
partly due to the space constraints of the thesis. Nevertheless, the UN civilian aid mission 
faced the vast majority of its challenges during the eighteen-month period from June 1960 to 
December 1961, at which point civilian aid between the UN and the Congo normalized and 
stabilized. 
The narrative of the first eighteen-months of the crisis is highly complicated. 
However, it is enough to say here, without going into exhaustive detail, that a series of major 
political, economic, administrative and humanitarian crises quickly followed the 
independence of the former Belgian colony of the Congo on 30 June 1960. Into the void left 
by the fleeing Belgians and the general mayhem that ensued stepped the United Nations and 
thousands of peacekeepers and aid workers. Together they formed the UN Operation to the 
Congo, identified by its French acronym ONUC. 
                                                          
25 Christopher O’Sullivan, ‘The United Nations, Decolonization, and Self-Determination in Cold War Sub-
Saharan Africa, 1960-1964,’ Journal of Third World Studies, 22, no. 2 (2005): 106-107. In recognition of the 
vernacular of the period under review, this thesis will use the title ‘the Congo’ to refer to the present-day 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which was also formerly Zaire.  
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Crucially, these chapters examine an important but overwhelmingly neglected part of 
ONUC and the anatomy of the Congo Crisis—namely the work of the UN Civilian Operation 
to the Congo.26 Totaling over 400 aid workers by 1961, the Civilian Mission attempted to 
administer the UN brand of economic and social development aid that purported to be 
multilateral, impartial and development-focused. This took place in multiple sectors of the 
Congo—mostly notably in the essential services of public administration, health, education 
and finance. Thus, these chapters will argue that the UN Civilian Mission was an integral part 
of the overall ONUC mission and a vital part of what the UN was trying to accomplish in the 
Congo. Nevertheless, this study will show how the Congo presented a myriad of new 
challenges for UN aid workers and members of the UN Secretariat who now found 
themselves effectively trying to administer aid to a near failed state through much of 1960 
and 1961. With the Belgians having fled, much of the Congolese civil service severely under-
trained, the economy in shock and high government positions left vacant, these chapters will 
show how, at the level of implementation, the UN tried to account for the local realities. It 
will make apparent how the seemingly innocuous brand of UN development aid developed 
over the previous decade wound up being far more provocative than ever imagined in the 
context of the Congo Crisis. Thus, these chapters will examine how the UN struggled to 
adhere to its previous standards as it attempted to serve as a guarantor of Congolese 
development, while trying to avoid becoming an inheritor of European colonialism.  
Sources and Methodology 
The strength of any historical argument centers on its sources. Therefore, this thesis 
relies heavily on a number of key archives as well as other primary source material. These 
sources are found predominately in institutional, government and private archives in the 
United States, Britain and Sweden. Firstly, this thesis makes use of the collection of the Dag 
                                                          
26 See Chapter Four for an exhaustive historiographical analysis of the Congo Crisis and the UN’s role.  
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Hammarskjold Papers—dispersed among three separate archives.27 The vast majority of the 
Hammarskjold Papers are at the National Library of Sweden in Stockholm. Due to the size 
and scope of this collection, it contains the best material for a serious study of the Secretary-
General. The collection is divided into two parts, one containing more personal papers taken 
from Hammarskjold’s residences in New York and Sweden, while the other more political in 
nature and obtained from the Secretary-General’s New York office filing cabinets upon his 
death. As expected, much of the political material relates to various peace and security issues 
like the Suez Crisis, the formation of the UN Emergency Force in the Sinai, the Lebanese and 
Jordanian crises of 1958 and the Congo Crisis. Yet also among these resources, one can 
discover Hammarskjold’s increasing interest in expanding the UN’s role in economic and 
social development in newly independent and often underdeveloped countries. Next, the 
Andrew W. Cordier Papers held at the Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscripts 
Library in New York are the second main source of Hammarskjold-related material. This 
collection yielded a few useful sources but unfortunately, much of the material remains 
closed.28 Finally, the last few boxes of Hammarskjold’s Papers are contained at the UN 
Archives (UNARMS) in New York. The collection consists of a very small portion of records 
left over after transferring the bulk of his material to Sweden or Columbia. 
Nevertheless, the latter two archives contain a wealth of information in other areas 
relating to the topic of this thesis. Specifically, this thesis makes use of Andrew Cordier’s 
own papers—apart from Hammarskjold’s. Cordier served as Hammarskjold’s executive 
assistant and trusted adviser. His position within the Secretariat made him privy to most of 
the key political decisions and the originator of a great deal of policy himself. For these 
                                                          
27 Please refer to the author’s post on the Dag Hammarskjold Papers here:  
http://unhistoryproject.org/research/research_experiences-Rietkerk.html.    
28 Despite requesting full de-classification of the Cordier Papers in November of 2013, and following up 
repeatedly, the author’s petition still awaits approval. The delay may have to do with the fact that the 
corresponding UN departments of origin make the decisions on de-classification, not the Columbia University 
Libraries. 
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reasons, Cordier is often described as the most important behind-the-scenes figure during 
Hammarskjold's tenure in office. The remaining papers that are accessible offer a crucial and 
altogether unique window into the UN and Hammarskjold during the 1950s and early 60s. 
Moreover, this thesis makes wide use of the Arthur David Kemp Owen Papers held at the 
Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscripts Library. David Owen, the longtime head of 
the EPTA, was important due to the central role he played in shaping UN development aid 
from its outset. Additionally, Owen corresponded with many of the top UN aid agents and 
administrators in the field, while also communicating regularly with the UN’s stable of 
development economists—including Hans Singer.  
Despite the fact that the official UN archive, UNARMS, has a minimal amount of 
material on Hammarskjold and is characterized by similar restrictions on other individuals or 
topics related to this thesis, it contains numerous untapped records on the UN Civilian 
Mission to the Congo. These mostly come in the form of cables to and from New York and 
Leopoldville, the Congo’s capital, as well as regular ‘Progress Reports’ updating those at the 
Secretariat as to the implementation of civilian aid on the ground. These files were critical in 
piecing together a full picture of the UN Civilian Mission as a component of the overall UN 
operation to the Congo. Supplementing these files was the UN Careers Records Project 
collection at the Oxford Bodleian Library. In particular, the papers of George Ivan Smith 
offered a personal account of some of the UN’s early development efforts with African 
leaders. Additionally, a large collection of oral history transcripts collected by the UN itself 
or through the UN Intellectual History Project offer many outspoken reflections from UN 
personnel that serve to provide even more of a human element to an institutional history.  
Next, this thesis makes use of the national archives of the UK and US. The goal in 
using these archives was to gain access to files relating to each country’s UN Mission to New 
York. Both Britain and the US had large UN Missions and their respective Ambassadors to 
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the UN had many significant and candid conversations with top UN officials including 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold. For this reason, it was also helpful to consult the papers of 
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., the US Ambassador to the UN from 1953-1960. Lodge’s papers 
reveal a top US official who served as the strongest advocate for channeling aid through the 
UN within the Eisenhower Administration. To supplement these sources this thesis make use 
of files contained at the Eisenhower and Kennedy Presidential Libraries and the published 
volumes of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) series. These US sources were 
also helpful in examining a number of alternative schemes to UN development offered or 
supported by the US—like PL 480 food aid or IDA finance aid to name two. Nevertheless, it 
is worth mentioning here that this thesis does not offer comprehensive coverage of every 
alternative to UN development aid devised by state or non-state actors during the period 
under review. For example, it mostly avoids analysis on any specific non-American 
development schemes devised in the postwar decades by various European metropoles 
(except for Belgian aid to the Congo, which is addressed) or the British Commonwealth.29 
Furthermore, it mentions only briefly the bilateral Soviet economic offensive of the 1950s 
and Soviet aid to the Congo. Certainly, these aid options were present and offered viable 
alternatives to UN or US development aid schemes, but ultimately go beyond the scope of 
this thesis.  
Finally, this thesis makes wide use of two other main published primary sources. The 
first are the Dag Hammarskjold volumes of the Public Papers of the Secretaries-General 
series. Spanning Hammarskjold’s entire UN tenure over four volumes, this series includes an 
impressive array of sources including speeches, press conference transcripts and official 
                                                          
29 In 1950, the British Commonwealth established the Colombo Plan a cooperative venture for the economic and 
social advancement of the peoples of South and Southeast Asia. The group originally included seven 
Commonwealth nations—Australia, Britain, Canada, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), India, New Zealand and 
Pakistan. See, Daniel Oakman, Facing Asia: A History of the Colombo Plan (Canberra, Australia: Pandanus, 
2011). Additionally, the European Economic Community established in 1959 the European Investment Bank 
and the Development Fund for the Overseas Countries and Territories for the purpose of allocating and 
administering development aid.  
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papers composed by Hammarskjold. The other main published primary sources utilized by 
this thesis are the Official Records of the United Nations volumes. These abundant sources 
are essential to accessing verbatim Assembly and Council debates, in addition to retrieving 
UN reports and directives. Importantly, one can only access these records in physical form at 
UN depository libraries, since the majority of UN records during the period under review are 
not yet available online through the Official Document System of the UN (ODS). Often 
overlooked by UN and international historians alike, these records offer an insight into the 
conference diplomacy that took place in various UN forums. This is especially significant 
during the period of mass decolonization since a country’s UN Mission was often the only 
major diplomatic mission a newly independent underdeveloped country sent out to transmit 
its message to a global audience. UN reports, on the other hand, were where members of the 
UN Secretariat were able to exert their executive function by interpreting and augmenting 
often vague UN Resolutions. Altogether, the use of this combination of critical sources, while 
not without gaps, does offer a more-than-adequate picture of the UN’s role with regard to 
development and development aid from 1949 to 1961.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
The Spadework of Development: Technical Assistance and Pre-Investment Aid at the 
UN, 1949-1959 
 
On 20 January 1949, US President Harry S. Truman famously included as the fourth 
point in his inaugural address the call for ‘a bold new program for making the benefits of our 
[American] scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas.’ Truman then went on to indicate America’s ‘pre-eminent’ 
position especially in its ability to offer its seeming inexhaustible resources in a form of aid 
known as technical assistance.30 In short, technical assistance sought to address an issue 
believed to be a major restraint to development, the general lack of know-how in 
underdeveloped countries. Expert personnel and technical organizations could fill these 
knowledge and skill gaps by advising and training underdeveloped countries on nearly any 
aspect of economic or social development.  
Point Four, as the US program would come to be known, has garnered perhaps as 
legendary a reputation as the Marshall Plan, especially among development historians who 
credit it for ushering in the dawn of the postwar international development project.31 To be 
sure, Truman’s Point Four program did kick-start the development mandate in the US and 
beyond but should be viewed as part of a process already underway. As stated in the 
Introduction, historians have studied postwar development, in a broad sense, as the outgrowth 
of multiple forerunners. More specifically, technical assistance too was not a completely new 
idea unveiled by the Truman Administration in 1949. For example, the International Labor 
Organization (ILO), established in 1919 in conjunction with the League of Nations, sent out 
                                                          
30 Harry S. Truman, Inaugural Address, 20 January 1949, The American Presidency Project (hereafter, APP), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13282.  
31 See Helleiner, ‘The Development Mandate of International Institutions: Where Did it Come From?,’ 189. 
Helleiner cites, Arturo Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World 
(Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1994), 44, Gilbert Rist, The History of Development: From 
Western Origins to Global Faith, 3rd Ed. (London and New York: Zed Books, 2008), 70-79. Helleiner himself 
has challenged this notion by emphasizing the crucial role played by the Bretton Woods conference of 1944 and 
early US-Latin American relations of the early 1940s as two crucial nurturers for the international development 
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experts at the request of member states during the interwar period. Other Specialized 
Agencies, as they came to be known, like the FAO, the World Health Organization (WHO) 
and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), each 
allocated some of their resources to sending out technical advisers in their respective fields of 
expertise soon after their founding during the mid-1940s.32 
Moreover, member states of the United Nations took up the issue of technical 
assistance as a means for development already in 1946—a year removed from the founding 
of the Organization. Specifically the Chinese and Lebanese delegates, two states that had 
made use of technical assistance through the League of Nations, proposed that the UN ought 
to administer its own technical assistance program. Invoking the language of the UN Charter, 
the Lebanese delegate, Charles Malik, referenced the UN’s expressed purpose ‘to employ 
international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all 
peoples.’ Malik concluded with a warning, already in 1946, of the need for a multilateral 
option that underdeveloped countries could utilize citing the drawbacks of strictly relying on 
bilateral aid from either the US or the Soviet Union.33 After studying the matter further, the 
General Assembly adopted resolution 200 (III) on 4 December 1948. Sponsored by Burma, 
Chile, Peru and Egypt, the resolution addressed technical aid as a way for member states to 
live up to the principles of the UN Charter. The resolution stated that a modest sum 
($288,000 for the first year) be set aside each year for technical assistance as a means to 
economic development. This program, known as the Regular Program for Technical 
Assistance, came six weeks prior to Truman’s Point Four speech, which also included 
language that foresaw the UN and its Specialized Agencies as at least one of the conduits to 
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make available the storehouse of Western technical expertise to underdeveloped countries.34 
However, the expansion of the UN’s foray into development aid arena was by no means 
inevitable, especially in light of the growing Cold War tensions and the temptation by the US 
and Soviet Union to emphasis unilateral action or bloc aid. Certainly, the Marshall Plan and 
the Soviet equivalent, COMECON, are two indications of the latter trend. 
This chapter examines how the United Nations fought to establish and lay claim to its 
development mandate during the first postwar decade. It this way this chapter depicts 
development as a collective goal but also a competition, whereby the UN sought to offer what 
it believed was a unique and more acceptable form of international aid to underdeveloped 
countries. The motivation behind this effort initially came from a desire to respond to the 
principles spelled out in the UN Charter. It had pledged the Organization’s services for ‘the 
economic and social advancement of all peoples’ and more specifically as a means to 
promote ‘higher standards of living, full employment and conditions of economic progress 
and development’ and find solutions to ‘international economic, social, health, and related 
problems’.35 However, further igniting the UN was a desire to keep pace with the advent of 
development aid options outside the Organization. More specifically, the goal of this chapter 
is to examine the two branches of grant-based aid offered through the UN during 1950s—
technical assistance and pre-investment aid. It was through these activities that the UN added 
a crucial dimension to the development discourse of the period and helped to give postwar 
development its global quality through its earliest attempts at the internationalizing 
development aid.  
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Moreover, the role of significant personalities crucial to the formation, justification 
and evolution of the UN’s development mandate will come into focus. These include 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold, along with David Owen, Executive-Director of the UN’s 
technical assistance program, and Paul Hoffman, the Managing Director of the UN’s pre-
investment scheme. Juxtaposing UN aid to its bilateral alternatives, these individuals and 
others framed development aid offered by or channeled through the UN as a distinct, and 
altogether better, form of aid compared to strictly bilateral aid options. Moreover, this chapter 
addresses the challenges the UN faced in trying to live up to what it claimed was its 
singularly favored position in offering or administering development aid. The chapter, 
therefore, examines the formative debates over the ability of UN aid to de-emphasize specific 
national interests, balance conceptions of development from Western donor states and 
recipient states from the Global South, and finally, establish more reciprocity between aid 
recipient and donor countries. Lastly, looking into the origins of the development directive at 
the UN during the 1950s will provide much of the context needed for the further examination 
of UN aid discussed in later chapters.  
UN and Development: The Establishment of the EPTA 
In his study of UN development aid, David Webster argues that during the 1950s the 
UN ‘found a global mission’ in a form of aid known as technical assistance. Webster uses the 
UN-run Technical Assistance Administration (TAA) to highlight how the UN Secretariat 
generally, and the TAA specifically, served as independent diplomatic actors in administering 
‘highly multilateral’ technical assistance to Indonesia and its State Planning Bureau.36 This 
section will draw on some of Webster’s broad arguments but extend the narrative to include 
additional actors while contextualizing UN technical assistance as one branch of UN aid that 
later spurred the creation of others.   
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As stated, modernizers justified the need for technical assistance on the premise that 
one major bottleneck to development was a general lack of know-how in underdeveloped 
countries. Expert personnel and technical organizations could fill these knowledge, skill and 
structural gaps by advising and training underdeveloped countries thus providing the 
foundation for future social development and economic growth. In this way, modernizers 
envisioned technical assistance as a form of aid that included not the transfer of wealth 
directly but the transfer of the capacity to generate wealth. One UN publication described the 
range of this type of intellectual capital offered by the Organization during the 1950s to 
include everything from, ‘the basic problem of how to produce better pencils to the more 
sophisticated art of using radioisotopes in industry and medicine; from child care and 
maternity training, to surveys of industrial potential.’37 Crucial to the establishment of the 
first branch of grant aid administered by the UN were two British-run wartime alliance 
programs—the Middle East Supply Centre (MESC) and the United Nations Relief and 
Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA). Both served as models of international instruments 
that specifically provided multilateral technical assistance aid.38 
In the case of the MESC, it utilized Western advisers to plan and expand harbor and 
inland transportation networks in the Middle East during the Second World War not only to 
prosecute the war more effectively but also to use logistical know-how to improve the lives 
of those peoples damaged by war. The MESC also served as a breeding ground for future key 
leaders at the UN.39 Similarly the UNRRA, established in 1943, provided food and equipment 
to areas liberated by the Allies during the war through the use of the same logistical acumen 
employed by the MESC. After its de-commissioning in 1947-48—when it was essentially 
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replaced by the Marshall Plan—many of the UNRRA personnel, as with the MESC, took up 
posts at the UN or within its Specialized Agencies. Thus as MESC alumnus and UN official 
Robert Jackson has noted, ‘the intellectual seeds of technical assistance were sown 
throughout the United Nations system very early in its existence.’40 
Others, namely David Owen, the then Assistant Secretary-General in charge of 
Economic Affairs at the UN and the future Executive Director of the UN’s first technical 
assistance program, acknowledged another stimulus for the establishment of a UN technical 
assistance program came from the fact that some vital aspects of economic and social 
development were not covered by any Specialized Agency. Owen was referring to a number 
of mostly autonomous Specialized Agencies within the UN system, like the aforementioned 
ILO, WHO and UNESCO that had each made technical assistance part of their mission in 
their respective fields of competence. This had resulted in member states appealing to 
Owen’s own office at the UN headquarters for technical assistance in the fields of public 
administration and social welfare services, economic planning and the upgrading of transport 
and communication networks.41 
A month after Truman’s Point Four speech, the vision for an expanded UN program 
for technical assistance began to crystallize. The US delegate Willard L. Thorp, opened the 
discussion at the first UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) meeting of 1949 by 
submitting a draft resolution to enlarge the technical assistance activities of the UN and its 
Specialized Agencies. While having no objections to Thorp’s proposal, the Indian delegate, 
B.R. Sen (the future Director-General of the FAO whose role is discussed in Chapter Three), 
believed the proposal was a step backwards from the ‘higher plane’ on which he believed 
President Truman placed the problem of economic development. Foreshadowing a debate 
that would envelope the UN for the next decade, Sen acknowledged the need for more 
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technical assistance yet wished Thorp’s proposal would have addressed the bigger desire 
among underdeveloped countries for investment capital (the focus of Chapter Two). Thus, 
Sen thought Thorp had intentionally, ‘rob[bed] President Truman’s daring progamme of all 
its substance.’42  
The technical assistance proposal, however circumscribed, did pass easily setting up 
the UN Expanded Program of Technical Assistance later in 1949. For the next decade, the 
EPTA served as the backbone of UN technical cooperation as one of two main branches of 
grant aid offered by the UN—along with the UN Special Fund discussed below. From its 
inception, the EPTA was the most completely multilateral source of economic aid available 
to underdeveloped countries through the 1950s. The aforementioned David Owen headed the 
EPTA and remained its only director until it merged with the Special Fund in 1965 to form 
the UN Development Program (UNDP).43 
Soon after its launching the EPTA established field offices, which according to Jolly, 
et. al., crucially ‘served as experimental stations where the new principles of technical 
assistance were tested in order to identify good practices.’44 Starting in 1951, UN Resident 
Representatives headed these field offices. Each Resident Representative functioned as a type 
of developmental diplomat, acting as the point of contact between the experts and the 
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recipient government and as an in-country deputy to Owen. In fulfilling this role, Henry L. 
Spence Jr., a Resident Representative to Afghanistan, Libya and Pakistan during the 1950s 
and 60s, described his duties as trying to be, ‘at one and the same time—an executive, an 
administrator, a diplomat, an economist, and a public relations officer.’45 In special cases, 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold appointed his own handpicked Resident Representative, a 
telling sign of the value of such a position. For example, Hammarskjold chose fellow Swede 
Sture Linner to serve as the Resident Representative to the Congo in mid-July 1960 at the 
outset of the Congo Crisis. Chapters Four and Five will highlight Linner’s role extensively 
but it is worth mentioning here that as a UN official he played an invaluable role in steering 
the Congo’s economic and social development endeavors over the first eighteen months of 
the crisis.  
Most Resident Representatives did not head a ‘mission’ in the traditional diplomatic 
sense. However, a few in addition to Linner, managed to develop extraordinary governmental 
contacts. Such was the case for Margaret Joan Anstee, the Resident Representative for 
Bolivia from early 1961—the first women promoted to such a posting within the UN system. 
As a Resident Representative of Latin America’s largest UN program, Anstee enjoyed a close 
working relationship with Bolivia’s President, Victor Paz Estenssoro. Anstee described 
Estenssoro as a, ‘wily political bird’ who ‘constantly played the United Nations against the 
United States. Being the only other major actors we [the UN] acquired a political significance 
far beyond our monetary importance.’ Operationally, Anstee’s major responsibility was to 
support the Bolivian government in designing a ‘development plan’ that would attract 
external investors, make use of its natural resources and ultimately improve the lives of the 
population. According to Anstee, development planning was still a novel concept among 
underdeveloped countries and the West even in the early 1960s. Thus, Bolivia served as a 
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‘guinea-pig’ as it attempted to implement on an operational level the development theories of 
the day. In this way, she acknowledges the UN’s early significance in the field of 
development aid.46 
The main task of most UN Resident Representatives was to help recipient countries 
decide on and submit their annual requests for technical assistance. In this capacity, the 
Resident Representative was to serve as an impartial referee, balancing the partisan interests 
of Specialized Agency representatives and government departments—a quality the EPTA 
would use to highlight its deserving place in the global development process. As more 
countries gained independence, requests for Resident Representatives increased. In 1952, 
there were Resident Representatives in fifteen countries, by 1958 forty-five countries had UN 
Resident Representatives, and by 1966, their numbers totaled seventy-two.47 Resident 
Representatives received most of their technical assistance experts or fellowship recipients 
through a specific Specialized Agency depending on the need, as the EPTA itself was far 
from having its own stable of experts on retainer. In other cases, individuals petitioned the 
EPTA directly, inquiring if their particular skill might be of use. Most EPTA experts early on 
were Westerners and the majority from colonial powers. From 1950 to 1964, 4,811 EPTA 
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experts came from the United Kingdom, 3,966 from the US, 3,215 from France and 1,675 
from the Netherlands.48  
Promoting UN Exceptionalism in Technical Assistance in a Changing UN 
Despite the colonial and Western pedigree of these technical experts, the EPTA held 
steadfast to the claim that their aid was new and exceptional as it sought to carve out a place 
in an increasingly competitive development aid market. EPTA officials made a point to 
enumerate why the program was best suited to offer technical assistance and underscored the 
unique nature of UN technical aid, which also served as a motivating factor behind the call to 
expand the EPTA further. Hugh Keenleyside, a Canadian who headed the TAA from 1950-58 
was one such energetic advocate. Assistance from a central UN mechanism, according to 
Keenleyside, was distinct because it was divorced from the political and military undertones 
associated with bilateral aid—most certainly from either Cold War superpower. Instead, 
Keenleyside argued, technical assistance through the UN provided an ideal instrument to 
initiate global development due to its singularly favored position to respond to the needs of 
underdeveloped countries with the necessary sensitivity. This was especially true of aid 
targeted towards a recipient country’s financial policy and public administration where, 
according to Keenleyside, the UN could be inclusive of the recipient country’s objectives—a 
quality of the UN-brand of aid tested to its limits during the Congo Crisis as Chapters Four 
and Five will show. Moreover, the UN only provided aid upon request and came from an 
organization of which the recipient country was a full and equal member alongside donor 
states. Finally, the UN alone could boast that it drew upon a worldwide network of scientific 
and technical knowledge.49 To bolster the claim that it offered multilateral aid inoculated 
from colonial stigmatism or as a potential hostage to Cold War superpowers, the EPTA 
sought experts from non-colonial and non-American extraction. For example, from 1950-64, 
                                                          
48 Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme, 78. 
49 Hugh L. Keenleyside, International Aid: A Summary (New York: James H. Heineman, Inc., 1966), 140-41. 
39 
 
India contributed 1,336 experts, Canada 1,157, Denmark 856, Switzerland 821, Australia 803 
and Sweden 791.50  
From the start of his tenure as Secretary-General, Hammarskjold also acknowledged 
the value of technical assistance work. He was the most high-profile salesmen of UN 
technical assistance. In most cases, however, Hammarskjold attempting to place UN technical 
assistance on a higher plane, much like Truman had in his Point Four speech. He, therefore, 
publicized technical assistance as a vital international element for cooperation in human 
progress and for the preservation of peace.51 Speaking at a National Press Club luncheon in 
April of 1954, he stated:  
When I speak of the United Nations as an instrument of realistic construction 
for a permanently peaceful world, I am thinking of all that undramatic work of 
international cooperation for economic and social progress and for the 
advancement of dependent peoples which so seldom makes news for you 
gentlemen of the press. And I suppose that it is not news in the sense that it is 
preventing war from happening to us today. But it would be news for your 
children, because these activities are directed at anticipating tensions and 
preventing conflicts tomorrow and the day after tomorrow, and thereafter at 
preventing future wars.52  
 
In fact, he lamented more than once how the world media under-represented the work of the 
EPTA. Hammarskjold postulated this might be due to its work in ‘unattractive situations’—
namely among what he called the underfed, underemployed and the illiterate two-thirds of 
humanity.53  
Nevertheless, Hammarskjold continued to tout, along with Owen and Keenleyside, 
UN exceptionalism when it came to administering international aid. He was careful to draw 
attention to the fact that UN technical assistance was not simply ‘one-way traffic’, but instead 
noted that countries that received one way often gave in another. He highlighted EPTA’s 
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pilot ventures including Haitian coffee specialists working in Ethiopia, Bolivian doctors 
serving the Philippines, Rhodesian statisticians assisting in Libya, in addition to, Icelandic 
marine engineers working in Ceylon and Finnish aviation experts assisting El Salvadorians 
on airport improvements.54 For Hammarskjold, the role of the UN in this enterprise was as an 
outstretched arm serving to channel the flow of know-how where needed, a task the 
Secretary-General called an ‘A-1 priority’ in what he branded as an ‘age of anti-
colonialism.’55  
Thus, early on Hammarskjold associated development with the process of and fallout 
from decolonization. Later he would qualify this statement by describing the UN as a ‘bridge’ 
where colonial powers and newly independent countries alike could safely transition through 
the decolonization process. In Hammarskjold’s estimation, the UN Charter provided the 
mandate in its call for, ‘the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small.’ 
This included the desire among newly independent countries for de facto independence 
alongside de jure. The failure to meet this request had led to suspicion that any economic aid 
offered nearly always came with political strings. What Hammarskjold believed these 
countries preferred was not charity or manipulation but mainly two forms of postwar aid. One 
demand was for a ‘hardheaded system of technical assistance, carried out mainly through the 
United Nations family of agencies.’ The other was capital investment in economic 
development discussed in the following chapter.56  
In fact, as the mid-1950s approached, global and institutional changes as a result of 
decolonization seemed to inform Hammarskjold’s position further. In April 1955, the 
governments of Indonesia, India, China, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon co-sponsored a 
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conference in Bandung, Indonesia attended by representatives from twenty-nine Asian and 
African countries in total. The Bandung Conference had as its primary focus on the problems 
of colonialism, economic development and the maintenance of peace in the midst of the Cold 
War as it sought to build solidarity among countries, many of which had only recently 
emerged from colonial rule. Asked at a press conference to evaluate the Bandung Conference 
in relation to the UN, Hammarskjold remarked that he believed the delegates based their final 
communique largely on principles expressed by the UN Charter. Therefore, Bandung would 
most likely come to buttress the efforts of the UN.57 With more time to reflect, 
Hammarskjold would state that Bandung served to enhance the consciousness of Bandung 
countries towards the UN and a desire among them to work with the UN.58 Craig Murphy 
draws on this notion when explaining how the UN system provided a variety of supports to 
anti-colonial movements during this era. Specifically, Murphy notes the ability of the UN to 
act as a forum for nationalists to demand independence while serving as a rallying point for 
small nations. As for UN Secretariat, it hardly shied away from producing reports that 
supported the view that ‘colonialism was a holdover of a less progressive past.’ Murphy 
concludes that by the 1950s a ‘broad, international, anti-colonial coalition had formed and 
simultaneously became a force promoting “development”’ 59  
Strengthening this coalition were a number of countries that joined the UN the same 
year as the Bandung Conference. Their addition ended a moratorium on new UN member 
states starting in 1950 and imposed by Soviet obstructionism and the effects of McCarthyism. 
Sixteen new countries joined the UN in 1955 alone, among them a number of 
underdeveloped states from the Third World including Cambodia, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka), 
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Jordan, Laos, Libya, and Nepal.60 Then in the following year Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia, along 
with Japan, joined. These states widened the circle of underdeveloped states in the 
Organization while acting as a significant factor in what Mark Mazower has called ‘the rise 
of the General Assembly.’61 
Promoting development also meant the UN showing how its technical assistance had 
a real measureable appeal in underdeveloped countries. UN publications touted the 
accomplishments of the EPTA from the start. In its first five years, EPTA experts had located 
fifty oil well sites in Iran. With the help of WHO, the UN established Asia’s first penicillin 
factory. Guided by FAO experts, farmers in Thailand were able to grow pineapples for export 
as a year-around crop. In Libya, UN supported surveys helped to uncover that country’s great 
oil wealth.62 The EPTA’s ostensive ability to find solutions to problems and spark growth in 
underdeveloped countries, at least during the 1950s, might have trumped perceptions and 
criticism that UN aid derived from a colonial pedigree.  
The EPTA’s adoption of a ‘country programing’ approach in 1955 also helped to re-
inforce the idea that UN development aid was distinctly different from a civilizing mission. 
Country programming did away with the previous EPTA practice of allocating a fixed 
amount of funds to each participating Specialized Agency annually. Instead, recipient 
governments, still in consultation with a Resident Representatives, became the sole 
determinant of the type of EPTA aid they needed based on their own plans for development. 
Jolly, et. al. in particular states that country programming gave force to the idea of country 
ownership and control—a development principle only rediscovered in the 1990s. It also 
heralded a new recognition of the integrated nature of development aid as it evolved through 
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the 1950s.63 Fredrick Cooper and Randall Packard in International Development and the 
Social Sciences also pick up on this point when stating that,  
Unlike earlier claims of Europe to inherent superiority or a “civilizing 
mission,” the notion of development appealed as much to leaders of 
“underdeveloped” societies as to the people of developed countries…This 
community shared a conviction that the alleviation of poverty would not occur 
simply by self-regulating processes of economic growth or social change. It 
required a concerted intervention by the national governments both of poor 
and wealthy countries in cooperation with an emerging body of international 
aid and development organizations.64 
 
For Owen, this ‘partnership approach to development’ was what made the UN ‘a “most 
acceptable”—frequently the most acceptable—form of outside assistance.’65  
The first systemic review of the activities and value of the EPTA took place in 1956 
in a report entitled, The EPTA: A Look Forward. By this time, the EPTA had administered 
operations in 133 countries and territories, employed the services of some 5,000 experts and 
awarded over 10,000 fellowships since 1950. Overall contributions from its inception totaled 
$142 million from 77 member states. Not surprisingly, A Look Forward promoted the 
cardinal principles of the EPTA that set it apart from other forms of aid and its concrete 
results. The report claimed the EPTA was especially proud of its perception among recipient 
countries that its aid served as a ‘valuable reinforcement – particularly in certain critical 
sectors – of their own efforts to raise the economic and social standards of their people.’ 
Although, the report acknowledged that not enough time had elapsed to judge fully the 
impact of many technical assistance projects—a verdict made all the more difficult, if not 
impossible, due to the impact of other variables and the hurdle of finding an appropriate 
yardstick.  
Speaking more to its title, the report then enumerated goals for the years ahead. The 
first was to alleviate the limitations on its financial resources, far too modest compared with 
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similar bilateral programs. Another was to take on larger development tasks and a larger 
share of the global development effort to meet an increasing demand as more underdeveloped 
countries gained independence. It specifically noted a growing emphasis in technical 
assistance relating to two fields crucial to states emerging from colonialism—namely public 
administration and training activities. This had been true of Libya, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 
and the Sudan and was sure to be the case for the soon-to-be-independent states of Morocco, 
Tunisia, Malaya and Ghana.66 Although, unbeknownst to the UN it was the Congo that 
demanded the most assistance in these areas as will be discussed later.  
Altogether, A Look Forward would serve as a guidepost for the rest of the decade for 
one branch of grant aid administered through the UN while suggesting it should work to 
enlarge its share of responsibility for global development. It also served to put a positive spin 
on UN aid much like Hammarskjold, Keenleyside and Owen had done. Nevertheless, for all 
the touting of its exceptionalism, accomplishments and aspirations, UN technical assistance 
had some serious constraints and shortcomings. 
Limitations & Challenges to UN Technical Assistance  
As stated, one major limitation for the EPTA from its inception was a general scarcity 
of funding. Keenleyside, Hammarskjold and Owen readily admitted this shortcoming. In fact, 
all mitigated their claims to the value of UN aid by acknowledging that, despite its supposed 
superiority, the program was continually constrained by a meager budget that had spread its 
resources thin.67 It is important to recall that the EPTA obtained its entire operational budget 
from voluntary contributions from member states. This took place at a funding conference 
held annually—usually each October. During its inaugural funding drive in 1950, 
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contributions totaled $20 million from fifty-four countries, with the US as the largest donor. 
By 1955, seventy-one countries pledged funds yet the total only rose to $28 million. Overall, 
voluntary contributions to the EPTA averaged just over $26 million per year from 1950-59.68 
These figures were extremely modest compared to America’s own bilateral technical 
assistance aid that averaged nearly $730 million per year from 1953-56.69 This was after the 
$13 billon in Marshall Plan aid allocated from 1948-1952. Those at the UN who still clung to 
the general belief that technical assistance yielded the greatest return on investment, however, 
were no doubt disheartened when a rising demand for technical assistance through the UN 
did not equate to a comparable increase in pledges.70  
Additionally, the EPTA faced challenges to its claim of UN exceptionalism. David 
Belleoch, a longtime Resident Representative for the UN in Columbia and technical 
assistance expert to South and Central America, the Caribbean and across Asia offered an 
especially stinging criticism. In 1958, Belleoch published a pamphlet through the Fabian 
Society entitled, Aid for Development. Belleoch intended the pamphlet to serve as a synopsis 
of all avenues of development aid but when it came to describing UN aid, it included an 
especially harsh critique of the work of the EPTA. First, Belleoch challenged the concept of 
collective responsibility that UN aid promotors so often touted. Belleoch questioned the 
theory that recipient governments—if they even represented the needs of the people—were 
competent enough to plan their own development program and make requests for assistance 
from various Specialized Agencies. It was his experience that underdeveloped countries were 
only rarely capable of the immense technical task involved in planning a development 
program.71 Instead, in Belleoch’s estimation, requests amounted to nothing but pet-projects 
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pursued in the self-serving interest of a particular minister, official or government 
department. Sometimes this resulted in, according to Belleoch, the allocation of free technical 
assistance by a foreigner when a national of the recipient government could have done it just 
as well or better. Secondly, when the UN and its Specialized Agencies did get involved in 
prompting governments to request technical assistance, a ‘keen competition’ ensued, in what 
amounted to UN agencies all chasing after the development dollar. To retain this funding 
year after year, Belleoch argued many EPTA projects tended to perpetuate themselves even if 
results were disappointing.  
Finally, Belleoch questioned the impartiality of UN aid. He noted that there were 
serious drawbacks to having experts who invariably pushed only the institutions and methods 
of their own countries. In recruiting these experts, it was often the case that the aid worker 
had no knowledge of the recipient country and no prior experience in international work. 
Therefore, for Belleoch, the notion of impartial international assistance was a farce. He 
stated: ‘the briefest of conversations with anybody who had had a direct experience of United 
Nations’ technical assistance in the field will reveal how much waste and frustration these 
haphazard arrangements involve.’ In Belleoch’s own experience working for the ILO, he 
once came across a report drawn up by a fellow technical adviser. The recipient government, 
who Belleoch kept anonymous, had pigeonholed the report which concluded that the problem 
with country X’s factory policy was that it did not match that of the expert’s home country. 
Belleoch wondered how many other recipient countries shelved other useless reports for this 
very reason. Any other grant-based aid agency was, in Belleoch’s opinion, a far better option 
than the UN. Elsewhere in the pamphlet, he especially promoted the ‘business-like’ model 
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offered by the World Bank and reserved a fair amount of praise for a number of bilateral 
development aid programs like those of the US and British Commonwealth.72  
Testimony from one EPTA aid worker seems to support some of Belleoch’s 
criticisms. Inspired by a Reader’s Digest article describing the work of the EPTA, James 
Scott Davidson—of South African and British nationality—wrote to the UN and offered his 
services in management accounting. Davidson then served in two posts, as a technical 
assistance expert in management accounting with the TAA in Egypt from 1960-64 and as a 
financial management expert with the ILO in South Korea and Turkey from 1964-68. 
Davidson’s first appointment left him undertrained and underwhelmed. After a less-than-
adequate four-day training in Geneva, the TAA sent Davidson to Egypt to advise twelve 
Egyptian accountants working for the Egyptian General Industrial Organization. He admitted 
that their project fell well short of expectations. Specifically, Davidson faulted what he 
considered the failure of the Egyptian government to contribute to the inputs expected of 
them and the ‘indifference’ and ‘indolence’ of the Egyptian accountants. Both spoke to a 
wider problem, according to Davidson, of ‘the inability and/or disinclination of national staff 
to accept the transfer of competence from international staff and use it to promote the 
economic development of their country.’ Nevertheless, Davidson’s second appointment with 
the ILO in South Korea and Turkey resulted in a glowing reflection on his experiences.73 
Moreover, subsequent chapters will also highlight the mixed experiences of UN aid workers 
ranging from technical advisers to Resident Representatives—a point mentioned, but not 
emphasized, in A Look Forward.74  
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Owen, Belleoch’s boss while at the EPTA, wrote to his former employee soon after 
the release of Aid for Development. Interestingly, Owen accepted many of the criticisms, 
while assuring Belleoch those at the EPTA already recognized these shortcomings. 
Altogether, however, Owen felt Belleoch’s critique was unbalanced. Owen argued that at 
worst, ‘the record is uneven, steady improvement in most places with poor showing 
elsewhere.’ Owen believed Belleoch’s critiques amounted to sweeping generalizations of the 
EPTA, based on his own dismal experience in Colombia alone, while ignoring relative 
successes in places like Bolivia. Owen also questioned why Belleoch did not extend the same 
criticism to the development aid offered by the World Bank or the US.75 Other top UN aid 
officials also weighed in, having received a copy of Belleoch’s pamphlet from Owen. Eric E. 
Ward, the then current Resident Representative to Israel and formerly to the Philippines, also 
admitted that much of what Belleoch stated was correct in certain cases. Overall, however, 
his scrutiny was one-sided and unduly critical. Ward highlighted a number of UN-led 
programs that had led to useful and productive work by quality recruits, which was why the 
recipient governments continued to use the UN. Margaret Joan Anstee, serving in Uruguay at 
the time, echoed Ward’s analysis.76  
The exchange between these individuals heavily invested in the international 
development aid process of the 1950s is telling. Certainly, it draws attention to the fact that 
UN development aid was a growing priority for the UN during this period but also that it was 
not without its shortcomings. Indeed, later chapters will highlight more key deficiencies 
associated with UN development aid and the challenges the Organization faced in attempting 
to gain and maintain relevancy in the development arena. Yet, the nature of UN technical 
assistance outlined above also provides a vignette for what Fredrick Cooper recognizes as 
two development dialogues that rarely speak to one another—development as oppressive or 
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disingenuous, and conversely, development as liberating. For the former, Cooper notes that 
critics often argue how development was part of an agenda that simply reinforced existing 
power structures—presumably in donor and recipient countries alike. On the other hand, 
there are those that laud development efforts because of their tangible results—feeding the 
hungry, piping water to the thirsty, fighting diseases, etc., in many cases with the use of 
experts and aid.77 In this case, and in subsequent chapters, one sees the confluence of these 
development dialogues as it applied to UN aid and its alternatives.  In other words, some 
viewed UN aid as less than effective, impartial or genuine. Meanwhile, others responded with 
a competing view that promoted UN development aid as both exceptional and helpful—
freeing underdeveloped states from the political strings attached to bilateral aid while 
transferring valuable skills and raising standards of living.  
More directly, the exchange also brings light to the fact that the work of the EPTA, 
important but ‘undramatic’ in the words of Hammarskjold,78 and ineffective according to 
Belleoch, could in either case get lost alongside big development projects that produced 
newsworthy results. It also could easily get overlooked next to the vast amount of bilateral 
aid flowing from countries like the US and USSR. To stay relevant, and in some ways answer 
critics like Belleoch, the UN needed another means of offering development aid to 
underdeveloped countries—besides that of the EPTA. Thus, the remainder of this chapter will 
examine the second branch of UN grant-based aid through the establishment of the UN 
Special Fund. Crucial to its creation was the role of the Organization’s most powerful and 
influential member state—the United States. 
The Evolution of US Foreign Economic Policy through the 1950s  
 Hammarskjold’s appointment as UN Secretary-General in early 1953 coincided with 
two other significant shifts in global leadership. First, in January 1953, Dwight D. 
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Eisenhower replaced Harry Truman as the new President of the United States. Then in March 
1953, the death of Soviet leader Joseph Stalin created a power vacuum in the Kremlin filled 
soon afterward by Nikita Khrushchev. From the start, the shake-up in Washington and 
Moscow had a significant effect on the foreign economic policies towards the Third World of 
the two superpowers. Departing from Truman, Eisenhower held true to a campaign promise 
to pursue ‘trade not aid’ by promoting trade liberalization and private investment with the 
Third World.79 Therefore, early on in Eisenhower’s presidency, backing multilateral 
development assistance through the UN was hardly a priority. The Administration did 
provide 40% of the EPTA’s total funds but because of the EPTA small budget, this amount 
hovered around $11 million per year for most of the 1950s.80 Eisenhower’s only indication of 
the possibility of supporting any larger aid program came in an April 1953 speech in which 
he suggested that if the Soviets and Americans could devise a comprehensive disarmament 
plan, each country could then reallocate funds normally spent on weapons and defense 
towards global development. The suggestion might have only been wishful thinking on 
Eisenhower’s part but nonetheless served to whet the appetite for Third World states pushing 
for the establishment of some type of capacious aid program.81 Meanwhile, starting in 1954, 
the new leadership in Moscow unleashed what it considered a new economic offensive. 
Moscow’s strategy was to offer generous amounts of development aid, namely technical 
assistance, along with trade and finance aid, to underdeveloped countries in the Global South 
as a means to promote development along socialist lines in these areas. The new economic 
offensive included Soviet contributions, for the first time, to the UN technical assistance 
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program. Overall, Moscow’s aggressive foreign economic policy was substantial. Whereas, 
Soviet aid totaled $1.4 billion from 1945-53, it grew to $1.9 billion from 1954-58.82  
Historians have rightly described a shift in Eisenhower’s foreign economic policy 
starting in the spring of 1955 as a response, albeit delayed, to the inability of ‘trade not aid’ to 
keep pace with the Soviet economic offensive. Kaufman cites the Administration’s concern 
of the recent loss of Indochina by the French and the susceptibility of other Asian nationalist 
movements to communist aggression. Thus, during Eisenhower’s second term, ‘trade and aid’ 
replaced ‘trade not aid’.83 Scholar Michael Adamson argues this policy modification was a 
change in strategy but not in purpose since the primary aim of the Administration’s foreign 
economic policy was still to protect national security interests and only secondarily to 
modernize economies of the developing world.84 As Chapter Three will fully delineate, 
domestic factors like finding additional markets for American surplus agricultural 
commodities also played an important role in justifying the expansion of US aid abroad—
specifically food aid. Nevertheless, as was the case with food aid, the Eisenhower 
Administration’s ‘trade and aid’ policy did awaken some top policymakers to the benefits of 
multilateral development aid channeled through international institutions as a viable response 
to the ever-loudening demands from the Global South. In other words, just as Truman’s Point 
Four kick-started the development mandate in the UN in the early 1950s, Eisenhower’s shift 
to ‘trade and aid’ opened the door for a number of multilateral development aid schemes 
through international institutions by the second half of the 1950s—including the UN and the 
World Bank. 
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Initially the belief that the Soviet economic offensive was something less than 
genuine or sustainable, especially at the State Department, limited the Eisenhower 
Administration’s shift towards the allocation of more development aid. In a February 1955 
assessment, the State Department acknowledged that some significant economic penetration 
had taken place by the Soviets. It cited a sixteen-man technical mission sent from the Soviet 
Union to India to advise on the construction of a large steel mill and another mission to 
Indonesia to offer technical assistance in the building of a sugar mill. Meanwhile, the State 
Department recognized the high level of Soviet economic penetration taking place in 
Afghanistan. Yet, it doubted the capability of the Soviet bloc to initiate more large-scale 
projects or maintain its global technical assistance offensive over the long haul. Moreover, it 
advised that the Administration should not place itself in a position to bargain against the 
Soviets.85 Considerable opposition to a program of long-term economic development aid also 
came from Treasury Secretary George Humphrey. Thus, it was not until 1957 that the 
moratorium on economic, non-military aid ended with the launching of the US Development 
Loan Fund (DLF)—proposed in Eisenhower’s second inaugural address. The DLF would 
serve as the lending arm of the International Cooperation Administration, the predecessor to 
the US Agency for International Development (USAID). The DLF offered bilateral soft loans 
to underdeveloped countries seeking development assistance. The intellectual backing for the 
DLF had come from a report written by two economists working at the MIT Center for 
International Studies (CENIS), Walt Rostow and Max Millikan. They highlighted the value 
of diversifying US foreign economic commitments by creating a bilateral loan fund. Thus, 
Washington foresaw the DLF as an attractive alternative to not only Soviet aid, but also to 
hard loan lending institutions like the World Bank and the Export-Import Bank (Exim).86 
                                                          
85 Current Economic Developments, 1 February 1955, US National Archives and Records Administration II, 
College Park, Maryland (hereafter, NARA II), RG 59, Lot 70D467, Current Economic Developments, Box 6.  
86 From Rostow to Jackson, 28 August 1958, Dwight D Eisenhower Presidential Library, Abilene, Kansas 
(hereafter, DDEL), C.D. Jackson Papers, Box 91. See also, Kaufman, 49-50, 103; Rostow, Eisenhower, 
53 
 
The DLF might have officially ended ‘trade not aid’ but its appeal among potential 
recipient countries was less than enthusiastic for the simple fact that, by offering decidedly 
bilateral aid, it failed to address the demand from undeveloped countries for a multilateral 
approach. Joining this chorus was Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., Eisenhower’s UN Ambassador. 
Presidential historian H.W. Brands describes Lodge as the Eisenhower Administration’s 
answer to Joseph McCarthy, except that, ‘Lodge went after real communists.’ This took place 
primarily in various UN forums where it was Lodge’s goal to respond to and immediately 
contest every attack or challenge spouted by a representative from a communist member 
state. By doing so, Lodge hoped to ‘break up their headlines, interfere with their news stories, 
and, actually take the news away from them.’ As a leading cold warrior within the 
Administration, and someone who enjoyed Cabinet rank, Lodge was just what Eisenhower 
was looking for in contrast to the previous US Ambassador to the UN, Warren Austin, who 
he claimed had been far too slow in countering Soviet verbal volleys at the UN.87  
To be sure, Lodge’s primary role during his tenure as UN Ambassador was as a point 
scorer against the Soviets, yet this was far from his exclusive function. Lodge witnessed 
firsthand the effects of the influx of newly independent states joining the UN starting in the 
mid-1950s. He was also regularly exposed to anti-American sentiment stemming from the 
Eisenhower Administration’s fondness for bilateral aid programs and subsequent demands by 
Third World member states for a viable multilateral aid option.88 In March 1956, he wrote to 
Eisenhower acknowledging that the international community had readily welcomed the 
President’s ‘Atoms for Peace’ and ‘Open Sky’ initiatives—two hallmarks of the 
Administration’s Cold War policy. However, the President now needed to take action on an 
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issue that would impact people and countries more directly—namely aiding the 
underdeveloped through some type of multilateral assistance program. Crucially, Lodge 
justified this type of action both as a means to out-pace the Soviets and as a mechanism to 
develop underdeveloped countries.89  
By the spring of 1956, Lodge began to make a public case for the advantages of US 
participation in a multilateral aid program. First, Lodge pointed to the ability of multilateral 
aid to mitigate the so-called ‘auction’ effect where the US and the Soviets tried to out-bid 
each other. Instead, multilateral aid allowed more countries to share the cost of development. 
Moreover, recipient countries were less likely to misunderstand multilateral aid, according to 
Lodge, since it eliminated any attempt at disguised political penetration.90 It was this last 
point where Lodge’s thinking really seemed to evolve beyond viewing aid through a Cold 
War lens and aligned with much of the thinking of aid advocates at the UN. Max Finger, a 
senior adviser to Lodge at the UN, acknowledged that by the mid-1950s many within the US 
mission to the UN came to adopt a ‘please the customer’ mentality. Lodge and others did this 
initially as a way for the US to garner more favorable votes in a UN forum where the US had 
once enjoyed widespread favor bolstered by a built-in majority, but whose power was in 
danger of waning as the Organization’s make-up and agenda changed. Secondly, Lodge 
claimed his position had evolved as he came to understand better the problems of the Third 
World.91 This perspective challenges historians’ claims, namely those of Brand and Caroline 
Pruden, who argue that Lodge always viewed multilateral aid through a Cold War lens.92 
The clearest detailed proposal for a multilateral aid program marketed by the UN 
Ambassador came in November 1956. In a speech to the President’s Citizen Advisers in 
                                                          
89 Memorandum for the President from Lodge, 15 March 1956, DDEL, Ann Whitman Files, Administration 
Series, Box 24. 
90 Press Release from the US Mission to the UN, 30 April 1956, DDEL, Ann Whitman Files, Administration 
Series, Box 24.  
91 Transcript of Interview with Seymour Maxwell Finger, 30 November 1999, UN Intellectual History Project, 
9; Finger, 79.  
92 Brands, 167-74; Pruden, 208-211.  
55 
 
November 1956. Specifically, Lodge called for a ‘bold initiative in the field of economic 
development’ including a grant-based fund for capital development to aid in the development 
of dams, roads, agricultural improvements, water transport systems, etc. in underdeveloped 
countries. According the Lodge, donors could pay into the fund with their own currency and 
contributors would retain a considerable amount of control through weighted voting. Lodge 
believed the US could then challenge the Soviet Union to match its own contributions, yet 
argued his proposed economic development fund should not be viewed as a Cold War move, 
‘but as a sincere effort to help meet the needs of the under-developed countries.’ Therefore, 
Lodge proposed to set up an inter-governmental committee, under UN auspices, that would 
make the final decisions on projects—a stipulation strongly urged by underdeveloped aid 
recipient states and now endorsed by Lodge. Operationally, it would also work closely with 
the administrations of the World Bank, the International Finance Corporation and the EPTA. 
He continued by stating that America’s position towards newly independent countries over 
issues relating to self-determination and economic development ‘is of paramount importance 
to our world leadership. These countries want multilateral help very much. Such an offer on 
our part would show our interest in their problems and a willingness to forego political 
strings for the aid we extend.’ Crucially, Lodge made clear that he, in fact, was not 
advocating the establishment of SUNFED—a proposed soft loan financing institution under 
the direction of the UN discussed below. He opposed any program where the US supplied all 
the money and the rest of the world spent it—the criticism attached to SUNFED by most 
Americans. Yet, he also contested the use of strictly bilateral aid subject to accusations of 
disguised imperialism and a policy that only gave rise to Soviet bilateral aid in-kind. Instead, 
Lodge adopted a compromise position where he believed the US could get credit for its 
substantial contribution to multilateral development aid—much like it already received from 
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its contributions to the UN’s technical assistance program—and thus acclaim it would never 
expect to receive from bilateral aid.93  
Finally, Lodge stressed the need for the US to act urgently. Just weeks after the Suez 
and Hungary crises, Lodge claimed it was essential for the US to make the most of the new 
prestige it had acquired among the nations of Africa and Asia in its stance against overt 
imperialism. Specifically, the US now had the chance to respond to demands by Afro-Asian 
countries at the current UN General Assembly session by stepping out from underneath 
Eisenhower’s previous policy of making contributions towards Third World economic 
development contingent on disarmament. Instead, Lodge quoted from Secretary-General 
Hammarskjold’s 1956 Annual Report that stated, ‘“To make adequate progress in economic 
development dependent upon disarmament is to put the cart before the horse. We need a 
wider understanding and acceptance of the fact that a successful program of economic 
development is one of the most important elements in building up the conditions of stability 
and confidence which will make possible real progress toward disarmament.”’94 
  Lodge’s major opponent in the establishment of a multilateral aid program was 
Treasury Secretary George Humphrey who charged Lodge with advocating a multilateral 
program that would result in, ‘everybody getting into the act to help us distribute our 
money.’95 Some at the State Department even accused Lodge of acting too much like the 
‘natives’ at the UN as a result of serving too long at his UN post.96 Nevertheless, Lodge 
seemed to have gained at least nominal support from Eisenhower, who according to Pruden, 
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advised Lodge to see if Humphrey might relent and support more than an exclusively 
bilateral aid option.97 Humphrey never acquiesced, yet Lodge’s bold efforts seemed to gain 
momentum, aided in part by another influential internationalist who turned his attention on 
the UN in 1956.  
The Second Branch of UN Grant Aid: Pre-investment Aid and the UN Special Fund 
 Paul G. Hoffman had formerly served as the president of Studebaker automobiles 
from 1935-1948 and then President of the Ford Foundation from 1950-1953. However, he is 
best known as President Truman’s appointee as director of the Economic Cooperation 
Administration—the organization established to administer Marshall Plan aid.98 Like Lodge, 
Hoffman had a strong personal relationship with the President Eisenhower and served as his 
chief fundraiser during his 1952 campaign. Having worked himself out of a job as 
Administrator of Marshall Plan aid, Hoffman joined the US delegation to the eleventh session 
of the UN General Assembly in 1956. When the State Department first suggested Hoffman as 
a potential delegate to Lodge, he appeared on the roster as ‘Paul Hoffman, Ind.’ Lodge 
wondered if this meant someone from Indiana, an Independent or, ‘my Paul Hoffman who 
administered the Marshall Plan? If so, I would vote an enthusiastic “yes” in favor of having 
him here. Of course, he is controversial. But he would also be a big producer if we could get 
him.’99 Apparently, ‘Ind.’ meant Industrialist, an adequate classification given Hoffman’s 
background, yet, Clarence B. Randall, chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy 
from 1956-61 and special consultant to the President, described Hoffman as a special kind of 
businessman. According to Randall, Hoffman was a type of visionary—albeit one who was 
given to tunnel vision. By the mid-1950s, Hoffman’s new passion was for the UN. Hoffman 
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even confided to Randall that in the months following his term as UN delegate, Hoffman’s 
friends badgered him for talking of nothing else but his new obsession.100  
 Speaking to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the US Congress, Hoffman elaborated 
on his newfound interest in the international organization. Hoffman’s testimony, coming in 
the midst of the 1956 General Assembly session, was a mixture of Cold War idioms and the 
same ‘please the customer’ mentality adopted by Lodge. On the one hand, Hoffman 
emphasized the ineffectiveness of the current US foreign economic policy in light of the 
Kremlin’s new approach for ‘communizing the world’ by subverting Asia’s new democracies 
with further plans to target Africa and South America. On the other hand, Hoffman pointed 
out the need to respond to the pressing demands by underdeveloped and uncommitted 
countries of the Global South for improved living conditions, health services and educational 
and economic opportunities. Employing Marshall Plan logic, he linked American prosperity 
to the economic health of underdeveloped countries and thus highlighted the need for the US 
to take action on a new program that included more than just trade. Touting the Marshall 
Plan’s ability to turn $13 billion of US foreign aid into an investment, Hoffman continued: ‘I 
am not suggesting there should be a Marshall Plan for Asia or South America. Conditions are 
entirely different in these areas than they were in Europe.’ Cognizant of the differences 
between reconstruction and development, Hoffman nonetheless believed some lessons were 
applicable. He noted that the success of the Marshall Plan stemmed from America’s role as 
an investment banker—choosing ventures that fitted its criteria, placing a large onus of the 
responsible on the recipient country and insisting on programs of a limited duration. No 
doubt drawing from Lodge’s proposal unfurled just days earlier, Hoffman suggested that a 
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new multilateral program might be drawn up along these lines, specifically mentioning the 
UN as a viable option for its implementation.101  
Hoffman elaborated on his ideas for a new direction in American’s foreign economic 
policy in a February 1957 article in New York Times Magazine entitled, ‘Blueprint for 
Foreign Aid’. The article specifically called for a pilot program to fund raw material surveys 
and other investment projects. Hoffman’s recommendations, as noted by Craig Murphy, were 
curiously similar to an Argentine proposal from 1956 and the aforementioned A Forward 
Look—the EPTA study that called for an expansion of UN development aid.102 Although 
seemingly far from original, Hoffman’s article did further recognize the need for an 
additional development fund offered through the UN to address issues the EPTA could not 
and simultaneously provided another aid option for the US to support. Specifically, 
Hoffman’s proposal echoed an idea previously expressed at the UN Secretariat—the concept 
of ‘pre-investment’.  
UN development economist, Hans Singer—a major focus of Chapter Three—
claims to have ‘invented’ the phrase ‘pre-investment’ and certainly helped to shape its 
intellectual formation as a viable form of development aid.103 The premise of pre-
investment aid was that economic and social development would not follow the unknown. 
Thus, latent investment opportunities in underdeveloped countries, according to Singer, 
had to be sought out and brought to a stage where productive investment could take place. 
This required spadework to make investment more attractive, feasible and effective. In 
particular, pre-investment aid would come to include projects in three categories: 1) 
surveys of natural resources, 2) vocational and technical skills training to develop human 
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resources and 3) applied research to find new uses for local materials and products.104 For 
recipient countries, pre-investment aid was meant to elucidate with more authority the 
needs and resources of underdeveloped countries. For donors, it proposed to serve as a 
means to attract investors to projects that had less of a ‘start-up’ feel and risk.105  
Additionally, Singer asserted that from the UN’s perspective, pre-investment came 
from the effort to solve the dilemma whereby the UN desired to expand beyond the work 
of the EPTA but had no power or means to invest capital into development—the domain 
of the World Bank and donor states. A pre-investment aid program through the UN would 
allow it to project itself into another arena of economic development, while responding to 
critics like David Belleoch, since pre-investment aid involved more than just sending 
individual advisors for visits to write reports but could lead to sizeable investments and 
meaningful development.106 Thus, Lodge, Hoffman and Singer represented a confluence 
of interests that would soon give birth to the second branch of grant-based aid through the 
UN system. The impetus for this came, in part, from Lodge and Hoffman who desired to 
respond to Soviet economic advances as well as meet the demands of Third World states. 
Meanwhile, Singer provided the intellectual backing for this method of aid while 
emphasizing the UN’s centrality to any future pre-investment aid program. Finally, 
developments within the UN forum served as another important stimulus.   
SUNFED, the Special Fund and the Birth of a UN Pre-Investment Aid Program 
The UN debate surrounding the establishment of SUNFED is a major focus of 
Chapter Two, however, it is worth stating here that SUNFED was a proposed billion dollar 
lending agency administered by the UN and controlled by UN member states collectively. 
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Moreover, a UN economist within the UN Secretariat had originally proposed this type of 
multilateral lending agency back in 1949. Initially, its only major supporters were potential 
recipient states mostly from the Global South. Throughout the 1950s, these states debated the 
merits of establishing SUNFED with its potential donor states. Then in 1956, three potential 
donor states joined the so-called SUNFED bloc, including the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia 
and the Netherlands.107 The move was significant since, in the case of the Netherlands, it 
actually switched from opposing SUNFED to being one of the few Western industrial 
countries that now supported it. The decision of two communist bloc countries to back 
SUNFED meant that the US could no longer defer to Eisenhower’s decision to make Third 
World development a condition of disarmament as he had done back in 1953. Finger notes 
that the Soviet decision to support the establishment of SUNFED while the US remained in 
opposition especially disturbed Lodge. Finger claims it was at this point that he had the idea 
to create a UN program that focused on pre-investment as an alternative to SUNFED.108 
Although, clearly the historical record suggests this idea was already present for some time. 
The need was made all the more urgent when, at the July 1957 meeting of the UN Economic 
and Social Council, member states adopted, by a vote of 15-3, a resolution to recommend to 
the upcoming General Assembly the establishment of SUNFED. The US, Canada and Great 
Britain were the only members to vote against the measure—the first formal split in 
ECOSOC between developed and underdeveloped countries.109  
  In the light of these developments, the Eisenhower Administration made the decision 
to support the establishment of a new multilateral aid program at the 1957 General Assembly 
session, much to the delight of Lodge and Hoffman, as well as those in the Administration 
they had managed to persuade. For instance, Council on Foreign Economic Policy chairman, 
                                                          
107 Murphy, The United Nations Development Programme, 62. 
108 Transcript of Interview with Seymour Maxwell Finger, 30 November 1999, UN Intellectual History Project, 
14.   
109 ECOSOC OR, 24th Session, 994th meeting, 31 July 1957; Toye and Toye, The UN and Global Political 
Economy, 173. 
62 
 
Clarence Randall, now joined Lodge and Hoffman in acknowledging the futility of US 
opposition to multilateral development aid in the face of the increased demand, since voting 
against these measures in the General Assembly put the US in an increasingly shrinking 
minority. For Randall, Hoffman’s ideas offered an attractive option to offset this problem by 
assuaging Third World leaders while still avoiding a major financial commitment by the US 
toward multilateral development.110 Others in the Eisenhower Administration joined in and 
called for ‘a comprehensive, upbeat, and sense-making answer to SUNFED.’111 
 Aided by a combination of Third World demands, Soviet economic threats and 
intellectual backing from the UN, the Eisenhower Administration led a successful effort at 
the 1957 General Assembly to call for the establishment of a new fund to ‘facilitate new 
capital investments of all types—private and public, national and international—by creating 
conditions which would make such investments either feasible or more effective’—in other 
words a pre-investment fund. The resolution espoused confidence in the UN to manage such 
a program based on the work of the EPTA as an instrument ‘of proven effectiveness’.112 The 
UN Special Fund, as it would come to be known, did expand the UN’s development reach by 
creating a new mechanism aimed at providing pre-investment aid. It did not, however, end 
the bid by underdeveloped countries to establish SUNFED—an effort further explored in the 
next chapter. However, it did stunt, if only temporarily, the momentum the supporters of 
SUNFED had acquired.  
  Member states commissioned a preparatory committee made up of their 
representatives to work out the details of the UN Special Fund, although the committee seems 
to have been highly influenced by recommendations from Hammarskjold and Singer as to the 
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details of the Fund.113 According to David Owen, drawing up the details was no easy task due 
to the ambiguity of the Special Fund resolution. Owen noted the many ‘contradictions and 
obscurities in the text’ that filled the wording of the resolution reflecting that, although 
overwhelmingly approved, it far from reconciled two divergent positions. Specifically, the 
US along with all the major contributors to the EPTA, except the Netherlands and the USSR, 
viewed the new program as an extension of technical assistance as outlined in A Forward 
Look, produced eighteen months prior. The other side, essentially the main backers of 
SUNFED, regarded the Special Fund as an embryonic SUNFED.  
Owen noticed how this division had indeed led to an especially sharp exchange 
between the US and Indian delegates during the previous General Assembly.114 In particular, 
the Indian delegate, Ali Yavar Jung made clear to his American counterpart, Walter H. Judd, 
that proponents of SUNFED would not tolerate the closing of the door to the evolution of the 
SUNFED proposal at the expense of establishing the Special Fund. India would back the 
Special Fund resolution, but Jung made a point of reiterating a common sentiment among 
member states from the Global South: that ‘under-developed countries did not see themselves 
as beggars holding out their bowls. They were not prepared to take whatever was offered 
simply because it was offered. The manner of giving was as important to them as the gift 
itself.’115 US State Department assessments confirm Owen’s evaluation and the view 
expressed by India and other SUNFED backers. It viewed the UN Special Fund as a means to 
counteract support for SUNFED, in addition to answering the mounting demands for more 
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multilateral aid by offering more technical assistance. Nevertheless, it further acknowledged 
that, once established, the Special Fund did not leave the question of SUNFED dormant.116  
Member states officially established the UN Special Fund with General Assembly 
resolution 1240 (XIII) on 14 October 1958. As an indication that its aim was to widen the 
UN’s participation in the global development process, its initial funding goal was set to $100 
million annually. To re-enforce the message that the Special Fund was not meant to be a 
viable replacement for SUNFED, member states also passed, later in 1958, resolution 1317 
(XIII). It urged member states to continue working for the establishment of a version of 
SUNFED. That vote saw 70 out of 83 members support the resolution, again with the US and 
other major potential donors in opposition.117  
The establishment of the Special Fund also represented the first real effort by the 
Eisenhower Administration to back a multilateral aid program indicating that the shift to 
‘trade and aid’ in 1955 was later accompanied by another policy adjustment. Namely, that 
multilateral aid was a necessary supplement to bilateral aid, a detail so far neglected in the 
scholarly literature. For Lodge, the value of multilateral aid over bilateral aid was clear. He 
reminded the President in February 1958, that programs like the Special Fund took the US 
‘off the spot’ from having to say no to the seemingly unlimited demands for aid. Even if the 
answer remained no, Lodge concluded that it would be better for any bad news to come from 
a multilateral source, like the UN, rather than directly and primarily from the US.118 
As promised, the Fund granted pre-investment aid to underdeveloped countries. 
Although not a lending agency, it intended to serve any organization or state that had 
significant funds to invest in Third World development. As envisioned by Singer, Hoffman 
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and others, it primarily aimed to assist in survey projects to explore ‘wealth-producing 
potentialities’ in land and marine resources with the hope that they would be followed up by 
larger-scale investment. Secondarily, it sought to develop human resources in 
underdeveloped countries through training and technical education schemes. Finally, the 
Fund planned to invest in the development of applied research institutes in underdeveloped 
countries to find new uses for local material and products.119  
Owen’s initial concern that the Fund would do no more than duplicate the work of his 
own EPTA120 were somewhat justified, especially since the Special Fund would eventually 
combine with the EPTA in 1965 to form the UN Development Program. In reality, the two 
were complementary in nature. For example, the Fund did not usually partake in field 
operations itself but delegated the execution of approved projects to the EPTA and the 
Specialized Agencies. Yet the Special Fund, which launched in January 1959, did have some 
unique qualities since it undertook larger-scale and longer-term projects averaging almost $1 
million, double that of the EPTA. Functionally, a Managing Director oversaw the activities of 
the Fund, a position taken up by Paul Hoffman—to the surprise of few. A Consultative 
Board, made up of Secretary-General Hammarskjold, David Owen and the President of the 
World Bank, Eugene Black, advised the Managing Director. However, Hoffman alone 
retained the authority to recommend specific projects to an eighteen-member Governing 
Council made up of delegates from donor and recipient governments. Requests for pre-
investment aid came from governments themselves, usually working in consultation with 
their in-country UN Resident Representative. Altogether, the Special Fund was to operate on 
a highly selective project-by-project basis and include substantial contributions by recipient 
governments to the cost of the project.121  
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Selling the UN Special Fund: Modernization and Development Economics  
Part of Hoffman’s initial task as Managing Director was to sell the Fund to its major 
budget contributors—member states from the Western industrialized world—since, like the 
EPTA, it obtained its operational budget completely through voluntary giving. Hoffman’s 
lobbying efforts indicate that just because member states voted to create an additional 
development fund through the UN, did not automatically mean they intended to support it 
financially. Likewise, it was still up to Hoffman to drum up business among underdeveloped 
countries in a field of development—pre-investment—that he and others like Singer had only 
theorized. In selling the Fund, Hoffman would rely on the many of the same arguments used 
to promote UN aid through the EPTA. However, he would also add another crucial 
dimension to UN aid by marrying it to an evolving development discourse still coalescing in 
the mid to late 1950s.  
In ‘The Eisenhower Administration, Foreign Aid, and the Third World’, Michael R. 
Adamson makes a distinction between modernization theory and development economics. 
Adamson points out that while both glorified scientific, industrial and technological progress, 
modernization theory aimed at social transformation, including the notion that other societies 
could become more American and more democratic through the means of economic aid. 
Alternatively, development economics focused on the building of physical infrastructure to 
spur rapid economic growth.122 When it came to describing the Special Fund, Hoffman 
merged these components to appeal to aid donors and recipients. In this respect, the Special 
Fund served not only as a response to a renewed attempt to establish SUNFED but also as a 
derivative of a development discourse. 
Key to Hoffman’s strategy to garner financial support for the Fund from its primary 
donor, the United States, was to frame the program as part of an American modernization 
effort. In his Congressional testimony from late 1956, Hoffman had already shown he was 
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aware of the main arguments of the two economists who had popularized modernization 
theory—W.W. Rostow and Max Millikan. In short, modernization theory alleged that all 
nations passed through fundamental stages of development on a linear trajectory from 
traditional societies to take–off to maturity. The United States, along with a handful of other 
Western states, had reached the pinnacle of this development process. These states, therefore, 
ought to serve as the model for other less developed countries while helping them make use 
of their under-utilized physical and human resources. Modernization theory relied on 
scientific, industrial, and technological advancements as a means to achieve economic, social 
and political (ie. democratic) progress. By the mid-1950s, the theory was still in its formative 
stage but would come to enjoy widespread favor in the years ahead—especially once Rostow 
joined the Kennedy Administration in 1961. For this and other reasons, historians have nearly 
exclusively depicted modernization theory as an American foreign policy tool as stated 
earlier. Certainly, Rostow and Millikan promoted this use, believing that the application of 
their theory could offset the Communist threat among underdeveloped countries.123  
However, in this case, the UN successfully made use of modernization principles to 
appeal to potential donor and recipient countries interested in investigating the benefits of 
pre-investment aid offed by the Special Fund. Hoffman was already drawing parallels 
between his idea for a new branch of UN aid and the ideas of Rostow and Millikan during his 
December 1956 testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee described above. 
Hoffman cited a specific study of theirs to argue economic aid to the underdeveloped world 
would only take an investment of roughly $10-14 billion from the US—with further 
contributions from other states and regional organizations that would bring the total to 
between $12.5 and $16.5 billion over a five-year period. Similar to the cost of the Marshall 
Plan, and far less than the estimated $150-200 billion in US military expenditures over the 
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next five years, Hoffman used the Rostow and Millikan study to argue a US investment in 
economic aid to underdeveloped countries was easily justifiable.  
He concluded: ‘[w]hat is of infinitely more importance, the program, if it succeeds, 
would in the words of Messrs. Millikan and Rostow achieve for us the two-fold result of 
increasing the awareness elsewhere in the world that the goals, aspirations, and values of the 
American people are in large part the same as those peoples in other countries; and of 
developing viable, energetic, and confident democratic societies throughout the free 
world.’124 Now as Managing Director of the UN Special Fund, Hoffman wanted to make sure 
part of the US commitment to Third World development included a substantial investment in 
his own multilateral development scheme. Thus, Hoffman spent some of his early months at 
the Special Fund effectively lobbying Washington to keep its contributions to the Special 
Fund at 40% of the total—the same percentage as US contributions to the EPTA and the 
maximum amount allowable.125  
Additionally, Hoffman relied on his Marshall Plan credentials to argue that Europe 
had largely accomplished the reconstruction of its war-torn economies. Now a much more 
difficult task lay ahead—speeding development of underdeveloped countries. One that 
Hoffman quickly learned was not as analogous to the Marshall Plan as he initially perceived. 
Comparing the two, Hoffman described Marshall Plan aid as restoring an old painting to a 
pristine condition while the Special Fund was attempting to aid in creating on canvas a 
completely new picture. Moral, political and economic reasons should incentivize, according 
to Hoffman, developed countries to participate in this artistic endeavor preferably through 
what Hoffman considered the ‘link which had been missing in the chain of UN assistance to 
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the less developed countries.’ It functioned not as a give-away, nor as a paternalistic gesture 
but as a multilateral partnership where the developed world might transfer its advancements 
to the underdeveloped via the UN.126   
  When it came to selling the Special Fund to an international audience, Hoffman 
blended modernization rhetoric with development economics. A year into the start of the 
Fund, Hoffman described his program as engaging with a ‘great new economic frontier’ in 
desperate need of making use of its so far under-utilized physical and human resources.127 In 
Southeast Asia, the Special Fund could play its part in taming the Mekong River, harnessing 
it for irrigation, electric power and transportation much like America had done for Arizona 
and California by subduing the Colorado River. According to Hoffman, ‘the people of South 
East Asia…don’t even know how thirsty their land –and they – are.’ The same opportunity 
existed for Chile with its un-mined mineral resources. Likewise, once India came to make full 
use of its soil and water through mechanization, fertilizers, insecticides and seeds it was sure 
to produce enough food to feed its population, much like America already was with only 6-7 
million families farming enough food to feed nearly 180 million Americans with an abundant 
surplus. Speaking of human resources, Hoffman foresaw the Fund elevating underdeveloped 
peoples ‘to a position above that of straw boss’ through education and training programs, as 
was his firsthand experience working for the Economic Cooperation Administration in South 
Korea. Through these endeavors, less developed countries should focus on one goal—
economic development, which according to Hoffman was impervious to political, military, 
ideological or commercial strings and unaffected by Cold War intrigues if pursued through 
multilateral channels.128  
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 Of course, for donor and recipient countries the real value of the Fund hinged on its 
results. Therefore, from its inception, aid through the Special Fund targeted projects that 
would have a real measureable appeal in underdeveloped countries with more immediate 
results than the work of the EPTA. Thus, Special Fund aid gave preference to projects that it 
expected would lead to new capital investment. One of its initial projects was a survey of the 
Niger River at the request of the Nigerian government. The pre-investment survey 
investigated the most suitable location for a dam for the purposes of power generation, 
navigation, flood control and irrigation. The Special Fund contributed $735,000 toward the 
survey while the Nigerian government covering the remaining cost of $1.6 million. 
Meanwhile, the World Bank oversaw the survey itself and used a private firm to perform the 
actual study adding the UN to a string of international developers. The Special Fund invested 
in similar water and soil surveys in roughly twenty other underdeveloped countries from 
January 1959 to May 1960. It also assisted in three regional surveys including a four-year 
study of the Mekong River Basin.129  
The Fund’s clear desire to associate its funding with larger capital investment projects 
would allow the UN to participate, for the first time, in what development historians have 
called ‘high-modernist’ projects. High-modernism of the 1950s and 60s, as described by 
development historian Nick Cullather, placed an emphasis on development of a given state or 
region by means of a comprehensive plan, often aimed at mastery of the physical 
environment.130 Thus, high-modernism is frequently associated with the dam-building boom 
and other major infrastructural projects pursued by underdeveloped countries, to go alongside 
‘low-modernist’ pursuits like technical training and community development.131 Thus by 
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linking the Fund to large-scale capital investment projects, like the building of dams, the UN 
was also affixing itself to the high-modernist trend of the period. 
Moreover, the Special Fund invested in thirty-five training projects and research 
institutions in its first year and a half—seven in India alone. Illustrative of one such training 
project was the Central Training Institute in Calcutta started with $1 million in Special Fund 
assistance, $2 million from the Indian government and executed by the ILO. The Institute 
was set up to train 2,400 craft instructors over a four-year period in fifteen trades (ie. 
carpentry, mechanics, plumbing, etc.). These instructors’ trainees would then be used to train 
a substantial portion of craftsmen required under India’s current Five-Year Plan. Similarly, 
the Special Fund helped to finance a number of institutions for applied research aim at 
facilitating greater production and investment. As an example, the Fund contributed $935,000 
to the Central American Research Institute for Industry to higher more experts and provide 
scientific equipment.  The governments of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras 
and Nicaragua made counterpart contributions of a further $1.3 million to the Institute, which 
was started and overseen by the United Nations own technical assistance program.132  
Hammarskjold praised the Fund for adding a new dimension to the existing UN 
technical assistance activities and for bringing the UN ‘closer to the public authorities and 
private enterprises engaged in the financing of investment in the under-developed areas, 
thereby underlining the potentialities of the Organization as an Executing Agency for 
action.’133 He also hoped the program reflected a growing recognition that the multilateral 
approach to aid through the UN was a better alternative to bilateral programs complicated by 
political tensions.134 Meanwhile, Eugene Black believed the Fund could now put developing 
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countries in a better position to carry out their own development goals and expected a number 
of Fund surveys to lead to Bank investments.135  
 Interest in Fund aid was substantial from the start. In its first two years, from 1959 to 
1960, the Special Fund had received 219 formal requests for projects. Hoffman and the 
Governing Council approved 74 of these in 49 countries while allocating $55 million in 
Special Fund resources. Of the remaining projects, 54 were still under review as of December 
1960, 83 had been denied and eight withdrawn. Despite these figures, a shortfall in funding 
plagued the Special Fund as it had the EPTA. It took three cycles of pledging conferences 
held in 1958, 1959 and 1960 to provide the Fund with its first $100 million.136 In one 
instance, Hoffman even made a personal appeal to the Prime Minster Robert Menzies of 
Australia. Hoffman drew his attention to the fact that Australia was one of a few countries in 
the world that had not contributed to the Special Fund in any of its first three pledging 
conferences held each fall. He pointed out that back in 1957, the General Assembly had set a 
target of $100 million a year for the EPTA and Special Fund. For 1959, voluntary 
contributions totaled just $55.5 million for the two programs, for 1960, $71.2 million. Given 
the need for 1961 with the addition of so many newly independent underdeveloped states, 
Hoffman hoped Menzies would reconsider. Additionally, Hoffman enclosed a booklet for 
Prime Minister Menzies he had published earlier in 1960, verbosely entitled, One hundred 
countries one and one quarter billion people: how to speed their economic growth and ours – 
in the 1960’s.137  
The sixty-two page booklet was Hoffman’s most comprehensive justification to date 
for how aiding undeveloped countries was not only ‘good morals’ but also ‘good business’. 
Again, blending modernization discourse with development economics, it divided 
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underdeveloped countries into three ‘groups’ based on their average per capita annual 
income. The pamphlet further provided a target growth rate for these groups of 1-2% each 
year for the decade of the 1960s. According to Hoffman, non-charitable, non-paternalistic 
and non-spasmodic development assistance ought to come via the UN—the only donor that 
could get ‘tough’ with underdeveloped countries without being accused of seeking any 
political or commercial advantages. Of course, Hoffman dedicated a number of pages to the 
latest member of the UN development family—the Special Fund, and its potential to make 
use of the ‘underutilization of physical and human resources’ in underdeveloped countries. 
He concluded, that if underdeveloped peoples could partner with those of the industrialized 
countries, ‘the two, working together in a common program in the common interest, can 
create a steadily expanding world economy in which all can find increasing satisfaction and 
opportunity.’138 
Overall then, selling the Special Fund as a partnership was crucial to its success. For 
this reason, Hoffman took every opportunity to highlight figures that showed that over its 
first two years, underdeveloped governments contributed nearly 60% of the total cost to 
Special Fund projects.139 According to Hammarskjold, the Special Fund’s ability to share the 
development burden was Hoffman’s favorite argument for UN-channeled aid. Both believed 
this fact had not been lost on donor governments, who appreciated the commitment made by 
the recipient countries to the long-term success of a project. Like Hoffman, Hammarskjold 
also saw its potential to act as the crucial link connecting international machinery like the 
EPTA and the Specialized Agencies to large-scale investments from the likes of the World 
Bank, governments and private financing intuitions. Now, the Special Fund could add its 
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stamp, and a neutral one at that, to projects with a high likelihood of substantial investment of 
capital in the future.140  
Conclusion 
From its inception until it merged with the EPTA in 1965, the Special Fund sent out 
more than 1,500 international experts to work with more than 17,000 national project staffs, 
trained 56,000 people under 124 projects, carried out 31 natural resource surveys and 
established 2 applied research institutions.141 By the mid-1960s it was actively engaged in 
522 on-going projects in 130 countries and territories. The total cost of the program neared 
$1.2 billion, of which just over $670 million came from recipient governments and the rest 
from pledges to the Special Fund. Meanwhile, the EPTA continued to expand its services 
throughout the first half of the 1960s. In 1963-64, when it adopted biannual programming, its 
total expenditures in field programs totaled $93.3 million, a $15.4 million increase over the 
previous two years. For 1965-66, the UN expected EPTA expenditures to reach $134 million. 
In 1964, it sent out 3,292 experts from eighty-six countries.142    
Altogether, the EPTA and the Special Fund were important conduits to the 
internationalization of development during the postwar decades. This came only through the 
motivation at the UN to stake out a claim and carve out a niche in this process. Spearheaded 
by Owen and Hoffman, and to a lesser extent Hammarskjold, the UN juxtaposed its aid to 
bilateral alternatives during much of the 1950s. In doing so, it framed development aid 
offered by or channeled through the UN as a distinct, and altogether better, form of assistance 
compared to strictly bilateral aid options. To highlight this distinction those at the UN 
promoted the use of the EPTA and then the Special Fund, which both allowed the 
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Organization to expand beyond its peace and security functions and enlarge its share of the 
global development burden. Cautiously facilitating the expansion of the UN’s development 
mandate was the US—still the most powerful, influential and wealth UN member state. 
Meanwhile UN member states from the Global South deserve much of the credit for focusing 
the attention of the General Assembly on the urgent needs of underdeveloped countries while 
demanding that the UN play a greater role. Finally, looking into the origins of the 
development directive at the UN provides much of the context needed for each of the 
subsequent chapters in which the further expansion of UN development aid into areas 
including capital finance aid and food aid continued to be hotly contested issues among 
member states. Furthermore, the coming of mass decolonization in Africa only exacerbated 
these debates.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
‘Better Billions’: Financing Mass Decolonization at the UN, 1959-60 
George Ivan Smith joined the United Nations in 1947, spending a little more than the 
three subsequent decades in various high-ranking positions within the UN Secretariat. 
Recognized as an adept political adviser and skillful press spokesman, Secretary-General 
Hammarskjold selected Smith to represent the UN on a trip through much of central and east 
Africa during the summer and fall of 1960. This included a stopover in the Congo to assist 
with a newly initiated UN operation. It was there that Smith proclaimed to Hammarskjold 
that he, much like the Organization, ‘had become Africanised.’143 Also, high on Smith’s 
agenda was a meeting with Julius Nyerere, the future President of the soon-to-be independent 
state of Tanganyika—then a UN Trust Territory.144 Earlier in the year, Nyerere had written to 
the UN Secretariat informing Heins Wieschoff, the top UN official on Africa, of his country’s 
imminent independence. Nyerere wanted to make certain that the UN was prepared to make 
available sufficient channels of development aid for Tanganyika immediately following its 
independence, expected in 1961. Believing his country would require substantial amounts of 
aid, Nyerere recommended opening a regional UN aid office in Tanganyika. His appeal 
received the personal attention of Hammarskjold, who sent Smith to make preliminary 
arrangements in response to the African leader’s proposal, among his other tasks.145 Smith 
recounted their initial meeting in October 1960 where Nyerere greeted the UN representative, 
‘smiling from all creases saying “We’ve been waiting for you for a long time.”’146  
The above episode is telling for a number of reasons. First, it was indicative of the 
increased attention shown to Africa in the 1960s as many of the continent’s countries made 
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the transition from colonial dependence to political independence. What also comes across in 
Nyerere’s greeting is a heightened sense of urgency and expectation among African leaders 
as to the value of development aid—specifically through the UN. As this chapter will show, 
this urgency also gave rise to a competition over what type of aid best suited newly 
independent countries and who should administer the aid. Yet, more than the competition 
described in the previous chapter, the advent of mass decolonization in Africa amplified this 
contest. The growth of this debate by 1960 was no more apparent than in the hothouse-like 
atmosphere of the main UN forums. There, a scramble ensued where each side—aid recipient 
countries, potential donor states and the UN Secretariat—at times haggled and at other times 
harmonized over the best method of administrating and allocating development aid.    
Leading the UN effort was Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold, who had travelled 
extensively throughout Africa in early 1960. Upon his return, Hammarskjold matched the 
activism he had so often displayed with regard to political and security issues during his UN 
tenure. Through much of 1960, he played a central role in shifting the Organization’s 
attention towards Africa and the economic and social development of the continent. In an 
effort to fulfil the needs expressed to him by the various African leaders, Hammarskjold also 
paid increasing attention towards what he classified as the proper ‘internationalization of 
aid’.147 This amounted to a renewed effort to change the nature of development aid—from 
bilateral, paternalistic and potentially a hostage of the Cold War, to a multilateral 
collaboration where more reciprocity existed between donor and recipient countries.  
Although, the UN did manage to increase its development-presence in Africa in 1960 
and certainly thereafter, it competed directly with alternative development schemes that 
challenged the UN-model envisioned by Hammarskjold. The most direct challenge came 
from the culmination of a decade-long attempt to set up a billion dollar soft loan financing 
agency. Again, decolonization in Africa exacerbated a debate that pitted the Special United 
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Nations Fund for Economic Development, or SUNFED, against a rival agency known as the 
International Development Association, or the IDA. Whereas most of the UN Secretariat and 
member states from the Global South—including the sixteen newly independent Africa 
countries that joined the UN in 1960—backed SUNFED, the major Western industrial states 
supported the IDA. From the perspective of its backers, SUNFED would have been the truest 
and most meaningful way to internationalize development aid. Meanwhile, most Western 
states felt the IDA best protected their interests while still offering a multilateral aid option. 
Although the competition between SUNFED and the IDA was more contested than depicted 
by scholars, the IDA did outpace SUNFED in 1960 and beyond. However, the clash itself 
showed the important role played by international institutions like the UN in shaping the 
predominant development thinking of the day. Together with Hammarskjold’s efforts, it laid 
the groundwork for the Organization’s pivot towards making development its primary 
function. 
The Secretary-Generalship of Dag Hammarskjold and the Turn Toward Africa 
Hammarskjold had been a relative unknown outside Sweden prior to taking up his 
post as Secretary-General on 31 March 1953. Raised in Uppsala, Sweden, Hammarskjold was 
the youngest of four sons to Hjalmar and Agnes Hammarskjold. His austere and conservative 
father served as the unpopular Prime Minister of Sweden from 1914 to 1917. Sweden’s 
public tagged the Prime Minister with the moniker ‘Hungerskjold’ after he imposed food 
rationing during World War One. His own Cabinet resigned in 1917 after he refused to sign a 
trade agreement with Britain. Dag Hammarskjold was not close to his ascetic father but later 
revealed that he did learn a great deal about public service from him. Hammarskjold’s mother 
Agnes was the antithesis of Hjalmar. She was warm, nurturing and passed on to her youngest 
son a personal and intimate Christian faith. Dag Hammarskjold studied law and economics at 
the University of Uppsala and a received a PhD in economics from the University of 
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Stockholm. Preferring the government to academia, he joined the Swedish Finance Ministry 
as an Under-Secretary at the age of thirty while simultaneously serving as a chairman of the 
Bank of Sweden.148 Early on Hammarskjold worked under Ernst Wigforss, Sweden’s most 
recognized Fabian socialist economist. Wigforss saw in Hammarskjold, a ‘“man of action”’ 
who was ‘“little tempted by an academic career.”’149 Hammarskjold’s first major 
international mission was as a delegate to the 1947 Paris Conference that launched the 
Marshall Plan. He then oversaw Sweden’s participation in the Organization for European 
Economic Cooperation (OEEC), created to administer Marshall Plan aid and was a key player 
in negotiating Sweden’s accession into in the Bretton Woods institutions in 1951. It was at 
the OEEC, claimed Wigfross, that Hammarskjold gained an international reputation as a 
dutiful civil servant and as a sharp-minded practical diplomat. Hammarskjold reinforced this 
reputation when he served as Sweden’s top delegate at the 1951 and 1952 UN General 
Assembly sessions. Concurrently, he carried out his duties as a member of the Swedish 
Cabinet from 1951-53, despite never having joined a political party, dealing with issues 
relating to trade and economics.150  
Hammarskjold was anything but a frontrunner to replace the outgoing UN Secretary-
General, Trygve Lie. His appointment as UN Secretary-General came as a result of a 
compromise following the inability of alternative candidates, including Lester Pearson of 
Canada, Stanislaw Skreszewski of Poland and General Carlos Romulo of the Philippines, to 
garner the necessary votes and approval by the Great Powers. Member states then supposedly 
settled on Hammarskjold for his prosaic qualities and administrative experience. The hope 
was that Hammarskjold would be more discreet and less political than Secretary-General 
Lie—a fellow Scandinavian who had held the office from 1946 to 1953. Hammarskjold 
accepted the position of Secretary-General of the UN after the Soviet Union had effectively 
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excommunicated Lie for the pro-Western position he took on the Korean War. 
Hammarskjold’s posting also took place towards the end of the McCarthy Era that had seen 
numerous Americans working at the UN investigated and accused of communist treachery. 
Altogether, this meant that Hammarskjold joined the UN at a low ebb, and thus critical 
juncture, for the Organization and his Office.151 Caution and circumspection marked 
Hammarskjold's early tenure. He spent most of his first term carefully choosing his staff, 
reorganizing the Secretariat and then only dabbling in political and diplomatic matters.152 
Taking into account his academic and administrative background, some forecasted 
that he would most likely make his mark as an economist. Fellow Swede Tor Gjesdal, 
personal adviser to the outgoing Trygve Lie, remarked to George Ivan Smith that many of 
Gjesdal’s Swedish friends believed Hammarskjold’s, ‘personal qualifications in field of 
economic cooperation may be an interesting component in the picture of the future when we 
think of the very great importance of the UN technical assistance activities and other work in 
the economic and social field as a part also of the political future of the Organization.’153 
Oscar Schachter, director of the General Legal Division of the UN from 1953-66, recognized 
Hammarskjold’s propensity to emphasize economic matters. He commented that 
Hammarskjold, ‘had a kind of stake’ in wanting, ‘to be seen as an economist.’ He cited 
Hammarskjold as being the only Secretary-General who was attentive to the work of 
economists within the Secretariat and having a vested interest in their major annual 
publication, the World Economic Report.154 Just two months after taking up his post, 
Hammarskjold publically affirmed that as the ‘dark horse entering the race’ much guesswork 
had gone into figuring out just what might be his focus. He then validated commentators who 
speculated he might give added emphasis to the economic aspects of UN work due to his 
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background. He cautioned, however, that this would not come at the expense of his attention 
towards the political activities of the organization as some had predicted. In fact, he viewed 
the economic aspects of the world’s troubles as inherently wedded to the political.155  
There is no doubt that Hammarskjold promoted the economic aspects of the 
Organization rhetorically through his support for two UN economic aid programs, the EPTA 
and the Special Fund as seen in Chapter One. It is also apparent that by the mid-1950s 
Hammarskjold was astutely aware that a shift was taking place, or would take place, at the 
UN towards Asia and Africa—two continents where UN economic aid could have a 
significant impact. In the light of six countries from the Global South joining the UN in 1955, 
Hammarskjold, in his tenth annual report, stated that the ‘peoples of Asia today, of Africa 
tomorrow’ were forging, through the UN, a new relationship with the rest of the world.156 
Elsewhere during that year, he commented that the rise of Asia and Africa was the great 
historical development of our times but also the greatest challenge and task facing the UN 
due to those regions’ economic and social underdevelopment.157 While interviewing Philippe 
de Seynes in 1955, for the position of UN Under-Secretary of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Hammarskjold remarked that ‘From now on, the two main problems occupying the United 
Nations will be Africa and the atom.’158 Nevertheless, the historical record suggests that this 
might have been an unequal marriage for much of Hammarskjold’s early UN tenure as 
Secretary-General. For all his oratory on the importance of UN action in the field of 
development aid and specifically technical assistance, Schachter, the same UN official who 
had recognized Hammarskjold’s expressed interest in economics, also confessed he could not 
recall one initiative where the Secretary-General ‘really pushed the economic role as a big 
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issue.’ In fact, by 1958 Hammarskjold was even referring to himself as an économiste 
manqué (lacking/ex-economist).159 
Schachter did recall Hammarskjold taking an interest in developing countries for the 
valuable political support they could offer by way of votes at the UN. Additionally, he 
believed Hammarskjold came to identify with their movement in principle, as is also seen in 
the Secretary-General’s above statements, but seemed to have stopped short in initiating 
action from rhetoric. Schachter’s explanation for this amounts to Hammarskjold identifying 
with the cause but not the culture of the Third World. He cites the fact that the Secretary-
General ‘had very much an upper-class European view of people’ and could be, especially 
during the Congo Crisis, ‘quite patronizing about Congolese figures and others from the 
Third World.’160 Scholars too disagree over just how much Hammarskjold prioritized 
development and its manifestations. Nick Cullather recently claimed that the UN, ‘under the 
secretary-generalship of economist Dag Hammarskjold, claimed international development as 
a primary function.’161 Conversely, David Webster concluded that Hammarskjold’s 
preoccupation with bolstering the UN’s peace and security functions resulted in the 
downgrading of the Organization’s development agenda towards underdeveloped 
countries.162  
Jeff King and A.J. Hobbins in ‘Hammarskjold and Human Rights: the Deflation of the 
UN Human Rights Programme 1953-1961,’ offer more insight into some of the reasons for 
Hammarskjold’s torpid approach to two issues closely related to economic development and 
decolonization—namely self-determination and human rights. They argue that overall, he 
preferred and even relished the diplomatic and political elements of his job to the neglect of 
social matters. On self-determination, King and Hobbins argue Hammarskjold advocated 
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gradual change, citing the Secretary-General’s position that an ‘unrealistic impatience in the 
movement towards self-determination and wasteful resistance to it would contradict [the] 
philosophy of the Charter by leading to conflicts which might threaten peace.’163 
Furthermore, they suggest Hammarskjold systematically downgraded the Human Rights 
Division within the UN, viewing it too as an avenue for potential and needless conflict that 
might hinder his efforts to secure peace.164 The authors also cite evidence that Hammarskjold 
ultimately viewed self-determination and human rights, certainly in much of the Third World, 
as the domain of the UN Trusteeship Council, not his Office directly. Finally, the authors 
recognize that any strong stance by Hammarskjold on either self-determination or human 
rights might have seriously jeopardized the reservoir of good will and political influence he 
had built up with the Great Powers. King and Hobbins conclude that change only really came 
for Hammarskjold in 1960 when the outbreak of the Congo Crisis led to his embrace of 
human rights and self-determination. They argue that this was not because of a genuine 
change of heart but as a means to justify a highly contentious UN intervention in that central 
African country.165 
The merit of King and Hobbins’ argument lies in its description of Hammarskjold as 
an enigmatic figure, but ultimately someone who had a ‘desire to run things his way’—albeit 
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with impressive patience at times.166 They are also correct in surmising that circumstances, 
more than ideology, had a profound effect on Hammarskjold’s perception on matters—
political, social or economic. This study would argue that in the realm of economic 
development, Hammarskjold was not as torpid as with human rights issues but was 
unhurried. The difference being, Hammarskjold never shelved or neglected economic 
development to the extent he sidelined human rights. In fact, rhetorically Hammarskjold 
never downplayed the value of a UN-centered model for economic development assistance 
channeled from donor to recipient countries. In other words, he did not push everything to the 
background at the expense of reclaiming the Organization’s peace and security functions as 
claimed by Webster and emphasized by most of the historical scholarship discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis.  
What is apparent is that Hammarskjold had a strong vision for the role of the UN and 
his Office in many areas including economic development. Overall, his motivations certainly 
stemmed in part from an innate sense of duty to humanity that he derived from his religious 
beliefs. One of the very few public windows into Hammarskjold’s religious life was an 
address he gave on This I Believe, a radio program of famed journalist Edward R. Murrow. 
There, Hammarskjold spoke of a deep-seated belief ‘that no life was more satisfactory than 
one of selfless service to your country—to humanity.’167 It was from comments like this that 
Hammarskjold likely acquired the moniker of, ‘the Pope on the East River’. For this secular 
pontiff his sense of duty clearly extend to the peacekeeping functions of his Office. 
Moreover, later evidence in this chapter will show the increasing sense of responsibility 
Hammarskjold felt towards the underdeveloped segment of humanity and especially his role, 
as an executive who believed strongly in executive power, in this process. Nevertheless, 
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operationally he seemed to wait for changing international circumstances to animate his 
ideas.  
For much of his early tenure, for example, there seemed to be a number of practical 
reasons why Hammarskjold did not push any specific initiatives relating to economic 
development and development aid. One partial motive may lie in Hammarskjold’s failed 
attempt to corral and make use of the Specialized Agencies through a UN body called the 
Administrative Committee on Co-ordination (ACC)—a point addressed below. He and others 
at the Secretariat might have also realized that any petition for a substantial increase in 
economic assistance to underdeveloped countries would have certainly fallen on barren soil 
during the early to mid-1950s as European countries were still rebuilding their own 
economies. Africa specifically was still under the rule of the colonial powers or under the 
purview of a colonial state as a UN Trust Territory during much of 1950s. In fact, Smith 
recalled a long period when the British Colonial Office balked at the suggestion of utilizing 
UN technical aid in British Africa. It was only in 1960 that he perceived a new attitude 
among these officials who now seemed to welcome UN technical aid in their African 
territories, so long as the local government agreed.168  
Figures on aid to African member states through the EPTA and Special Fund support 
Smith’s analysis. From 1950 to 1956, field program costs for Africa averaged 7.5% of the 
total global funds distribution by the EPTA. Meanwhile, Asia and the Far East received an 
average of 27.6% of the total funds, Latin America 24.7% and the Middle East 18.4% over 
the same period. From 1957 to 1960, Africa’s percentage of EPTA funding rose only slightly, 
averaging 13.2% of the total.169 Similarly, over the first year-and-a-half of Special Fund 
operations, from January 1959 through May 1960, Africa’s share amounted to roughly 12.8% 
of the total funds allocated by the Fund. Of the ten Special Fund projects that took place in 
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Africa over this period, only two occurred in colonial dependencies—the survey of a dam site 
in Nigeria mentioned in Chapter One and an aerial geophysical survey in Uganda—both 
being British dependences at the time.170  
What is clear is that changing circumstances, starting in the mid-1950s and certainly 
mushrooming by 1960, resulted in UN economic development assistance to underdeveloped 
countries becoming a top priority for Secretary-General Hammarskjold and the UN. Once 
determined to act, he moved with impressive vigor as much of the rest of this chapter, as well 
as Chapters Four and Five, will highlight. For example, by 1959 with much of the world’s 
attention drawn to a growing Berlin crisis, Hammarskjold reminded his audience in a speech 
at the University of Lund, Sweden that: ‘[n]o matter how overwhelming other world 
problems may appear to us because of their proximity, it is possible that the future will attach 
greater importance to the rebirth of Asia and Africa in the historical evolution of the present 
epoch, than to questions now uppermost in the news.’171 Hammarskjold went on to stress his 
desire that Asia and Africa’s ‘rebirth’ might progress in solidarity with the West, where no 
party claimed supremacy. He believed the UN was working towards this goal as a matter of 
principle by providing modest amounts of knowledge and resources through the EPTA and 
the Special Fund, which gave underdeveloped nations an equal chance at development.172 Yet 
Hammarskjold envisioned a greater, but at this point still undefined, role for the UN in the 
process. He argued that the UN ought to respond to the demands placed before it, regardless 
of its perceived limitations. His eagerness showed through when he remarked at a press 
conference in April 1959 that, ‘[i]t did take the very steep hill of Suez; it may take other and 
even steeper hills’ to understand the full capacity of the Organization.173 
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Overall, Hammarskjold presaged the changes the UN would soon go through but did 
not precipitate them. New UN member states from the Global South deserve much of the 
credit for pushing the UN into new terrain by focusing the attention of the General Assembly 
on the urgent needs of underdeveloped countries while demanding that the UN play a greater 
role. At the 1959 General Assembly session, there was no shortage of this type of language 
and demand for action. The delegate from Brazil, Eurico Penteado, noted that the world’s 
poor were no longer reserved to the nineteenth century dictum of being resigned to their life 
of poverty. He continued, education and mass communication had resulted in a revolutionary 
psychological change and the world must heed this change or all would be lost. Africa, in 
particular, demanded more attention since once independent and separated from colonialism, 
new African member states had no source of support to look to other than the UN, which, 
according to Penteado, was obliged to respond. Other delegates echoed these sentiments 
especially delegates from African countries. Ernest Eastman, from Liberia called the UN the 
ideal instrument for ‘mutual assistance’ among nations. Ghanaian representative, W.A.C. 
Essibrah, emphasized that newly independent countries would expect the UN to provide 
‘disinterested assistance’ to help them fulfill their Charter obligations. Abdel Hamid Abdel-
Ghani, of the United Arab Republic (UAR) lamented the small share Africa had so far 
received in development assistance and asserted that the UN had an obligation to give all the 
aid it could to newly independent countries. Finally, Guinean representative, Conte Seydou, 
remarked that recipient countries viewed UN assistance as a ‘co-operative effort’ meant for 
rapid development and should not be mistaken for merely charity.174  
No less than twenty-seven resolutions passed during the course of the 1959 Assembly 
dealing with either UN Trust Territories or colonial dependencies (classified by the UN as 
Non-Self-Governing Countries) and economic development aid. Many of them called for 
action from the Secretary-General to give his urgent and sympathetic attention to all requests 
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for economic aid. Hammarskjold responded almost immediately. Desiring to get a deeper 
sense of just what soon to be independent countries needed from the UN, Hammarskjold 
embarked on a tour across Africa, immediately following the conclusion of the 1959 General 
Assembly, a trip that lasted from 21 December 1959 to 31 January 1960.  
Hammarskjold’s African Tour: December 1959-January 1960 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold’s African tour took him to twenty-three countries 
and territories over a six-week period. An article from the Egyptian Gazette entitled, ‘Mr H.’s 
Tour Puts Accent On Africa’s Growing Influence’ summarized the trip in one sense, stating 
how the tour was indicative of just how much dedicated attention Hammarskjold believed 
Africa deserved at this point in its historical development.175 According to Hammarskjold 
himself, the trip was primarily a reconnaissance mission to get a fuller picture of the views of 
African governments and peoples—their aspirations, problems and needs. Hammarskjold was 
also motivated by the chance to form personal acquaintances with African leaders—essential 
for a Secretary-General who preferred private diplomacy. Finally, it was a chance for 
Hammarskjold to express his own views to African leaders, providing a taste of what the UN 
could offer newly independent states. Overall, the trip left Hammarskjold as impressed as he 
was troubled, but nonetheless eager for an expanded role in Africa for the UN generally and 
his Office specifically.  
The most repeated declaration of Hammarskjold’s trip was his great impression of the 
new generation of African leaders and their ‘highest seriousness, devotion, and 
intelligence.’176 It is fair to say he was taken and motivated by African leaders who expressed 
their clear desire to involve the UN in the future development of their respective countries. 
Topping the list was Julius Nyerere of Tanganyika who struck a chord with Hammarskjold 
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when he stated that if given the chance, Tanganyika would even choose less aid through the 
UN compared to more through a bilateral channel. Nyerere’s proclamation also puts in 
context Hammarskjold’s eagerness to send Smith to Tanganyika later that year and the 
President’s response.177 Nigeria was a bright spot for Hammarskjold as well. There, the US 
Consul observed that Hammarskjold received more attention in thirty-six hours than any 
other foreign envoy in recent years, less a royal visit from the Duke and Duchess of 
Gloucester. Hammarskjold was particularly pleased with what he called the ‘puritan spirit’ of 
West African leaders—including Abubakar Balewa of Nigeria, Sekou Toure of Guinea and 
Sylvanus Olympio of Togoland (now Togo). In the case of the Balewa and Olympio, both 
expressed to Hammarskjold the desire for UN-channeled aid. For Balewa, he feared the loss 
of administrators and private investment upon independence from Britain at a time when 
Nigeria needed both for economic expansion and for development. In fact, the anticipated 
shortage of qualified administrative personnel was a reoccurring concern raised by most of 
the African leaders Hammarskjold met.178 
Hammarskjold too, was aware of the shock of independence no matter how orderly 
and peaceful. During a speech at the second session of the UN Economic Commission for 
Africa (ECA) in Tangier, Morocco, Hammarskjold provided probably the best summary 
assessment of what he believed Africa now faced. Echoing the development discourse of the 
day, Hammarskjold spoke of the ‘scarcity of skills’ and the ‘magnitude of adjustments’ 
required at a time when a country lacked a defined economic and financial identity or full 
knowledge of its own resources and needs. Moreover, he recognized Africa’s ongoing battles 
with disease, illiteracy, mono-cultural economies, subsistence farming and isolation from 
world markets. Yet, he reminded his African audience that the continent’s awakening was 
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taking place at a time of growing interdependence among all nations. According to 
Hammarskjold, the UN best exemplified this reality. Thus, new countries could avoid 
isolation by making use of the diplomatic and economic machinery of the UN. Moreover, the 
UN could do its part in ‘putting its weight on the scales’ to make Africa’s transition as 
smooth as possible, not only politically but also economically and socially. For 
Hammarskjold this included expanding the UN aid programs on the continent, not to create a 
dependency on outside expertise but where the international community might help in 
creating a ‘favorable climate’ for long-term growth and development.179 As a signal of 
Hammarskjold’s next move, he directed Heinz Wieschoff, the top UN official on Africa, to 
initiate plans upon his return to New York for a ‘massive’ African program.180 
 It would seem that Hammarskjold had a realistic sense of the problems facing Africa 
on the verge of independence and was equally confident that the UN was a crucial part of the 
solution. Some, however, believed that the Secretary-General’s optimism amounted to a 
rather simplistic and one-size-fits-all view of the solutions to Africa’s problems. At a press 
conference in Tanganyika, Hammarskjold argued that there should be no distinction made 
between underdeveloped countries moving towards independence and those who had 
achieved it four or five years ago.181 The British Colonial Office in Tanganyika similarly 
observed that Hammarskjold was far more concerned with economic and social conditions 
than the date of independence.182 Brian Urquhart, the longtime UN official and 
Hammarskjold’s biographer, affirmed there was a naïve belief at the UN during this period 
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that if the UN could take care of the economic and social needs of Africa, any political 
problem would work itself out.183 
 Pierson Dixon, the UK Ambassador to the UN, offered another insightful analysis. In 
light of a conversation with Hammarskjold upon his return from Africa, Dixon recognized 
that, ‘the Secretary-General has been fired by [the] prospect of [the] decisive and benevolent 
impact by the United Nations on a complex new situation which is clearly of very first 
importance.’ Nevertheless, Dixon warned that Hammarskjold was prone to try to fit many 
complicated problems into one matrix and one broad solution with himself acting as the 
linchpin, in this case between the African states and the UN machinery. Dixon attributed 
some of Hammarskjold’s eagerness to act to perhaps feeling over-extended in the Middle 
East over the past years and where his plans for economic development in 1957-58 fizzled. 
Africa, according to Dixon, could prove more rewarding for the Secretary-General.184 
 However, there is also evidence that points to some strong and less naïve reservations 
Hammarskjold had with regard to Africa’s impending decolonization and the future of its 
leadership. Privately, he expressed his reservations at the speed of independence in the 
Belgian Congo and was similarly troubled by the situation in what was then known as 
Ruanda-Urundi. Apparently, he was so concerned over the conditions in this region of Africa 
that he considered sending a follow-up envoy of ‘Ambassador-level’ diplomats in order to 
provide a more extensive assessment. He was also less than impressed by the leadership in 
Cameroon, the French Congo and British Cameroon.185 In these cases, Hammarskjold 
acknowledged that the demand for independence rarely bore relation to those countries’ 
health.186 Prime Minister Nkrumah of Ghana alarmed Hammarskjold more than any other 
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leader he met. He had no misgivings in describing Nkrumah as self-seeking and personally 
ambitious. He was particularly distressed over Nkrumah’s imperialistic interests in Togoland 
as well as Nkrumah’s calling of a special session of the legislature during his visit where he 
castigated Olympio, Togoland’s President. Within Ghana, Hammarskjold believed Nkrumah 
had built a ‘cult of personality’ despite his inferior leadership. Finally, he deplored 
Nkrumah’s efforts at development that Hammarskjold likened to ‘building pyramids’. He 
cited the Tema Harbor development project—an effort to transform a small fishing village 
into an ultra-modern seaport—as one such ‘pyramid’.187  
 No doubt also informing Hammarskjold’s impression of Nkrumah was the UN’s 
previous experience with the Prime Minister. In October 1957, just seven months after Ghana 
became the first sub-Saharan African country to declare its independence, UN economist 
Arthur Lewis arrived to take up a two-year post as the UN economic adviser to Nkrumah. 
Born in Saint Lucia in the British West Indies, Lewis had previously served as a lecturer at 
the London School of Economics and full professor at the University of Manchester. Lewis 
had a UN connection when, in 1950, David Owen utilized his services for a UN study that 
would become a classic in the field of development economics.188 Nkrumah had made two 
previous attempts to involve Lewis in his nation’s economic development. In 1953, he asked 
Lewis to advise him on the then British-planned Volta River Project. Lewis turned down 
Nkrumah at the time and the task instead fell to another UN top consultant, Robert Jackson. 
Lewis did acquiesce in 1955 to a request to provide an impartial evaluation of Jackson’s 
report.  
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Now in 1957, Lewis—paid through the EPTA for his services—was finally at the 
disposal of Nkrumah. Nevertheless, as UN historian Craig Murphy explains, the two were at 
odds from the start over what Lewis perceived as the Prime Minister’s excessive and 
imprudent spending.189 At one point, Lewis wrote to Nkrumah imploring him:  
as a fellow socialist, to whom the idea of spending money on embassies, 
airforces, yachts, “making Ghana’s voice heard all over the world” and other 
such boastfulness is downright sinful, so long as 80 per cent of the people still 
have no water, and so long as one baby in every three still dies before it is five 
years old. You belong to the class of great world leaders of small nations, like 
Masaryk, Ben Gurion, Munoz, Marin, Cardenas or U Nu, none of whom for 
one moment consider spending £80 million on such baubles.190  
 
Lewis especially advised against pouring in funds or making large concessions to chase after 
the Volta River Project. Nkrumah rejected Lewis’ advice on all fronts, prompting Lewis to 
seek another assignment before his time was up in Ghana. Lewis quickly transferred to a 
position, in early 1959, as Deputy Managing Director of the new UN Special Fund under 
Paul Hoffman.191 Ironically, one of the first projects undertaken by the Special Fund was a 
three-year survey of the Volta River flood plain in conjunction with Nkrumah’s 
government.192  
 Following Hammarskjold’s encounter with Nkrumah, where he made many similar 
observations as Lewis, the Secretary-General concluded that the UN should refrain from any 
further development programs in Ghana. (Presumably the Special Fund survey was, by this 
time, already underway). The feeling might have been mutual, as Ghana also showed little 
interest in a future role for the UN in its region, turning down an offer for a UN Resident 
Representative.193 Hammarskjold’s hesitancy and unease over Ghana and other African 
countries, and conversely his enthusiasm towards an extensive UN role in others, shows that 
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he might have had a one-size-fits-all approach to Africa’s problems, but that did not mean he 
was not selective in its application.  
Western Approaches to Development Assistance for Africa   
Overall, as Christopher O’Sullivan has argued in ‘The United Nations, 
Decolonization, and Self-Determination in Cold War Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960-1994’ the 
UN’s involvement in Africa grew in parallel to the process of decolonization.194 Yet, so did 
much of the rest of the world’s interest in the continent. As argued in Chapter One, the US 
and the Soviet Union both had a growing interest in aiding the underdeveloped world as the 
1950s progressed. Each subsequently bolstered their aid to this region as a result. The US and 
Soviet Union, like the UN, directed most of their economic aid to Asia and Latin America 
since much of Africa remained the domain of various colonial powers. However, by the 
beginning of the 1960s Western leaders also joined Hammarskjold in paying increasing 
attention to Africa. Easily the most famous example of this is British Prime Minister Harold 
Macmillan’s proclamation that a ‘wind of change’ was blowing through the continent. 
Macmillan’s declaration came during the Prime Minister’s own tour of Africa that coincided 
nearly exactly with that of Hammarskjold’s.195 Upon his return, Hammarskjold commented 
that it seemed that the major commonality for him and Macmillan was the recognition of ‘the 
strength of the awakening of national consciousness on the continent.’196 Similarly, President 
Eisenhower dedicated much of his 1960 State of the Union speech, delivered on 7 January 
1960, to newly emerging nations, their urgent development needs and the possibility of a 
cooperative response by the West.197  
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 Both Macmillan’s trip and Eisenhower’s speech came on the heels of a Paris Summit 
meeting, held from 19-22 December 1959, where these leaders along with President Charles 
de Gaulle of France and Chancellor Konrad Adenauer of Germany met to reevaluate the 
economic relationship between the West and the entire underdeveloped world. At the summit, 
one proposal dominated the discussion over how the West should approach economic aid to 
underdeveloped countries. The proposal, pitched by the Eisenhower Administration, was to 
transform and revitalize the OEEC, the institution responsible for managing Marshall Plan 
funds, into an organization that could coordinate the policies on aid and trade from Western 
donor countries to recipient countries of the Global South. For the Administration, this idea 
was built on the premise that the US alone could not provide all the capital needed to 
facilitate development throughout the Global South. Moreover, Western Europe, plus Japan, 
was now financially capable of sharing this burden. According to Secretary of State Christian 
Herter, the US did not mean for this proposal to be mistaken for a Marshall Plan for the Third 
World, since the envisioned reorganized OEEC would not have any lending functions. 
Instead, the purpose of a reconstituted and renamed organization would be to provide a 
platform for the US to spur other financially strong, but otherwise reluctant, industrialized 
countries of the ‘Free World’ to direct their monetary reserves towards development-hungry 
countries.198  
Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon laid the groundwork for the US strategy in 
visits to London, Brussels, Bonn and Paris from 7-14 December 1959. Then at the Paris 
Summit, Eisenhower raised the issue of increased Western cooperation over development aid, 
receiving a positive response from all but de Gaulle. The French President instead advocated 
the formation of a ‘directorate of four’ made up of France, Great Britain, the US and the 
Soviet Union, as a joint Soviet-Western effort to coordinate aid to the underdeveloped world. 
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Having tabled de Gaulle’s suggestion, Western Powers again met from 12-14 January where 
they reached an agreement to begin the transformation of the OEEC into a twenty-member 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Alongside the OECD, 
which would not officially launch until December 1960, a smaller group of eight (later ten) 
leading capital-exporting countries formed more immediately. The goal of this group was to 
serve as a forum where major donor countries could consider together the particular problems 
and techniques of development aid while designing and monitoring procedures for assisting 
undeveloped countries.199 Dillon established and led this smaller Development Assistance 
Group (DAG), for a time referred to as the Dillon Group or Plan. DAG held its first meeting 
in Washington from 9-11 March 1960.200 
Ultimately, the OECD and DAG are both examples of how the US and its allies 
sought to respond to the pressing call for development aid. The so-called Dillon Plan, as well 
as De Gaulle’s ‘directorate of four’, both figured prominently in discussions over 
development aid well into 1960. However, both bred a considerable amount of contempt by 
those who believed neither the West nor the Great Powers should have a monopoly on 
planning and providing for the needs of underdeveloped countries. Included in this list of 
critics was Secretary-General Hammarskjold whose trip to Africa overlapped with the 
development of these alternatives to UN-channeled aid.  
UN Aid Exceptionalism: ‘Better Billions’ 
 Clearly inspired by his tour of Africa, Hammarskjold used the weeks and months 
following his trip to sell UN development aid with a focus and passion not yet seen during his 
tenure. In a press conference just days after his return, Hammarskjold remarked that it was 
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his impression that all across Africa there had been ‘one standing demand, one standing 
hope.’ More than money or technical assistance, which African leaders already knew the UN 
could directly supply in modest amounts, these leaders wanted ‘moral support’. By moral 
support, he meant more than congenial encouragement but a sympathetic understanding of 
the problems facing African countries and a willingness to respond to their requests. For 
African leaders, this amounted to the proper ‘internationalization of aid’. Crucially, 
Hammarskjold remarked that switching from a system of bilateral aid to a system where a 
group of countries offered aid to a single country was not a true expression of the 
internationalization of aid. In this case, according to Hammarskjold, the bilateral nature of 
giving aid remained intact. Conversely, Hammarskjold believed recipient countries found it 
far easier to accept financial and technical assistance through an international body of which 
they were full and equal members alongside donor countries. Thus, he unequivocally stated 
that, as much as possible, states should channel development assistance through the UN.201 
 Questioned later about the apparent trend of superpower subversion of the UN in the 
field of economic aid, Hammarskjold’s response was to add an exclamation mark to his 
earlier statement. He began by stating that he was aware of the Soviet Union’s preference for 
bilateral aid and the current US pursuit of multilateral aid specifically outside the UN. Yet he 
saw these as a threat to the recipient countries more than the Organization. He concluded, that 
‘the billions put up would be better billions in terms of peace and world progress if they were 
put up in a forum which was more adjusted to the real political needs of the receiving 
countries.’ Overall, Hammarskjold remained positive. Aid through the UN would probably 
always be a fraction of bilateral aid through the Great Powers but it could carry greater 
weight to African countries since its donor was ultimately their Organization, which had no 
colonial past or future ambitions.202 In another press conference two weeks later, a reporter 
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asked Hammarskjold to comment on a statement from President Eisenhower the previous day 
regarding the establishment of a free world aid bloc203 while at the same time Khrushchev 
promoted Soviet bloc aid in New Delhi. Hammarskjold surmised the situation was still fluid, 
hoping each superpower would come to realize the benefits of UN-channeled aid and be 
made aware of the concerns of countries at the receiving end of being taken hostage by bloc 
aid.204 Moreover, keeping problems outside the Cold War obit was a role Hammarskjold 
believed was specifically and uniquely his as Secretary-General.205 Since the issue of 
development aid to Africa was, at least for the first half of 1960, still beyond the boundaries 
of the Cold War, the task now was to keep it out of range.  
 In what Andrew Cordier, Hammarskjold's executive-assistant, describes as his best 
exposition on the UN, the Secretary-General ruminated during a speech at the University of 
Chicago in May 1960 on higher forms of international society. He concluded:  
It is obvious that we cannot regard the line of approach represented by the 
United Nations as intrinsically more valuable or more promising than other 
lines, in spite of the fact that, through its universality, it lies closer to or 
points more directly toward the ideal of a true constitutional framework for 
worldwide international cooperation, and notwithstanding the obvious 
weaknesses of regional approaches to such cooperation. However, if one 
cannot a priori give it higher value, it is, on the other hand, equally 
impermissible to regard it as less promising than experiments at present 
pursued on other lines.206 
 
Seen in the light of the discussion of the day, and his other statements it would seem 
Hammarskjold was pragmatic enough to realize that the UN would never replace the 
metropolitan powers, the US or other forms of bloc aid. Nor was its goal to weaken the 
relationship between African states and other countries. However, the UN still had an equally 
valuable role to play.  
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The above statements by Hammarskjold evoked some candid and expositive 
responses from an individual who carefully measured any public remark. Yet perhaps the best 
source on Hammarskjold’s uncensored opinion toward UN development aid and its 
alternatives is found in a private letter to his friend Hans Engen, Norway’s Ambassador to the 
UN from 1952-1958. Again, Hammarskjold made clear to Engen his belief in a strong 
preference among Africans for UN-channeled aid, citing his conversation in Africa with 
Nyerere. On the alternatives, Hammarskjold admitted he lamented the ‘so-called Dillon plan’ 
(officially, DAG). He viewed bloc aid as a poor substitute for bilateral aid and the Dillon 
group—made up of five ex-colonial powers sprinkled with a few other NATO members—as 
simply bilateralism in disguise. He reasoned that African states would treat group or bloc aid 
from an institution they did not belong to as the same as bilateral aid, since neither brought 
them beyond colonial or Cold War influences. He also regretted no DAG country, less Italy, 
had made any contact with his Office to coordinate strategies. Hammarskjold attributed this 
to the West’s pathological effort to avoid ‘mixed company’, even with an organization that 
had considerable experience in the aid arena. The other unwelcomed alternative, which kept 
the UN on the periphery of the development aid game, was President’s de Gaulle’s 
‘directorate of four’. Hammarskjold considered it a ridiculous idea—‘substantially dangerous 
and tactically poor.’207 Hammarskjold also confided to Ambassador Dixon that he was far 
from sympathetic to the idea of a new international group dealing with aid to underdeveloped 
countries that operated outside the UN. Other members of the UN Secretariat echoed 
Hammarskjold’s resentment and suspicion over DAG, as did a number of governments from 
the Global South. The fact that their first meeting had been a closed-door affair only 
reinforced the perception it was a ‘donor’s club’.208  
Promoting UN Aid Machinery  
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 Determined not to let any bloc hijack what he believed to be the UN’s central position 
in providing economic development assistance to African countries, Hammarskjold spent the 
spring of 1960 promoting specific ways the UN could keep pace and compete alongside 
alternative schemes. This amounted to initiating plans for a massive push to increase aid 
provided by or channeled through the UN—aimed especially at Africa. Hammarskjold keyed 
in on the expansion of a number of UN aid programs including the EPTA and the Special 
Fund.209 These programs presented two pressing problems for Hammarskjold in early 1960. 
First, as mentioned, the geographic distribution of their current projects heavily favored Asia 
and Latin America over Africa. More urgent was the slumping contributions to the EPTA and 
the Special Fund from member states.  
 Specifically, the 1959 total contributions to the EPTA amounted to $32.8 million, one 
million less than the previous year and the first time that donations fell from one year to the 
next. Worse still, projected totals by mid-1960 for the EPTA were less than expected. The 
Special Fund did see an increase in pledges from 1959 to 1960—from $26 million to a 
projected $37 million for 1960, yet expectations had been higher.210 In fact, Hammarskjold 
had even complained to various leaders while in Africa about the insufficient funds available 
to the UN for technical assistance and economic aid, promising he would push for the 
expansion of these programs in the year ahead.211  
 Beyond those programs, Hammarskjold advocated the use of several other initiatives. 
He sought to make a pilot UN program known as OPEX permanent. Launched in 1959, 
OPEX, short for ‘operational and executive,’ provided technical assistance specifically 
tailored to newly independent countries by providing public administration aid to help 
remedy the lack of trained personnel needed to run large national services like railways, 
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public health programs, the post office, etc. Unlike EPTA experts, OPEX officers temporarily 
entered the services of the requesting government to perform any number of specific 
executive or operational assignments.212 Hammarskjold now pushed for the growth of this 
scheme in light of the inevitable and imminent independence of so many African countries 
lacking administrative experience at the governmental level.213 OPEX was a favorite of 
Hammarskjold, due in part to the fact that the Secretariat directly supervised the scheme, 
while only using the recruiting services of the EPTA.214 Chapters Four and Five will show 
how Hammarskjold and the Secretariat used a oversized version of OPEX in an attempt to 
administer impartial public administrative aid to the highest echelons of the Congolese 
government—ultimately showing how operational execution of a development aid theory 
could prove exceedingly difficult.   
 Similarly, by 1960, Hammarskjold became far more active in the selection of UN 
Resident Representatives. Recall from Chapter One, that Resident Representatives served as 
the point of contact between the UN, its aid workers and recipient governments—
coordinating EPTA functions from their field offices. While in Africa, Hammarskjold raised 
the issue of installing Resident Representatives in all the areas he toured. Furthermore, he 
seemed to envision any future Representatives to Africa as personal delegations of his Office 
alone.215 Soon after his return he got to work recruiting Resident Representatives for Africa. 
He petitioned the Canadian Secretary of State, Howard C. Green, asking for Canadian official 
Dr. George Davidson to serve as his Resident Representative to Nigeria.216 Similarly, 
Hammarskjold personally appealed to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, asking for Indians 
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with considerable diplomatic experience in handling economic development problems in 
addition to having sound political sense.217 
 Finally, Hammarskjold pressed the expansion of the Regular Program for Technical 
Assistance. Established in 1948, it operated separately from the EPTA formed a year later. 
Now in 1960, Hammarskjold asked Hans Singer, recently placed in charge of drafting a 
White Paper containing all the Secretary-General’s recommendations for the upcoming 
session of the UN Economic and Social Council, to add a request for an additional $2 million 
for the Regular Program on top of its current budget of $780,000 for 1960. The principle 
motive, according to Singer, was to secure an increase in technical assistance funds 
controlled solely by Hammarskjold and not the Specialized Agencies who garnered the 
majority of EPTA funding.218   
 The fact that Hammarskjold was especially keen on expanding programs controlled 
by his Office highlights yet another competing interest. To some extent, the UN Charter itself 
gave rise to a rivalry within the UN family over development assistance. ECOSOC contained 
two main institutions, the Specialized Agencies as well as Programs and Funds. The 
Specialized Agencies were constitutionally and financially self-contained—thus not subject 
to direct control from the UN Secretariat. As mentioned, the UN Programs and Funds (ie. the 
Regular Program for Technical Assistance, the TAA component of the EPTA, the Special 
Fund and OPEX) fell under the supervision of the Secretariat and member states. Thus, 
Assembly resolutions could modify their provisions often on recommendations from the 
Secretariat.219 Urquhart noted that early on, Hammarskjold naively believed that with serious 
leadership he could get the Specialized Agencies to work in closer cooperation with his 
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Office. However, he quickly grew frustrated with a relationship Urquhart described as 
analogous to the feudal barons under King John—whereas the Specialized Agencies were 
adept at jealously protecting their autonomy.220 Hammarskjold made a formal attempt in 
1955 to coordinate planning between himself and the heads of the Specialized Agencies with 
the creation of the Administrative Committee on Co-ordination, or ACC. He hoped the ACC 
would prompt the main organs of the UN—the General Assembly and Security Council—‘to 
put on the shoulders of the administrations and of the Secretariat an increasing 
responsibility.’221 But over time, resentment and antagonisms caused the ACC to meet less 
and less frequently.222 Now on the eve of mass decolonization in Africa, the Secretariat had a 
heightened sense of the tendency of Specialized Agencies to press their particular 
development plans on governments of underdeveloped countries. This was one of the main 
reasons why Hammarskjold pressed for his own Resident Representatives in soon-to-be 
independent countries and why he delineated between UN programs he specifically endorsed 
while leaving the promotion of others with the UN family to their respective heads.223 
 The only idea that Hammarskjold completely scrapped in the months after his trip to 
Africa was a so-called ‘Emergency Fund for Africa’. He had raised the possibility of creating 
a $5 million reserve fund with several African leaders.224 Philippe de Seynes, the Under-
Secretary of Economic and Social Affairs, recognized the funds could be a very effective 
instrument in the hands of the Secretary-General who would have near exclusivity in 
apportioning the emergency aid. However, the scheme never gained traction since 
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underdeveloped countries outside Africa opposed it, ex-colonial nations feared the program 
would have too many political features and the UN Specialized Agencies were wary of 
another competing plan.225  
Hammarskjold also seemed to have thought better of the idea. During the April 
ECOSOC session of 1960, Hammarskjold’s first direct appeal to UN member states to 
increase aid to Africa via UN channels, the Secretary-General announced there would be no 
special African program. He reasoned any regional or territorial approach to development 
would undermine the UN principle of universality, as would placing countries in certain 
categories of development. He continued:  
I think, on the whole, we should leave aside an idea of the possibility to class 
countries as to the degree of underdevelopment or, rather, as the degree in 
which they have lagged behind historically in their general economic 
development. There is a universal problem of underdevelopment in the 
technical sense, and this problem should not be complicated or twisted in 
some kind of false political direction by the introduction of classifications or 
differences among those countries to which it does refer.226  
 
The statement can be interpreted a number of ways. In one sense, it confronted the 
status quo at the UN—and the League of Nations before it—which categorized both peoples 
and states by stages of political development. The League accomplished this under the 
Mandate System. The two main categories for the UN were UN Trust Territories and Non-
Self Governing States. Hammarskjold seemed to recognize this system’s expiration date was 
quickly approaching. From another perspective, Hammarskjold could have been 
distinguishing UN aid once again from other bilateral options. His references to ‘categories of 
development’ could have also been a subtle reference to Walt Rostow’s ‘stages of 
development’. In fact, Rostow first published his seminal work, The Stages of Economic 
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto, in March of 1960 a month before Hammarskjold’s 
ECOSOC statement, although his theory had been in circulation for some time. Stages 
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certainly had a political or Cold War bent not welcomed by Hammarskjold who believed he 
was taking a far less dogmatic approach to development.      
Overall, Hammarskjold desired to place the UN near the epicenter of the new wave of 
development aid likely to hit Africa. Evidence suggests that at this point Hammarskjold not 
only joined the likes of Owen, Singer and Hoffman as a key figure in the Organization’s 
development aid efforts, but was now the spokesperson, policy formulator and visionary in 
this respect, a point so far neglected by UN development scholarship. A November 1959 
article in The Observer astutely described Hammarskjold as clearly the ‘Headmaster’ at the 
UN. The author affirmed, it was Hammarskjold who was the topic of conversation among 
other UN workers and agencies, even spoken of with awe by senior Under-Secretaries.227 
Now upon his return from Africa, the ‘Headmaster’ was schooling anyone who would listen 
on the inherent value of UN development aid directed toward African countries on the verge 
of statehood. Specifically, Hammarskjold promoted the expanded use of existing UN aid 
machinery—the EPTA, the Special Fund, OPEX, Resident Representatives, the Regular 
Program for Technical Assistance and his agency within each of these programs—motivated 
by the demand for UN aid among African leaders and a sense of proving its worth.  
Finally, this evaluation of Hammarskjold’s preference for UN executive action is in 
keeping with a recent study by Anne Orford. Orford contends that the Secretary-General’s 
advocacy for UN executive action—which for her included UN efforts in preventive 
diplomacy, peacekeeping and technical assistance—acted as the means for Hammarskjold to 
‘manage decolonization’. She includes in her analysis a link between this thinking and the 
formation of Hammarskjold’s economic philosophy prior to taking office. Specifically, she 
points to the influence of the German Ordoliberal School of economics had on 
Hammarskjold. It argued that economic decision-making suffered when left to parliaments 
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and thus promoted executive and expert rule over democratic interest-based politics. 
According to Orford, Hammarskjold then applied this broad way of thinking to the UN’s 
responsibility to act as a neutral executive administrator of development aid on the cusp of 
African decolonization. Although for Orford focuses on Hammarskjold’s actions in the 
Congo as the true testing ground for this strategy, it’s clear from the above evidence that he 
sought to implement this policy prior to the Congo Crisis and to Africa as a whole.228  
SUNFED and the IDA: The Debate over a Capital Development Fund 
However, the aforementioned aid programs only encapsulated part of what many 
underdeveloped countries really sought and expected from the UN in terms of development 
assistance. In fact, throughout the 1950s, member states from the entire Global South had 
made increasingly louder appeals for the UN to play a major role in what they considered the 
most critical constraint on development—the lack of financial capital. As mentioned in 
Chapter One, the UN hosted a passionate debate over the creation of a multilateral finance 
agency administered by the UN known as SUNFED throughout the 1950s. The proposed 
agency would have allocated large development loans at below market rates—a concept 
known as soft lending—to aid development among underdeveloped countries. This idea 
originated with Indian economist V.K.R.V. Rao—apparently known as ‘Alphabet Rao’. In 
1949, as the chair of a UN Sub-Commission for Economic Development, Rao produced a 
report for ECOSOC where he identified the need for a financing agency that could operate 
outside the strict lending principles of private lenders or the World Bank.229  
Created in 1944 as a cornerstone of the Bretton Woods conference, the World Bank—
officially the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), but also 
known as just ‘the Bank’—operated under the status of a UN Specialized Agency. Upon its 
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inception, its foremost mission was the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. However, focusing 
on the ‘R’ in its title proved untenable due to a lack of funding and the coming of the 
Marshall Plan. Under the leadership of its first two presidents, John McCloy (1947-49) and 
Eugene Black (1949-1962), it pivoted toward financing development to survive. Its new 
clients became underdeveloped or developing countries mostly from the Global South. 
Ultimately, it sought safe revenue producing investment projects among relatively stable 
countries that posed less of a financing risk and could afford to borrow Bank funds at market 
rates.230 These parameters were necessary, according to McCloy and Black, to convince the 
Bank’s major financers, namely US financial markets, that its bonds were creditable, secure 
and profitable.231 
Rao’s recommendation sought to fill a gap, by creating a facility that could lend 
development funds to countries on easier terms than the Bank. Others in the UN Secretariat 
kept Rao’s proposal alive during the early 1950s, including Arthur Lewis, Philippe de Seynes 
and especially Hans Singer.232 The proposal itself went through a number of name changes 
but finally came to be known as the Special United Nations Fund for Economic 
Development, or SUNFED.233 Through the rest of the 1950s, SUNFED’s other major 
supporters were member states led by India, Chile and Yugoslavia. Working from the 
premise that the primary constraint facing underdeveloped countries was a scarcity of access 
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to financial capital, these states voiced their displeasure with the IBRD’s apparent lack of 
interest in offering soft-loans while its voting structure exclusively favored donor states. 
Equally important was this group’s desire to construct a lending agency where recipient and 
donor countries were full and equal members in selecting projects and allocating funds, even 
if these funds came almost entirely from developed countries.234  
SUNFED’s initial detractors were McCarthyites who called the proposed fund a 
communist world conspiracy meant to steal money from American taxpayers, assuming any 
future program would require the US government to provide the majority of the funds. 
Meanwhile, these critics were certain its funds would be used ‘for the benefit of left-leaning 
characters in the Third World.’ Operating from offices within the UN building at the height 
of their power, the McCarthy committee especially targeted Singer in scathing personal 
attacks.235 The World Bank also reacted negatively, believing that it was already preforming 
the functions of the proposed SUNFED. Moreover, the Bank’s President starting in 1949, 
Eugene Black, operated by conservative lending principles and thought soft-financing was an 
unsound practice—although he would later do an about-face on this position.236 Recall also 
from Chapter One, that in 1953 Eisenhower deflected the growing demand to establish 
SUNFED by suggesting that Third World development ought to be a condition of 
disarmament—a view shared at the time by many of the other potential donor states of the 
industrialized West. Thus, early on, the Administration’s public strategy was to defer or delay 
SUNFED’s establishment if only by getting the scheme lost in endless preparatory 
committees with the various UN organs.237  
Opposition to SUNFED from within the Administration was less tactful. Secretary of 
Treasury, George Humphrey, was against all multilateral aid programs, especially one in 
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which he believed the US would pay the majority of the bill while other states spent 
recklessly.238 Then by the mid-1950s, the decision by three potential donor states to join the 
so-called SUNFED bloc, including the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and the Netherlands, 
rejuvenated the stagnating debate. Meanwhile, another group of industrialized countries, 
including Denmark, Italy, Norway and France, also seriously reconsidered their previous 
aversion toward SUNFED.239 The fact that wealthy industrialized countries were now 
contemplating supporting SUNFED was no small development. For SUNFED to work, it 
needed large donors to provide the capital to lend—none bigger than the non-committal 
United States. Whereas, if SUNFED backers could convince the US to support its cause, 
other big donors like Great Britain and Canada would likely follow suit.  
Thus at the 1957 UN General Assembly, SUNFED proponents attempted to force the 
US to take a firm position when they called for a vote, for the first time, on the drafting of 
statutes for SUNFED. The US voted against the measure, arguing that the establishment of a 
SUNFED program might soothe some consciences but had little chance of doing its job. 
Ironically, the task of outlining the US position in 1957 fell to Paul Hoffman, at the time part 
of the US delegation to the Assembly. A New York Times editorial from 1 February 1957 
reported Hoffman might have delivered the US position through gritted teeth since he had no 
rebuttal for why the US was unwilling to contribute $80 million towards a fund of $250 
million when its defense budget stood at $40 billion.240  
 The dissenting vote cast by the US for the 1957 SUNFED resolution left it in 
opposition to every member state from the Global South for the first time in a UN vote. The 
vulnerable US position, nevertheless, opened the door for multilateral aid advocates like 
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Lodge and Hoffman to respond by advocating the immediate establishment of the Special 
Fund. They believed pre-investment aid to be a viable alternative to SUNFED and a counter-
proposal that could put that scheme to rest. In fact, some scholars have made the same 
conclusion to the effect of dismissing SUNFED as early as 1957. Jolly, et. al. concludes that 
the birth of the Special Fund in 1958, ‘brought to a close the nine years of highly contentious 
and often-tortuous debate on the question of UN funding for the economic development of 
developing countries.’241 Likewise, Olav Stokke in The UN and Development: From Aid to 
Cooperation, argues that the unfulfilled idea of SUNFED stalled and ended sometime in 
1957.242 Even Singer called the Special Fund a type of consolation prize for SUNFED that 
ceased being a workable option by the late 1950s.243 Yet, these conclusions amount to a post-
facto analysis and are partially misleading in that they neglect the fact that SUNFED 
supporters always viewed the Special Fund as an initial step towards the establishment of 
SUNFED—not as a substitute. In fact, the hope that the Special Fund would at least keep 
dormant the question of SUNFED for a few years was misplaced. Already during the first 
meeting of the Special Fund Governing Council, set up for member states to approve the 
Fund’s aid requests, the delegate from Argentina reminded those present that the Special 
Fund was a short-term fix to the eventual establishment of SUNFED.244    
Realizing almost immediately that the idea of the Special Fund was an untenable 
surrogate for SUNFED, others within the US government moved simultaneously to come up 
with a more sustainable counter-proposal. In February 1958, the Democratic Senator from 
Oklahoma, Mike Monroney, announced his intension to introduce to the US Senate a 
resolution calling for the establishment of an International Development Association, or IDA, 
as an affiliate of the World Bank. Like the Bank, Monroney’s proposed IDA could offer 
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loans for development projects in underdeveloped countries, yet with two key differences. 
First, it planned to offer loans on terms more flexible than the Bank. Additionally, the IDA 
could finance projects regardless of their profitability. Monroney couched his argument 
solely in terms of American interests. He told Under-Secretary of State Herter that the IDA 
was a viable replacement for the bilateral Mutual Security Program (MSP) that Congress 
believed was now outmoded.245 Moreover, Mason and Asher associate the IDA with the 
American desire to find an outlet for its massive holdings of inconvertible foreign currencies. 
They track the pre-history of the IDA back to the passage of the PL 480 program in 1954—a 
major focus of the next chapter. In short, PL 480 allowed the US to sell surplus agricultural 
commodities to food deficient countries, paid for in the currencies of the recipient countries. 
As the popular PL 480 program expanded during the mid-1950s, the US holdings of foreign 
currencies grew congruently. Yet, the US hardly ever drew upon these reserves since the 
existing US aid programs, like the bilateral Development Loan Fund, paid out in US dollars. 
Under Monroney’s IDA, the US could transfer its large reserves of foreign currencies to the 
IDA, which could in turn make long-term loans at low interest rates to facilitate development 
in underdeveloped countries.246 
The Eisenhower Administration thought Monroney’s proposal would benefit from a 
discussion at the international level but nevertheless backed the creation of IDA almost from 
the start. First, it recognized the demand among underdeveloped countries for capital to come 
from a multilateral source. This was in keeping with the Administration’s decision, in 1958 
and discussed in Chapter One, to add a multilateral component to its foreign economic policy 
of trade and aid. Thus, the IDA actually leapfrogged other aid options in importance like the 
recently established DLF.  
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As a clear indication of the effect decolonization had on this process, Joseph 
Satterthwaite, Eisenhower’s Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, flatly asserted 
the DLF was not what Africa needed. Meanwhile, the value of the IDA over that of SUNFED 
was also readily apparent to the Administration. Under the IDA proposal, underdeveloped 
countries could join the program as benefactors but did not have voting power, which would 
remain in the hands of its principle financial subscribers led by the US. Whereas with 
SUNFED, member states would share voting power equally. Moreover, only countries 
affiliated to the World Bank could apply for IDA membership, thus excluding the Soviet 
bloc. Conversely, with SUNFED, the Administration surmised that the Soviet influence 
would far exceed its financial contributions. Finally, the IDA was clearly a far better plan 
than de Gaulle’s ‘directorate of four’ in the eyes of the Administration.247 
However, one should not only view the IDA proposal as a manifestation of American 
will—just as with the creation of the Special Fund. The purpose and timing of the IDA 
clearly meant it was also a direct response to the continued attempt to establish SUNFED, 
despite the creation of the Special Fund. In fact, Singer claims that the IDA’s true antecedents 
go back to Rao’s original appeal for a soft-financing agency.248 Eugene Black, who endorsed 
the IDA proposal in a New York Times article from February 1958, admitted years later that 
the purpose of the IDA was to offset SUNFED.249 This might partially explain Black’s 
conversion from his previous belief in the unsoundness of soft-financing. Additionally, in a 
meeting with Clarence B. Randall, the chairman of the Council on Foreign Economic Policy 
and special consultant to President Eisenhower, Black confided that during his past trips to 
Africa, the latest coming in March 1958, he had been ‘taken to task’ by African 
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representatives he met. According to Black, it was their belief that the Bank was essentially 
an extension of the metropole to the neglect of the needs of African peoples. Certainly the 
IDA, as an affiliate of the World Bank, could combat this stigma. Although, interestingly 
Black also informed Randall he foresaw a partial remedy in offering individual loans to 
Africans. For example, $50 to a farmer to buy a plow. The suggestion presages the micro-
financing movement of later decades. It also indicates that Black might have been willing to 
jump at the chance to create the IDA as a response to demands of African countries come the 
late 1950s.250 
Bolstered by the anticipation of mass decolonization in Africa, battle lines over the 
issue of multilateral soft-finance aid formed during the 1959 General Assembly where 
SUNFED and the IDA both sought further endorsement by member states. A handful of 
African delegations welcomed the IDA as a means to address the ‘grossly inadequate’ capital 
available to them and future independent states. However, they stood resolute in affirming 
that SUNFED represented a genuine international capital development fund and the soundest 
and surest means of promoting economic and social advancement.251 Member states from the 
Soviet bloc joined African states in supporting SUNFED, but went further in accusing the US 
and its allies of limiting the full implementation of SUNFED, while describing the IDA as a 
dangerous rival and puppet of the US government.252  
The biggest IDA backers, including the US, the UK, France and Canada, also made 
their case. US delegate, George Meany, pointed out that the IDA proposed similar lending 
terms to those of SUNFED but with four times as many funds at its disposal. The US 
estimated funds available at start-up to be near $1 billion—an estimate questioned by more 
than one delegate. (When the IDA did launch in September 1960, it had a total subscription 
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of $625 million from fifteen countries). Meany and the UK delegate, David Ormsby-Gore, 
argued that linking a capital loan fund with the IBRD was only logical since loans were a 
banking function better administered by a financing institution than the United Nations.253 
Ultimately, an IDA resolution did pass the General Assembly, receiving a full endorsement 
less eleven abstentions from the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, a SUNFED resolution also passed 
with an overwhelming majority, less abstentions from twelve Western states including the 
US. The difference between the two resolutions was in the language and timing. The IDA 
resolution welcomed the decision already made by the IBRD to create the program, which 
would sign its charter in January 1960. The SUNFED resolution called on the UN to study 
how to make further progress toward the early establishment of a UN capital development 
fund.254 Even as the IDA seemed to outpace SUNFED, the lack of unanimity ensured that the 
debate would continue well into 1960.  
The creation of the IDA in January 1960 coincided with the simultaneous formation 
of the OECD and DAG—two other Western dominated institutions aimed at facilitating aid 
toward underdeveloped countries. Yet, it also took place as Hammarskjold toured Africa, 
who returned, of course, motivated by the prospect of answering the demands of African 
leaders by using the UN aid to accelerate development on the continent. However, 
Hammarskjold remained publically silent during the course of the SUNFED and IDA debates 
taking place at the UN throughout 1959 and 1960. Although this may seem like a curious 
decision, it had been Hammarskjold’s customary practice to stay above the fray on hotly 
debated issues in the Assembly or Councils.255 It was one of the reasons why he never held 
press conferences when the main UN organs were in session. Nevertheless, Hammarskjold 
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was a passionate defender of the intrinsic value of UN-channeled aid and was equally 
adamant about keeping aid to Africa outside of the Cold War orbit, or likewise, dominated by 
a bloc or group.  
In terms of SUNFED specifically, Hammarskjold stated back in 1956 that he hoped 
for a ‘more forceful implementation and action’ on a program like SUNFED because of the 
great need. Yet, he advocated the use of any number of international channels to ultimately 
fulfill this need, naming at the time SUNFED, the EPTA, or the International Finance 
Corporation.256 In July 1959, he made an appeal for something innovative, to address the 
imbalance between rich and poor countries and a ‘widespread feeling in the under-developed 
countries of the need for some new break-through on the road to economic development’ yet 
did not mention SUNFED by name.257 At the same time, Hammarskjold’s top officials kept 
the Secretary-General informed on their deliberate efforts to defend SUNFED against false 
accusations. De Seynes in one instance wrote to the executive editor of the New York Daily 
News in response to an article from 21 October 1956 entitled, ‘Watch out for Sunfed’. De 
Seynes pointed out a number of the article’s ‘untruths’ including that SUNFED supporters 
expected the US to contribute $35 billion to the program’s projected budget of $50 billion, 
two bloated figures according to de Seynes.258  
Still, private conversations reveal a more definitive position by Hammarskjold 
towards the IDA. On 8 October 1959, just as member states prepared to debate the IDA and 
SUNFED draft resolutions in the General Assembly, Hammarskjold and de Seynes met in 
New York with Under-Secretary Dillon. There, Hammarskjold proposed setting up a 
Consultative Board for the IDA that would include himself, Paul Hoffman and David 
Owen—thus similar to the Special Fund’s Consultative Board. His justification was that he 
                                                          
256 Transcript of Press Conference, 27 February 1956, in Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume II, 696-97.  
257 ECOSOC OR, 28th Session, 1068th meeting, 6 July 1959.  
258 Letter from de Seynes to Richard M. Clarks (Executive Editor of the New York Daily News), 2 November 
1956, UNARMS, S-0450031014.  
116 
 
had noticed a desire among underdeveloped countries for an avenue to express their views, 
should the IDA form. Since aid recipient countries forecasted they would not be full or equal 
members of the IDA, a gesture like a Consultative Board may cultivate a feeling that the 
Secretary-General was providing this service on their behalf. He added that Western states 
vacillating between supporting SUNFED or the IDA, like the Netherlands for example, might 
be more in favor of the IDA option if there were some symbolic tie between it and the UN. 
Hammarskjold seemed to have persuaded Dillon, who nevertheless thought that Eugene 
Black should have the final say. Lodge concurred, a Consultative Board that met regularly 
with Black on the IDA would, ‘lay to rest any important SUNFED agitation.’259  
Black’s response was less enthusiastic. He opposed the Board, believing it would 
create the appearance the IDA was subject to political influences. A lack of confidence in the 
IBRD would then jeopardize the marketability of the Bank’s bonds.260 The best he could 
offer was to form a non-advisory liaison committee with Hammarskjold, Hoffman and Owen 
to inform one another of current and future plans.261 Overall, the episode does not necessarily 
mean Hammarskjold advocated the establishment of the IDA over SUNFED. What is more 
likely is that he was hedging his bets. No doubt expecting the imminent formation of the 
IDA, the Secretary-General wanted to influence it through his participation in a Consultative 
Board. Moreover, Black’s refusal to involve the Secretariat in the IDA in any meaningful 
way underscores the turf wars, discussed above, within the broader UN family. A situation 
that Urquhart equated to ‘a bunch of single-issued organizations paddling their own 
canoes.’262   
The 30th ECOSOC and 15th General Assembly, 1960 
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 The proposed Consultative Board may have been a non-starter for injecting the UN 
into an advisory role for the IDA, but Hammarskjold’s other recommendation during his 
meeting with Dillon did gain more traction. Hammarskjold noted with regret to Dillon the 
sagging image and waning influence of the UN Economic and Social Council—a UN organ 
envisioned by the UN Charter to operate with as much authority as the Security Council. 
Therefore, he suggested transforming the upcoming ECOSOC, set to meet during the summer 
of 1960, into a type of economic summit attended by cabinet ranking ministers. He argued 
that by raising the caliber of ECOSOC’s attendees, he hoped to raise the Council’s profile.263 
Curiously, as Hammarskjold worked to promote this ECOSOC economic summit during the 
course of 1960, he may have shrewdly been trying to compete with the likes of DAG and the 
OECD by offering an alternative forum to coordinate international development policies. He 
was likely interested in redirecting the development aid debate to an arena where his Office 
played a more prominent role in comparison to the General Assembly.  
As the events of 1960 unfolded, he used the summer ECOSOC for another key 
purpose. Having spent the majority of the spring of 1960 formulating and promoting an 
expanded role for the UN in terms of channeling aid to Africa, Hammarskjold used the 
summer ECOSOC meeting to unveil his most concrete policy recommendations. These came 
in the form of two official statements issued by Hammarskjold in early June 1960, about a 
month prior to the start of the 30th ECOSOC to give member states time to consider his 
proposals. This included proposing to set EPTA and Special Fund contributions for the 
coming year at $100 million—nearly doubling the 1959 total for the two programs. Next, he 
recommended that the UN consultant service, OPEX, be made permanent to help countries 
emerging from colonial rule with administrative needs. In addition, he advised that the budget 
for the Regular Program for Technical Assistance increase by at least $2.5 million a year for 
the next few years to keep pace with the demands and expectations from these same 
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countries. Lastly, he drew attention to the need to increase Africa’s share in all of these 
programs moving forward.264  
At least one ECOSOC delegate, Hector Bernardo from Argentina, later voiced his 
regret that Hammarskjold had backed off from a full endorsement of SUNFED in these 
statements.265 Considering that Hammarskjold was still awaiting a reply from Eugene Black 
on his potential role within the IDA, Hammarskjold might have still been simply hedging his 
bets. However, he never backed too far away from promoting the UN as an indispensable 
agent for development assistance. He did not mince-words when he wrote in his June policy 
recommendations of the problems and challenges posed to the UN by the effort to form 
intergovernmental organizations outside the UN—namely the remodeled OECD. 
Hammarskjold believed the OECD was ‘of great historic importance’ and was likely to play a 
big role going forward. However, he reminded member states that the UN ‘remains the only 
universal agency in which countries with widely differing political institutions and at 
different stages of economic development may exchange views, share their problems and 
experiences, probe each other’s reactions to policies of mutual interest, and initiate collective 
action.’ He warned that unless member states took action within the UN, a danger existed that 
regional economic organs outside the Organization may divide as much as unite.266 
The strongest response to Hammarskjold’s policy recommendations and general 
counsel came from Under-Secretary Dillon. He served as the US representative to the 
ECOSOC ministerial meeting that started on 11 July 1960, which Hammarskjold had 
proposed the previous October. Dillon’s remarks blunted many of the Secretary-General’s 
sharper demands. He described the pending OECD and currently operational DAG not as a 
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threat but as complimentary to existing organizations. He went as far as to invite the UN 
Secretariat to participate in the upcoming DAG meeting in October, where pre-investment 
and technical assistance were on the agenda—an invitation privately sought by several 
members of the UN Secretariat. Addressing SUNFED directly, Dillon estimated that the 
program could not adequately control the flow of capital funds to a continent like Africa that 
had ‘limited absorptive capacities’ for such funds—the newest in a long line of reasons why 
the US was not willing to support the program. The UN would serve newly independent 
nations best by focusing on its pre-investment endeavors while letting the West finance larger 
investment projects—presumably through the IDA.267 Altogether, the summer ECOSOC 
managed to keep the debate on the proper internationalization of development aid within the 
UN forum. It also set the stage for the already drama-filled General Assembly session that 
began on 20 September 1960.  
There was no shortage of excitement and theatre at the 15th Session of the UN General 
Assembly.  In one way or another issues like the increased tension over Berlin, the question 
of Chinese representation, the ongoing crises in Laos, Algeria and the Congo all found their 
way to the 1960 General Assembly. Adding to the spectacle was Khrushchev’s shoe 
pounding incident (for which Prime Minster Macmillan requested a translation), a scarcely 
supported, but nonetheless shocking demand for Hammarskjold’s resignation also by 
Khrushchev, Cuban President Fidel Castro’s four-and-a-half hour Assembly speech and a US 
Presidential election. Perhaps less dramatic, but nonetheless significant, was the ongoing 
debate over UN development aid. In light of its demands to increase contributions to existing 
UN development aid programs, the UN Secretariat and Hammarskjold scored a number of 
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clear victories. In particular, Owen expressed his relief that the anticipated budgetary cut to 
the EPTA had fortunately proven unjustified since by the end of 1960, contributions to the 
EPTA exceeded that of 1959 by over 12%. Meanwhile, pledges for 1961 had jumped to $42 
million, the largest increase ever in the program’s existence to date. Owen anticipated 
Africa’s share of UN aid to grow to 29% in the coming year, compared to about 16% for 
1960. This figure included aid to all the newly independent African countries beyond that of 
the vast amount of UN aid now going to the Congo.268 The General Assembly also took 
action by passing a resolution (1527 XV) based on Hammarskjold’s recommendations from 
the previous June. It raised the level of funding for technical assistance specifically for newly 
independent states through the EPTA and the Special Fund. It also provided an additional 
$3.5 million for financing technical assistance under the Regular Program, exceeding the 
amount requested by the Secretary-General. Resolution 1529 (XV) specifically urged 
member states to increase their contributions to the Special Fund—this after pledges for 1961 
increased to $46.3 million, up $7.8 million from 1960. Additionally, Resolution 1530 (XV) 
made OPEX permanent.269  
These trends set a precedent for the rest of the 1960s. Prior to the merger of the EPTA 
and Special Fund in 1965, EPTA funding resources reached just over $54 million while the 
Special Fund contributions totaled $91.6 million. Shares of EPTA aid to Africa, compared to 
other regions, reached 35.2% by 1964-65.270 Moreover, while bilateral aid in 1960 amounted 
to 90% of total international economic assistance worldwide, by 1962, multilateral aid had 
increased significantly and was now about five-times as large as in 1954-56. The share of all 
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forms of multilateral assistance to Africa, compared to underdeveloped countries as a whole, 
increased from 18% in the mid-1950s to 40% in 1960.271  
Meanwhile, under the power of his own executive authority, Hammarskjold appointed 
Resident Representatives to a number of newly independent African states—including 
Nigeria, Togoland and Somalia. Besides coordinating UN development programs, these 
Representatives also served in other ways. For example, in April 1960 Hammarskjold sent 
Piero Spinelli to Togoland to act as a UN ‘presence’ as a response to what Hammarskjold 
believed to be Prime Minster Nkrumah’s imperial designs on its neighbor to the east.272 
Signaling his trepidation over the Congo’s independence, Hammarskjold sent the high 
ranking and well-seasoned Ralph Bunche, then the UN Under-Secretary for Special Political 
Affairs. Sture Linner, a key figure in Chapters Four and Five, accompanied Bunche and 
served as Hammarskjold’s eyes on the ground throughout the Congo Crisis. Of course, it was 
also at this point that George Ivan Smith was so warmly welcomed as a UN representative by 
future Tanganyikan President Julius Nyerere. After serving briefly as a UN Representative to 
Katanga, the wayward Congolese province, Smith served as the Regional Director of the UN 
Technical Assistant Program in Central Africa under Secretary-General U Thant.  
With regard to the Assembly resolutions and increased funding, Hammarskjold 
seemed satisfied and welcomed the progress made in following through on the UN’s 
responsibility to newly independent states.273 The US, for its part, endorsed the expansion of 
the EPTA and the Special Fund by contributing the maximum amount allowable to each 
program.274 Nevertheless, the Eisenhower Administration’s eagerness to support the 
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channeling of aid through the UN stopped there. With the launching of the IDA on 26 
September 1960, the Administration seemed unlikely to budge on SUNFED.  
Regardless, with the addition of sixteen new UN member states from Africa alone, the 
now built-in majority for the Global South at the General Assembly was an even more 
powerful force. During the course of the 1960 Assembly—defined in large part by the issue 
of decolonization—African states couched their support of SUNFED in anti-colonial terms 
by tying the adverse effects of colonialism to the prospect of future economic development. 
The Ghanaian representative, Alhaji Yakubu Tali, argued that Africa had a right to economic 
restitution for providing the natural resources used for western industrialization.275 The 
Guinean delegate, Camara Maurice, similarly remarked that, ‘industrial countries, which 
were in many cases responsible for the backwardness of the less developed countries, were in 
[sic] duty bound to furnish such assistance and could do so more effectively through a United 
Nations capital development fund.’276 Meanwhile, Mahmoud Fawzi from the UAR described 
how developed countries continued to prosper by exploiting the poverty of others—thus 
colonialism, in all its forms, must be wiped out. Other states chose to criticize alternatives to 
UN aid, including SUNFED’s direct rival—the IDA. The Nigerian delegate, Alhaji Maitama 
Sule, warned of how bilateral aid might jeopardize a nation’s sovereignty, whereas no such 
fear existed about UN aid.277 Other states from the Global South joined the chorus. B.K. 
Nehru of India voiced his disappointment at what he viewed as the IDA’s meager funds; 
totaling $750 million over a five-year period to meet the soft-loan needs of countries whose 
populations totaled 1.2 billion. He called for a doubling of IDA funding and the establishment 
of SUNFED.278  
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 The US delegate, Fredrick Payne, attempted to snuff out and stale the debate with 
what had become standard responses. According to Payne, SUNFED depended on 
superpower disarmament not yet achieved. Next, SUNFED as a new agency was unlikely to 
supply significant aid since it would be so underfunded. Finally, the IDA fulfilled the same 
functions that the proponents of SUNFED ultimately wanted. Rebuttals came from all sides. 
Hector Bernardo, from Argentina, said the issue was a ‘matter of financing the economic 
development of under-developed countries in a satisfactory manner.’ The Iraqi delegate, 
Ismat Kittani, took exception to Payne referring to SUNFED as a ‘new agency’ since it was, 
in fact, the full realization of the Special Fund. Moreover, its potential lack of funding was 
not a natural defect but the conscious effort by the US to apportion development aid 
elsewhere.279 B.K. Nehru again highlighted the non-universal nature of IDA membership and 
its weighted voting, depriving underdeveloped countries of an effective voice in the 
organization. In a final plea or demand, Camara Sikhe from Guinea requested all who 
opposed SUNFED to stand down as the dissenting minority and accede to the wishes of the 
large majority.280 
 The vote on a 44-power draft resolution to establish SUNFED once and for all took 
place within the General Assembly Second Committee on 6 December 1960. It passed 68 to 4 
to 8. The US, the UK, Australia and South Africa were the only four dissenting votes while a 
handful of other states abstained.281 The resolution passed the full Assembly on 15 December 
1960 as Resolution 1521 (XV), the same day as the famous ‘Declaration on the granting of 
independence to colonial countries’ (Resolution 1513 (XV)). Together the resolutions mark 
one of the more definitive shifts at the UN towards an agenda now increasingly influenced by 
the Global South and an effort by these same states to pursue de facto independence 
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alongside de jure through the international institution. In some ways, these votes presaged 
future actions by member states from the Global South, including the formation of the UN 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in 1964 as the primary General 
Assembly body meant to deal with issues of trade, investment and development opportunities 
among developing states. Both resolutions also left the US and a number of its allies isolated 
from the very group they hoped to win over at the UN. Meanwhile the Soviet bloc joined 
member states from Asia, Africa and Latin America in voting for both measures.  
 Of course, this was not the first SUNFED resolution to have passed the Assembly. 
However, it was the first to call for member states to ‘decide in principle’ to establish the 
program and the first to request the formation of a 25-member committee to draw up its 
statutes. Unfortunately, for SUNFED backers, the victory was fleeting. The details of the 
program’s implementation were again exhaustively debated by the 25-member committee in 
the months ahead where underdeveloped states once again tried to get the likes of the US and 
Great Britain to acquiesce and buttress the program with sufficient funding. The debate 
continued for the next half-decade until the scheme was finally launched in 1966 as part of 
the newly created UN Development Program, or UNDP. However, major donors still refused 
to contribute to what was now called the UN Capital Development Fund (CDF) until the mid-
1970s. Influenced by the debates started by the New International Economic Order and the 
chronic problems facing the least-developed countries, the Netherlands became the first 
Western state to pledge a sizable contribution to the CDF in 1974, later followed by other 
developed countries including the US in 1978. Once underway CDF operations remained 
modest, offering small-scale capital grants to least-developed countries.282 Meanwhile, the 
IDA became, and still is, a staple of financing and development aid offered through the 
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World Bank, dramatically increasing the number of client states it serves over the past five-
and-a-half decades.283  
Conclusion 
 As UN historian Olav Stokke points out, in one sense the SUNFED episode 
highlighted the Organization’s impotency. At the same time, it also provided an indication of 
the predominant development thinking of the day and signaled the mood of the majority in 
the UN. Still, he and others argue the unfulfilled idea of SUNFED stalled and ended 
sometime in 1957 or 1958.284 As argued here, this analysis does not take into account the 
revitalization of the intense discussion over SUNFED on the eve of mass decolonization in 
Africa in 1960 or the emergence of the IDA on the UN agenda in 1959. Crucially these 
developments, in addition to the emergence of the OECD, DAG and the promotion of 
existing UN aid programs, show development aid as a competition defined by varying 
interpretations of the internationalization of aid. A competition that saw the UN involved as 
an autonomous institution and actor largely spurred on by its impassioned Secretary-General, 
key member states and the coming of mass decolonization in Africa.  
In the end, the UN did manage to increase its development-presence in Africa during 
1960 and beyond. It also laid the foundation for the expansion of UNDP, its flagship 
development aid program by the mid-1960s, now counted as a co-equal alongside other 
regional bloc aid schemes. In this way, this episode offers an important look at how 
Hammarskjold and key member states managed to lay the groundwork for the Organization’s 
pivot towards making development its primary function. Yet clearly, the UN did not meet all 
of its lofty expectations for 1960, nor the aspirations of its member states from the Global 
South. In terms of the debate over soft financing, the IDA clearly out-paced the UN and 
SUNFED. Nevertheless, if one treats the IDA as a response to, or derivative of, the debate 
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over the internationalization of development aid started at the UN, nurtured by UN personnel 
and spurred on by new member states within UN forums, then conceivably one could still 
credit the UN for providing much of the impetus for the IDA’s existence. Perhaps this is what 
Hammarskjold had in mind when speaking at a Kenyan Rotary Club in January 1960, where 
he defined the UN as neither the creator of history nor the guide, but ‘it may be the 
instrument through which the body politic of mankind knows how to respond to its own 
development.’285 Once more, a subsequent development did come from the debate over 
multilateral development aid highlighted in this chapter. Therefore, Chapter Three will focus 
on how food aid and the establishment in of the UN World Food Program in 1961 was, in 
part, a direct outgrowth of the continuing effort to expand the UN’s role in coordinating 
multilateral development aid. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
‘The Constructive Use of Abundance’: the UN World Food Program and the evolution of 
the international food aid system during the postwar decades 
In early June 1961, the Democratic Senator from Iowa, Roswell Garst, confidently 
declared to fellow Senator Hubert Humphrey (D, Minnesota):  
We [Americans/Iowans] know exactly how to raise chickens—and in 
immense numbers. We know that it takes three weeks after setting an egg to 
hatch the chicken and nine weeks more to make it into the finest broiler 
anyone ever ate. We can have broilers three months after the egg is set…They 
are the most efficient converters of free grain into the meat type of protein for 
human consumption that has ever been devised. They (the chickens) are not 
dependent upon the weather. They are not dependent upon the fertility of the 
soil… Furthermore, we have the technicians—we have the models—we know 
exactly how to do it.286 
 
Senator Garst went on to stress the need to send US chicken-raising techniques 
abroad as a way to show poor countries the benefits of American know-how and 
encourage long-term development. Writing as a member of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and former member of the Agricultural Committee, Garst seemed 
to connect poultry production to the ongoing Cold War contest over which political and 
economic system could provide the best standard of living. In fact, Senator Garst 
envisioned that at least half of the poultry and eggs be used for school lunch programs 
as a means to promote human development among underdeveloped peoples. Just as 
important, he argued that by providing large quantities of chickenfeed, the US could 
simultaneously and conveniently dispose of its surplus grain. Finally, Garst suggested 
that the US should pursue any such endeavor through international channels. Garst, 
who was also a close friend of the new US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai Stevenson 
stated,  ‘I cannot think of any one thing that would improve our prestige on a 
worldwide basis as much as to have Adlai Stevenson get up in the United Nations and 
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just point out that we are able and willing to be helpful.’287 Humphrey forwarded the 
letter to Secretary of State Dean Rusk who welcomed the idea while cautioning that the 
overall success of any such endeavor depended on the recipient country’s stage of 
development.288  
The above correspondence is telling on a number of levels. Beyond an examination of 
how chickens could help the US win the Cold War, it highlighted several prevailing and 
significant trends of the early 1960s. First, it suggested that modern farming techniques could 
lead to more than just increased consumption but further development. Additionally, it 
expressed the idea that poor countries could use food assistance by way of technical 
assistance for development purposes. It also alluded to some of the development thinking of 
that era and how policymakers attempted to apply the principles of progress accepted in rich 
countries to less developed countries. Finally, Garst’s letter also emphasized the need to 
address issues like surplus disposal and agricultural aid for underdeveloped countries at a 
multilateral level. It is with this latter qualification that Garst’s recommendation presaged the 
establishment of the UN World Food Program, or WFP, later in 1961.  
However, the creation of the WFP is also rooted in the important role played by the 
UN as an autonomous institution and actor within the context of postwar development and 
development aid. In the introduction to this thesis it was argued that while scholars have 
extensively chronicled much of the history of food aid, even food aid administered through 
the UN, they have paid far less attention to the broader historical impact development 
thinking had on food aid during the postwar decades and vice versa. Conversely, 
development histories tend to focus on political and industrial development to the neglect of 
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agricultural development.289 Therefore, this chapter aims to examine the postwar link 
between food aid, development thinking and the part played by the United Nations—the 
Secretariat and the member states. It will show how, through the establishment of the UN 
World Food Program in the early 1960s, food aid joined the development discourse, 
ultimately leading to a significant change over the nature and purpose of food aid.  
Certainly, progress towards re-routing the purpose of food aid came in fits and starts 
during this period as the food aid debate highlighted both the common goals and competing 
interests of state and non-state actors. Yet ultimately, what began in the 1950s as a bilateral 
method to feed the hungry through the disposal of surplus agricultural commodities, evolved 
into an international food aid system centered on the utilization of surplus agriculture to spur 
economic growth. Thus, food aid transformed into investment capital. This transformation 
challenged two prevailing impulses of the first half of the twentieth century—and especially 
the 1950s. The first was that, for donor countries, the primary purpose of food aid was to 
dispose of or ‘dump’ surplus agricultural stock. The second was that, for recipient countries, 
food aid’s primary function was hunger alleviation. What resulted from the change, in large 
part overseen by the UN, was a more recipient-centered utilization of food aid for economic 
development. Crucially then, this study provides a functional example of how, through the 
internationalization of food aid, postwar development aid took on a global quality. 
Central to understanding the context and advancement of food aid for development 
purposes is an examination of key figures at the UN Secretariat, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization and an evolving transnational debate over food aid in the early 1960s. Through 
this process, UN development economist Hans Singer joined with FAO Director–General 
B.R. Sen and Secretary-General Hammarskjold in an attempt to make the benefits of food aid 
a shared goal among donor and recipient countries. The aim was to de–emphasize specific 
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national interests in favor of more reciprocity between donor and recipient countries. To this 
end, these individuals proved their institutions were not handmaidens of national strategic 
interests but the midwives to a developmental and transnational approach to food aid.  
 Additionally, both affecting, as well as, affected by these changes was the United 
States. Thus, this chapter will highlight the role played by the US as the largest provider of 
food aid, the most powerful of UN member states and the important role it played in framing 
and directing the debate on multilateral food aid. It will specifically focus on the Kennedy 
Administration, which from the start adhered to the notion that foreign aid and multilateral 
action should be mainstays in US foreign policy to the underdeveloped world. Ultimately, 
Kennedy doubled-down on aid as a foreign policy tool to help the US keep pace with the 
Soviet economic offensive. Additionally, he viewed foreign aid as a mechanism to cast a new 
image of America throughout the Global South and with the Afro–Asian bloc at the UN 
General Assembly. In doing so, the Administration saw a multilateral food aid initiative as a 
means to cut across the tri-sectional divide at the UN—between the West, the East and the 
Global South—and instead delineate a Free World versus Communist bloc division. Shaping 
the implementation of this strategy, the Administration embraced the latest trends in 
development thinking while relying on the skills of development economists, much like the 
UN Secretariat and FAO, to make development theories a reality. This ultimately led to a 
shift in thinking for the Administration, away from surplus disposal of US agricultural 
commodities and towards food aid as both a valuable foreign policy tool and one to promote 
economic development in underdeveloped countries.290 
Food Science and Early Postwar Bilateral and Multilateral Food Aid Schemes  
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 Although not the focus of this study, certain antecedents to the transformation 
agriculture generally, and food aid specifically, presaged the changes that took place in the 
early 1960s. Undergirding the effort to alleviate hunger and poverty during the late nineteenth 
century and early twentieth century was a growing understanding of nutritional science that 
made food requirements for whole societies calculable. Additionally, technical advances in 
hybrid seed development, artificial fertilizers and harvesting methods aided production for 
many developed countries. High on the list of innovations was the famed Haber-Bosch 
process that synthesized ammonia from nitrogen and hydrogen on an industrial level. 
Developed by German chemists Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch between 1909 and 1913, the 
mass production of ammonia served as a highly utilized crop fertilizer worldwide soon after 
its development. The Great Depression and subsequent New Deal reforms acted as another 
catalyst transforming the US, in particular, into a development laboratory and testing-ground 
for new agricultural methods later used overseas in an attempt to show how science could 
triumph over hunger. These breakthroughs helped usher in the so-called ‘Green 
Revolution’—a term not coined until 1968 but which generally references a global 
agricultural development boom that took place between the 1940s and late 1960s. The 
resulting record harvests, in combination with humanitarian concerns and the view that 
hunger and poverty were causes of regional and global instability, vaulted the concept of food 
aid to national and international prominence by the mid-twentieth century.291    
By the mid-1950s, the world’s major food aid donor, the United States, was again 
seeking additional outlets for its mounting agricultural surpluses following the end of the 
Korean War and the winding down of Marshall Plan aid. Therefore, in July 1954, the US 
Congress approved the Agriculture Trade Development and Assistance Act, better known as 
Public Law 480, or simply PL 480. As briefly mentioned in Chapter Two, from its inception, 
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the primary purpose of food aid allocated through PL 480 was to provide a safety valve for 
US domestic agricultural surpluses. For this reason, the primary backers of PL 480 through 
the 1950s were US farming interests. Crucially, PL 480 food aid promoted ‘agricultural trade 
development’ of American surplus in recipient countries, not development by recipient 
countries. The US disposed of the majority of its surplus stock under Title I of the program. 
Title I facilitated the sale of food on concessional terms in the domestic markets of recipient 
countries, most of which were newly independent and underdeveloped states. Aid recipients 
used the sale proceeds, or counterpart funds, for a variety of purposes but above all the 
program promoted market expansion for the flow of additional future US commodities. PL 
480 aid also had an altruistic component—to alleviate hunger and malnutrition, often as an 
emergency measure. Namely under Title II, PL 480 allocated food aid for humanitarian and 
development purposes, but this seems to have been a secondary consideration at best through 
the 1950s.292 American farmers benefited tremendously from the program and US agriculture 
exports climbed 33% in its first year of operation.293 From the start, India was the main 
recipient of PL 480 aid, including a May 1960 arrangement that provided $1.3 billion in 
wheat and rice aid over a four-year period—the largest arrangement in the history of PL 
480.294 This and other arrangements meant that PL 480 aid quickly became the predominant 
option for bilateral food aid for the rest of the 1950s, while also reinforcing the practice of 
surplus disposal to feed the hungry.   
 There were a few modest postwar multilateral food aid schemes that sprang from the 
modest and tempered efforts of the United Nations and one of its Specialized Agencies, the 
FAO. Food relief had been a component of some early ad hoc UN programs of limited 
duration focused on emergency aid for the victims of war such as the UN Relief and 
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Rehabilitation Administration and the United Nations Korean Reconstruction Agency.295 As 
for the FAO, it too facilitated measured progress in multilateral food aid. The FAO came into 
existence in 1943 as a result of an international conference in Hot Springs, Virginia. Its first 
Director—General, Sir John Boyd Orr, unsuccessfully tried to create an organization with 
wide ranging international responsibilities. His 1946 proposal, to transform the International 
Emergency Food Council from the War into a World Food Board meant to monitor and 
control global food production and distribution, failed to materialize as it clashed with 
American and British domestic agricultural policies. Therefore, member states relegated the 
FAO to the collection and dissemination of agricultural data as well as providing technical 
assistance, on its own or through the EPTA, during its first decade-and-a-half of existence. 
Reserved to a role far more limited than envisioned by Boyd, the FAO still managed to use its 
vast and respected statistical analysis capabilities to stress that food poverty existed in large 
part because of a lack of food production. The FAO thus promoted increased agricultural 
production as the means of alleviating hunger and malnutrition.296 Altogether, surplus 
disposal under PL 480 food aid underscored a donor-centric approach, meanwhile early 
multilateral efforts of the UN and FAO focused on emergency food aid and increasing 
production to reduce hunger.  
However, two programs devised in the late 1950s and launched in 1960, 
foreshadowed a change in the conceptualization of food aid. The first came as a result of the 
efforts of Democratic Senators Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern. They argued that 
with such a strong focus on surplus disposal, PL 480 had overlooked or ignored food aid’s 
potential as a legitimate development resource. In April 1959, Humphrey introduced a bill to 
use PL 480 agriculture commodities to cultivate conditions for peace, relieve human hunger 
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and promote economic and social development in underdeveloped countries. The Food for 
Peace bill passed in 1959 and became operational as a new White House office program in 
April 1960.297 The US Food for Peace Program was a turning point in the orientation of US 
food aid by broadening PL 480’s purpose. It also served to assuage officials like Humphrey 
who disdained the phrase ‘surplus disposal’ which sounded to him as if America was getting 
rid of old boots.298 Certainly, US domestic economic concerns, which still advocated surplus 
disposal, had not vanished. However, PL 480 now additionally advocated a more benevolent 
rationale going forward.  
At the international level, B.R. Sen, an Indian diplomat and the first Director-General 
of the FAO from the Third World, simultaneously sought to proprose a program that 
represented more adequately the victims of hunger in underdeveloped countries. Many of 
these countries had joined the FAO as non-voting associate members in 1955. Before his 
tenure at the FAO, which lasted from 1956-1967, Sen studied at Oxford, worked as a relief 
commissioner during the 1943 Bengal famine, was the director general of food for all of India 
(1943-1946) and briefly served as India’s Ambassador to the US (1951-52).299 In July 1958, 
Sen used the summer ECOSOC meeting to announce a new campaign against hunger. 
Making use of the FAO’s skills in data gathering and analysis, he laid out the facts on global 
hunger and malnutrition in the hopes of arousing world public opinion, more than nation-
states, towards action. Sen’s crusade, which would come to be known as the FAO Freedom 
from Hunger Campaign (FFHC), targeted NGOs, churches, business associations, and local 
community groups to focus the world’s attention on combating hunger through agricultural 
and human development schemes. Finally established in July 1960, the FFHC remained 
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handcuffed by its meager budget. Crucially, it lacked the support of the Eisenhower 
Administration, which still preferred to draw down its domestic surplus through the Food for 
Peace Program and wished to abstain from an international aid scheme aimed at increasing 
agricultural production within food deficient countries.300 Although originally designed to 
address hunger issues, the FFHC in fact came to focus on human, social and institutional 
development in rural areas.301 The Campaign also signaled an expanding international interest 
over the growing question of food aid and its purpose, a topic additionally taken up by the 
UN General Assembly in the fall of 1960. 
As mentioned, the 1960 General Assembly session marked the entry of sixteen newly 
independent African nations into the UN. They joined other member states in the Global 
South in placing issues like decolonization and economic development aid at the center of the 
discussion. Hoping to seize on this development in a General Assembly otherwise marked by 
divisions between the West and member states from the Global South as shown in the 
previous chapter, the US joined Canada, Haiti, Liberia, Pakistan and Venezuela to sponsor a 
resolution that called on the UN and the FAO to undertake a study on the feasibility and 
acceptability of a multilateral option for ‘food surplus utilization.’302 Choosing ‘utilization’ 
over ‘disposal’ in the initial draft resolution was just the initial signifier that aid recipient 
countries desired to alter the intent of food aid going forward. What also became clear during 
the ensuing debate was the existence of broad support among underdeveloped and developed 
countries for involving the international community in the process of food distribution. To 
this end, the draft resolution specifically associated the UN and its affiliated agencies more 
closely with the practice of solving, not just alleviating, the problem of hunger and 
malnutrition. However, it also revealed a wariness espoused by countries such as Argentina, 
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Burma and Thailand whose economic well-being depended primarily on the export of food 
commodities. They foresaw the danger that an expansion and increase of food aid posed to 
the normal trade patterns of agricultural commodities. Others, namely India, the UAR and the 
USSR were unsure if recipient states could in fact use food aid for economic development in 
all cases.303  
Despite these reservations the proposal passed unanimously, no easy feat in a General 
Assembly marked by contentious votes on a myriad of issues. Specifically, the operative 
clauses of UN Resolution 1496 (XV) invited the FAO Director-General and the UN 
Secretary-General to report back to member states in eight months on the possible role for the 
UN and its agencies in the process of surplus utilization of agricultural commodities. The 
unanimity was in no way indicative of universal approval for the unconditional expansion of 
food aid. It did, however, reflect a willingness by member states to examine the use of food 
aid at a multilateral level, all the more important after the curtailment of the FFHC budget 
early in the year. 
The Maturation of the Food Aid Debate: Transnational Contributions 
The question of the distribution and use of food aid not only sparked a debate among 
nation-states at the UN, but was also symptomatic of an existing transnational debate among 
development and agricultural economists of the day. In fact, the discussion over UN 
Resolution 1496 in October 1960, took place just months after the annual meeting of the 
American Farm Economic Association (AFEA) held in Iowa from 10-13 August. The 1960 
AFEA meeting saw leading social scientists from donor and recipient countries meet to 
dissect the impact and implications of food aid on underdeveloped economies. Cumulatively 
the conference papers, published in the December 1960 issue of the Journal of Farm 
Economics, represented an important intellectual contribution to the food aid debate and 
further indicated the transnational nature of the discussion.  
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A leading opponent of food aid generally at the conference was Theodore W. Schultz, 
a development economist from the University of Chicago and future Nobel Laureate in 
economics who had worked with Arthur Lewis of the UN back in the early 1950s. At the 
AFEA conference, Schultz took issue with both the motives and the results of US farm 
surpluses sent to underdeveloped countries like India under PL 480. For Schultz, powerful 
groups and government agencies within the US used food aid to pursue their interests 
exclusively. Schultz cited the Democratic Congressmen from North Carolina, Harold D. 
Cooley (D), the House chairman of the Committee on Agriculture, who at a recent hearing 
had instructed a State Department official that, ‘“We are primarily interested in getting rid of 
these surpluses and we don’t care how you do it and under what authority. We have told you 
we want the commodities sold for dollars first and then foreign currencies or then donate 
them.”’304 Schultz claimed to see through Cooley and other US officials who had tried to 
make, ‘a virtue out of the transfer of US farm surpluses,’ and the hollowness behind their 
empty praise of PL 480 as a means to economic growth in underdeveloped countries. Schultz 
argued that no studies had yet shown that PL 480 assistance had definitively led to increased 
economic growth in recipient countries and further speculated that PL 480 imports had the 
opposite effect.305   
S.R. Sen, a Planning Commission official within the Indian government, affirmed 
some of Schultz’s criticisms but mitigated others.306 Sen described the dominant Third World 
impressions of American offers of food aid as, ‘a combination of that of a kind-hearted 
humanitarian, an anxious salesman and a hard-headed negotiator.’307 According to Sen, 
recipient countries were wary of three characteristics of US aid offers under PL 480. First, PL 
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480’s stated goal to increase foreign markets for US agricultural goods alarmed many aid 
recipients. Sen explained that creating a demand for grant-based American milk powder 
could easily sour if supplies unexpectedly dried up because of insufficient US stock, or 
before an underdeveloped country had the ability to produce its own. Secondly, the need for 
the US to justify PL 480 assistance domestically often resulted in the effort to direct aid 
towards specific projects, which over a short period, could tangibly demonstrate the value of 
US food aid or the counterpart funds they produced. This so-called ‘project approach’ 
conflicted with the desire of underdeveloped countries who wished to direct all aid into their 
countries’ overall plan for economic development, deemed the ‘program approach’ by Sen. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, underdeveloped countries worried that food aid 
would replace dollar aid, which underdeveloped countries also desperately sought.308   
With these reservations in mind, Sen noted that India had made its own demands 
when taking on PL 480 aid.  It stressed that all assistance should be on a program basis, 
integrated into India’s Second Five Year Plan and should target long-term generalized 
economic development. Moreover, no program established on PL 480 assistance would be 
created that could not later be maintained by India’s own resources. Under these stipulations 
the results for India, according to Sen, had been very encouraging. India consumed a record-
setting ten million tons of wheat and 0.4 million tons of rice during its Second Five Year Plan 
period—much of which came from four PL 480 aid agreements over this period. Challenging 
Schultz’s analysis, Sen estimated India’s sale of the food commodities obtained through PL 
480 garnered $927 million in counterpart funds. Of this total, India was expected to apportion 
$686 million towards economic development, including constructing irrigation and power 
facilities, improving transportation and communication networks and funding research. 
Indirectly, Sen believed the use of these counterpart funds manifested an, ‘urge in people for 
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change thus creating favorable material and psychological conditions for further progress.’309 
Overall, Sen’s analysis echoed the developmental approach to food aid delineated by others 
at the conference but emphasized a food aid system that was altogether more recipient-
centered.  
The AFEA meeting also included what it considered an ‘international perspective’ 
offered by Mordecai Ezekiel, the soon-to-be Assistant Director-General in the FAO 
Economics Department. A further basis for Ezekiel’s authority stemmed from his work as the 
drafter of President Roosevelt’s New Deal Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. More 
recently, Ezekiel had led a 1953-54 pilot study in India on the use of surpluses to help finance 
economic development. Working in consultation with MIT professor Paul Rodan-Rosenstein, 
formerly of the World Bank, and several Indian economists, the study concluded that surplus 
agriculture commodities could be properly used to feed otherwise idle men now engaged in 
‘capital-formation projects’ like the building of roads, schools, etc. In this way, the injection 
of food surplus did not reduce demand for domestically produced foods or for imported 
commercial foodstuffs, both prevailing criticisms of food aid. Instead, according to Ezekiel, 
the surplus all went towards additional consumption. Another significant part of the study 
was that it perceived food assistance as primarily a tool for underdeveloped countries seeking 
to promote economic development and not from the traditional viewpoint of assisting 
developed countries stuck with ‘burdensome surpluses’.310  Like Sen, Ezekiel used his study 
to refute Schultz’s claim that one could use surpluses either to increase consumption or to 
finance economic development, not both. Still, Ezekiel admitted that few studies existed 
beyond his own, and where a country ignored or neglected the safeguards for surplus 
disposal, adverse effects were likely. Ezekiel’s word of caution specifically targeted the US, 
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which he claimed disposed of its surplus too capriciously for recipient countries increasingly 
dependent on food aid. According to Ezekiel, thoughtless surplus disposal, or dumping, also 
posed difficulties for food exporting countries including Argentina, Australia, Burma, 
Canada, Mexico, New Zealand and Thailand, all of which depended on the fair market sale of 
agricultural exports far more than the US.311  
Canada, for example, had expressed in the fall of 1955 its strong dissatisfaction with 
US agricultural disposal procedures during the preceding six-month period. It protested the 
disposal of some fifty million bushels of wheat under PL 480, some of which had gone to 
traditional Canadian markets thus displacing Canadian wheat.312 Additionally, in early 
January 1961, the US was scheduled to meet in Bangkok with representatives from Thailand 
and Vietnam to clear-the-air with two major rice exporters and respond to accusations of rice 
dumping.313  No doubt aware of these and other instances, Ezekiel concluded: ‘In this 
connection, may I make a plea that American agricultural economists give more attention to 
what American policies mean for the rest of the world. In the recent marathon hearings on 
American farm policy, very few of the distinguished economists who testified gave any real 
attention to the possible effect on the world markets and on other agricultural countries of the 
policies they were proposing.’314 
 Further indicative of a change in the debate over food aid, a number of participants at 
the 1960 AFEA conference echoed the argument of the previous year’s presidential address 
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by Willard Cochrane.315 Cochrane was a leading agricultural economist at the University of 
Minnesota, who at the time was serving as a campaign adviser for Senator John Kennedy and 
would soon become the head agricultural economist for the Department of Agriculture under 
Secretary Orville Freeman. In his 1959 address, Cochrane advocated the use of surplus 
disposal exclusively for economic development rather than strictly feeding the hungry, except 
in cases of famine. The key for Cochrane was the transformation that took place when 
countries relegated food aid entirely for economic development. He argued that agricultural 
commodities committed toward development ceased being merely food aid and became 
development capital at the point of transfer. The way forward, for Cochrane and others, was 
for food exporting countries to join the ranks of donor countries and together participate in a 
multinational food development program under the auspices of the United Nations.316  
Overall, the US Food for Peace Program, the FFHC, the passage of UN Resolution 
1496 and the debate at the 1960 AFEA conference were all indicative of the growing 
complexity of the food aid question come 1960 and a challenge to the status quo. Each, in 
some way, heralded a further internationalization of the questions relating to food aid. 
Altogether, these efforts provided the stimuli for the year ahead when center stage in the food 
aid debate would shift once again. This time the UN Secretariat would seize the opportunity 
to explore a multilateral option for food aid and, at the same time, advance the food aid 
debate. 
Hans Singer and February Report on Food Aid for Development 
This process got underway early in 1961 when, in response to the passage of General 
Assembly Resolution 1496, Director-General Sen selected a group of experts to study and 
give shape to the idea of multilateral food aid. Sen wrote to Hammarskjold, expressing his 
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wish for a group of independent experts, ‘of the ablest economic minds available who are 
familiar with the economic development of underdeveloped countries, and have some 
acquaintance with surpluses and their use.’317 Sen’s desire to use economists—as opposed to 
policymakers, diplomats or politicians—was emblematic of the emerging thinking of the 
period. As Gerald M. Meier and Dudley Seer point out in Pioneers in Development, 
economic development could not be legislated like political independence, nor willed like 
nationalism. Instead, what was crucial was an understanding of the forces of development 
and the policies needed to support these forces—a task perfectly suited for the creative 
capabilities of a development economist.318 For Sen and Hammarskjold, one such economist 
stood out as the best candidate to chair the committee—Hans W. Singer.  
Singer left Germany for Britain in 1933 just as the Nazi Party took control. He 
obtained his Ph.D. from Cambridge while studying secular trends in land values. He joined 
the UN in 1947 at the request of David Owen, who was then the new head of the UN 
Department of Economic Affairs (DEA). Singer had worked with Owen before the war and 
the two continued their close working and personal relationship while at the UN. To Singer’s 
surprise, his first UN appointment was to the subdivision of the DEA assigned to study 
developing countries—a topic in which Singer lacked any qualifications or experience. 
According to Singer, the post was based on his early work on ‘countryside planning’ in 
Britain which was misunderstood as ‘country planning’ to those at the UN.319 Despite the 
inadvertent placement, Singer’s work as a development economist did not disappoint. One of 
his early studies argued that the terms of global trade between suppliers and manufacturers 
drastically favored the latter, sought to reverse the classical interpretation that the benefits of 
                                                          
317 Letter from Sen to Hammarskjold, 1 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S–045004670004.  
318 Meier and Seers, eds., 6.  
319 Shaw, Sir Hans Singer, 9, 36-48. 
143 
 
global productivity were generally equitable.320 The so-called ‘Singer-Prebisch thesis’ 
became the axiomatic battle-cry of underdeveloped countries well into the 1970s.321 By the 
end of his first decade with the UN, Singer had become the foremost development economist 
at the UN Secretariat. His theories often challenged conventional wisdom, but also 
acknowledged existing realities and the limitations of governments acting in their own 
narrow interests. Singer’s role in developing the concept of pre-investment aid, culminating 
in the establishment of the UN Special Fund, and his role in keeping SUNFED alive through 
the 1950s were discussed earlier. In 1960 Secretary-General Hammarskjold used Singer to 
prepare specific policy proposals for increasing the UN’s aid-presence in Africa. These 
endeavors showed his development acumen, as well as his accommodating nature. In early 
1961, Singer was given the chance to display his skills in the arena of multilateral food aid. 
For Singer, food aid fitted into what he called the ‘new look’ of development aid, one 
in which the UN served as a far better mechanism for brokering negotiations over 
development assistance than any one country by itself and, therefore, where the UN deserved 
a larger share of coordinating the work. In this way, he echoed the perspectives of Owen, 
Hoffman and Hammarskjold with regard to the unique place of UN aid generally. In Singer’s 
estimation, the value of the UN in these matters was its sensitivity to all interests. He 
described a typical scenario as it related to food aid whereby the US would transfer some 2 
million tons of food to a state to sell in its domestic market. A year later, a US official would 
arrive to instruct the recipient country how best to use the proceeds from the sale of the 
donated commodities. Acting in its self-interest, the US could too easily disregard the 
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national development plans of the recipient country, the impact on commercial competitors 
and the well-being of farmers. Making allowances for these varying and intricate needs, 
according to Singer, created a great opportunity for international organizations.322  
As the chair of the expert group, Singer was now in a position not only to advance the 
role of the UN and the FAO in administering food aid, but also make recommendations on 
what he saw as the real benefit of commodity assistance—economic development. UN 
Resolution 1496 included a clause that stated, ‘the ultimate solution to the problem of hunger 
lies in an effective acceleration of economic development’, but the resolution was ambiguous 
on any direct connection between food aid and economic development.323 Singer and six 
other experts crafted a report which made these links explicit.324 The report, presented to Sen 
in February 1961, is worth a closer look since it offers the most comprehensive case for the 
establishment of a multilateral system to mobilize available food surpluses for development. 
Moreover, it provides the clearest evidence yet for the shift in the food aid discourse.  
 The report first outlined the paradoxical nature of the global food situation where half 
of the world’s population was either undernourished or malnourished while food stockpiles in 
developed countries grew annually. For the experts, the solution was clear. ‘The task of our 
generation is to apply the principles of social progress accepted within the rich countries to 
the world as a whole. Only if this is done can we talk of an international community.’325 How 
could this be achieved? Progress would rely, largely, on the transfer of capital and 
commodities resources from the developed world to the underdeveloped over the next five 
years. Food aid was a crucial component of this transfer and should amount to between one-
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fifth and one-sixth of the total external assistance. But instead of food assistance going 
towards feeding the hungry as its main purpose, the committee underscored the value of food 
aid as capital in its original sense—as an investment mechanism to promote increased 
productivity. Singer and the experts worked from the premise that, ‘[s]urplus food is a most 
important part of capital aid—and economic development is the most important and largest 
part of a productive use of surplus foods.’326 Therefore, food aid could provide hungry people 
the necessary time either to increase their own agricultural production or provide the required 
sustenance to spur the production of some other product used to buy food. Thus, freedom 
from poverty was only ultimately the best way to achieve freedom from hunger. The report 
also outlined essential parameters for food aid. It was essential that ‘surplus food utilization 
programs’—as the committee now called them—must last for longer than five years, must be 
incorporated into a country’s overall economic development program and should not divert 
the recipient country away from their own food production. Additionally, food aid should not 
interrupt the fair market sales of food commodities especially among the rice, coffee and 
cocoa exporting countries in the underdeveloped world who the developed world should not 
ask to carry the same burden of surpluses.327 Moreover, the experts linked economic 
development to social development as it related to the use of food aid, lauding its use in land 
reform schemes, school feeding programs and domestic livestock production.328 Assured of 
the unquestionable demand for food aid by countries yearning for development, the group 
concluded that the supply of food surplus was plentiful, estimating that the US alone had 
between $12-13 billion worth of surplus food available over the next five years.329  
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 Altogether, the report was steeped in the development thinking of the period and 
engaged with many aspects of the debate taking place among social scientists described 
above.  It started with the notion that a segment of the world had unlocked the door to 
modernity and these duty-driven individuals or societies could direct others towards the same 
end. Similarly, the report spoke of the opportunity for underdeveloped states to leave behind 
traditional methods of production for modern processes. Singer’s report was scientifically 
driven, relying on empirical evidence from FAO data that provided the substantiated proof so 
coveted by modernizers of this era. Moreover, it outlined the basic parameters needed to 
stimulate and guide economic development. Finally, it referenced case studies, or models, to 
replicate on a wider scale, another favorite approach of postwar modernity efforts.330 
Admittedly, many of the recommendations within the report were not original ideas. 
The United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund, supported by FAO experts, 
promoted feeding programs in the mid-1950s to improve the long-term health of mothers and 
children vulnerable to malnutrition.331 School lunch programs, aided by the use of new 
nutritional science, originated in the United States in the early twentieth century and exploded 
during the Great Depression era.332 Nevertheless, the Singer report was distinct. It served as 
the first comprehensive synthesis of all the possibilities of food aid for economic and social 
development. It recommended the establishment of more than just a narrow, limited program 
but one that could move out on all fronts by making food aid the linchpin of a myriad of 
development activities. Moreover, the report argued that food aid through a multilateral 
program was its most effective use of food aid, envisioning a new and expanded role where 
international agencies played a greater role in pulling the levels of progress, none more 
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important than the FAO and the UN.333 In this way, the report extended the strategy pursued 
by the UN during the previous decade by carving out another avenue for the UN in the global 
development process. The report gained the immediate praise of B.R. Sen who used it 
extensively in constructing his own report to present to UN member states later that year. The 
report also garnered the attention and support of the new US Ambassador to the UN, Adlai 
Stevenson, who hailed it as, ‘[o]ne of the most remarkable documents on the subject.’ The 
aforementioned Willard Cochrane, now the chief agricultural economist at the US 
Department of Agriculture, celebrated its unmatched skill in analyzing the role of food in 
economic development.334  
The Kennedy Administration: A New Foreign Economic Policy & UN Policy 
The fact that Stevenson and Cochrane held the expert report in such high esteem was 
indicative of a further change in tack within the US government towards a multilateral 
approach to international cooperation, including food aid. Throughout 1961, the Kennedy 
Administration would play an important role in converting the changing discourse on food 
aid into an actual policy and finally a functional program. To be sure, Kennedy's approach 
was similar to President Truman's 1949 Point Four program, which had kick-started the 
development mandate and crucially foresaw the UN and its Specialized Agencies as a conduit 
for development.335 The Kennedy Administration was also following the general trajectory of 
the Eisenhower Administration to internationalize US foreign aid as seen by that 
Administration’s decision to back the UN Special Fund and the IDA. As indicated earlier, 
although it supported the Special Fund, the Eisenhower Administration favored the World 
Bank as the preferred international mechanism to administer US aid, due in large part to the 
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Bank’s structure of weighted voting based on contributions from its member states—of which 
the US was peerless. However, from the start, the Kennedy Administration sought to 
differentiate itself by pursuing an international development aid initiative specifically outside 
the World Bank. The Kennedy Administration’s new foreign economic and UN strategies 
both helped to facilitate this change. 
During the 1960 campaign, advisers encouraged Kennedy to characterize the 
Eisenhower Administration’s foreign aid program as inert, reactionary, dependent on military 
aid and generally lacking imagination. One such advisor, William A. Dymsza, formerly an 
assistant economic commissioner with the US State Department and by 1958 a business 
faculty member at Rutgers University, pointed out that the real foreign policy initiatives of 
the 1950s, Point Four and the Marshall Plan, were both Truman’s. Likewise, the 
aforementioned IDA and DLF had both started as US Senatorial initiatives.336 Thus, soon 
after taking up his new position, Secretary of State Dean Rusk advised a change from the, 
‘holding operations of the past,’ and a more intelligent use of foreign assistance to 
underdeveloped countries. For Rusk, even without the Soviet threat, a new initiative-driven 
policy was in order.337  
For the Kennedy Administration, the UN seemed to be an important conduit for the 
implementation of its new policies. It simultaneously served as another method used to 
differentiate Kennedy from Eisenhower. As a Senator and presidential candidate, Kennedy 
enumerated strong views towards the UN and the role of the US within the Organization. In a 
1958 speech, he voiced his fear that the US was not using the UN imaginatively in the great 
economic and social challenges facing the newer and poorer nations of the world. He 
acknowledged that one could not funnel all aid through the UN, but likewise believed 
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unilateral action alone could not meet the test of economic development in places like India 
and the rest of the underdeveloped world.338 In the midst of the 1960 presidential election, 
Kennedy commented:  
the United Nations can be no stronger and no more imaginative than the 
nations which make it up—and of these, the United States is one of the most 
important. Unless we are willing to exercise initiative in that body, rather than 
awaiting its thoughts and decisions—unless we are willing to channel our 
positive programs through the United Nations as well as giving it all of our 
negative problems—and unless we are willing, as a nation proud of its 
sovereign power, to join with other nations, to make it a truly effective 
body—then we may expect to see that one last hope for peace swallowed up 
in the oceans of hate.339  
 
Kennedy’s UN-team reinforced these views. Ambassador Stevenson described his 
main job as altering the trend of new UN member states aligning with the USSR, as was the 
case in the 1960 UN General Assembly votes on decolonization and SUNFED. For 
Stevenson, the UN was not simply valuable as an arena for doing battle against the USSR and 
its allies, as he claimed Ambassador Lodge had too often made it. Instead, he saw it as the 
primary forum for casting a new image of the US among the so-called Afro-Asia group—a 
caucus and increasingly powerful voting bloc at the UN.340 According to the State 
Department, the error of the Eisenhower Administration had been its willingness to, ‘sit out 
every second dance’ at the UN. This had been a crucial misstep since the UN was the only 
medium where the western world and the Global South could unite in its common interests, 
thus leaving less room on the dance floor for the Cold War tango.341  
Further directing Kennedy’s new UN policy were two ambitious ‘frontiersmen’ who 
led the effort at the State Department. From the start, Harlan Cleveland and Richard Gardner, 
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the Assistant and Deputy Assistant Secretaries of States for International Organization 
Affairs respectively, resisted the prevalent notion that the UN was a hopelessly lost or 
confused platform for pursuing US interests. Cleveland explained to Rusk, that the UN had 
not proven ineffectual in light of the so-called ‘swirling majorities’ of the General Assembly, 
supposedly entrapped under the leadership of the Soviet Union or by the will of its majority 
of underdeveloped states. Since there was, ‘hardly a major subject in international politics 
which does not have a United Nations angle, presently or prospectively’, Cleveland argued 
that disengagement was scarcely the proper policy.342 Pointing to the highly competent 
executive operations going on in the Middle East with the UN Emergency Force and the 
functional efforts of the UN in the Congo—especially the overlooked and underappreciated 
UN civilian mission (the topic of Chapters Four and Five)—Cleveland believed developing 
the UN’s operational capability ought to be the new central target of American foreign policy 
at the UN. Moreover, if the Soviet Union desired a UN limited to debate, the US should 
support the majority of states outside the Communist bloc who craved UN action, including 
multilateral development assistance.343 In the ensuing months, Cleveland, along with 
Gardner, would come to realize that a food aid initiative could simultaneously promote 
executive action through the UN while responding to the call by underdeveloped member 
states for multilateral development assistance.344  
 Additionally, one other individual—a development economist made top 
policymaker—helped shape the Kennedy Administration’s foreign aid policy. Crucially, his 
theories not only influenced many within his own administration but also those within the UN 
Secretariat. Walt W. Rostow first met Senator Kennedy in 1958, working with him on issues 
which included foreign aid to India. According to Rostow, it was Kennedy who encouraged 
                                                          
342 Memorandum from Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs (Cleveland) to Secretary of 
State Rusk, 2 May 1961, in FRUS, 1961–1963, Volume XXV, No. 169. 
343 Ibid. 
344 Personal interview with Richard N. Gardner, New York, 11 October 2013, Columbia University, New York. 
151 
 
him to publish his thesis on the stages of economic growth as a way to advance the objective 
that the task of the 1960s was to move towards ‘great goals’ in global development.345 
Rostow’s, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non—Communist Manifesto, published in 
1960, attempted to explain the process of economic growth, so far experienced to the greatest 
degree in the West, while latent in much of the rest of the world. As indicated in Chapter 
One, according to Rostow, all nations passed through fundamental stages of development on 
a linear trajectory from traditional societies, to take-off, to maturity. In Rostow’s estimation, 
the United States along with a handful of other Western states had reached the pinnacle of the 
development process and ought to serve as the model for other less developed countries. In 
this way Rostow matched Marx’s deterministic understanding of modern history, but 
attributed the real impetus for progress to liberal culture and compounding economic growth, 
not class conflict. Moreover, underdeveloped countries could best execute development 
through planned capitalism and foreign aid, not social revolution.346  
 Upon his election, Kennedy brought Rostow in to his Administration as the Deputy 
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, thus infusing the highest 
echelons of the US government with his sweeping development theory known as 
modernization theory. One of Rostow’s early tasks was to help craft President Kennedy’s 
March 1961 message to Congress on foreign aid. It called for the consolidation of all US 
foreign aid programs, of which PL 480 was a large component, and envisioned a broad role 
for US foreign aid going forward. The speech provided the basis for the establishment of the 
US Agency for International Development, or USAID, later that year.347  
 Others outside the Administration were also receptive to Rostow and modernization 
theory, including Hans Singer—although more selectively.  Perhaps riding the wave of 
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popularity the theory enjoyed immediately following the publication of Stages, Singer made a 
case in 1960 that Rostow’s concept of countries developing from one stage to another as a 
result of being spurred along by ‘pre-conditions’, did in fact substantiate the recent UN effort 
to promote what it called ‘pre-investment aid’ through the UN Special Fund launched in 
1959.348 Hoffman had also utilized Rostow and modernization theory in promoting the 
Special Fund. Moreover, Singer welcomed Rostow’s view that aid was not an end into itself 
but its purpose was to manifest self-sustained economic growth.349 Yet as historians John and 
Richard Toye have argued, the two men diverged over who ought to control and manage the 
aid from its source through to its eventual use. On the one hand, Rostow seemed to advocate 
the exclusive use of various US-controlled mechanisms such as the World Bank—and on this 
point disagreed with the general trend of thinking in the Kennedy Administration outlined 
above. Meanwhile, Singer and those at the UN Secretariat encouraged not only a greater use 
of the UN but UN predominance over the administration and allocation of aid.350  
These opposing views clashed throughout the 1950s and were, of course, at the heart 
of the SUNFED-IDA debate described in Chapter Two—a debate that seemingly culminated 
in 1960 when the major donor countries of the industrial West chose to finance the IDA over 
SUNFED. Out-paced by the World Bank and the creation of the IDA, Singer remained 
resolute. Believing in the UN’s vital role in administering aid, he now argued in 1961 that the 
UN and its Specialized Agencies still deserved an opportunity to coordinate the international 
effort for a project with as many varying interests as food aid. As further evidence will show, 
Singer believed an international food aid program could crucially serve to satisfy 
disillusioned SUNFED proponents by offering a consolidation prize in the form of a 
multilateral food aid program, a perspective he shared with the Kennedy Administration.  
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Food Aid and Multilateral Forums: The Internationalization of the Debate 
 It was against this backdrop that the FAO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee on 
the Use of Food Surpluses for Deficient People met in Rome from 5-12 April 1961. The 
Committee included twelve nations split evenly between developed and developing countries. 
Also in attendance were B.R Sen, Hans Singer and Mordecai Ezekiel, representing the 
interests of the FAO and UN Secretariat respectively. B.R. Sen had asked the group to 
convene to gain its perspective on UN Resolution 1496 and the Director-General’s draft 
report carefully and purposefully entitled, Development Through Food: A Strategy for 
Surplus Utilization—which was in fact a near reproduction of the expert group’s report 
headed by Singer. Sen’s opening statement echoed the expert report by recognizing that the 
ultimate solution to the problem of hunger and malnutrition was economic development now 
recognized and endorsed by world opinion as the ‘guiding philosophy.’351 The debate by the 
government representatives, however, fell short of the enthusiastic approval Sen, Singer and 
others desired. Representatives from Argentina, Canada and France tempered Sen’s 
recommendations in Development Through Food to make food aid for economic 
development the main objective of any future multilateral program. Wary of diving headlong 
into this approach, they called for only modest experimental steps in this direction.352 The 
meeting was about to sputter to an uneventful and unproductive conclusion when the US 
delegate, George McGovern, rose to speak. McGovern had only hours earlier gained approval 
from Kennedy to propose the establishment of a multilateral food aid program. McGovern 
then hastily sounded the idea off Sen, who enthusiastically approved before pitching the plan 
to the other delegates.353 Specifically, McGovern proposed to establish a multilateral food aid 
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fund backed by $100 million in commodities and cash contributions over the next three years. 
For its part, the US was prepared to contribute the first $40 million. McGovern’s proposal 
recognized Sen’s desire, ‘to make the widest possible use of commodities in alleviating 
malnutrition.’ But he sided with other delegations in arguing for a program whose primary 
aim was to meet emergency needs while secondarily supporting pilot activities aimed at 
economic and social development. McGovern's proposal was nonetheless novel in that it 
called for a multilateral approach to food aid—undertaken jointly by the FAO and UN. In 
fact, McGovern used the word ‘multilateral’ four times in his short speech, which came on 10 
April 1961.354  
Judging from statements following the April Intergovernmental Committee meeting, 
the UN Secretariat viewed the Committee’s broad endorsement of Sen’s draft report and 
McGovern’s proposal for a multilateral food aid program as more than a cautious step 
forward. Singer announced just after the meeting that the new concept of international aid, 
‘though it may still carry the eggshells of older days’, was indeed ‘the manifestation of a new 
era in which for the first time, the idea of an international world economy begins to emerge 
from the mists of philosophy to become an operational economic concept.’355 In other words, 
in the golden age of developmental social science, the climate seemed ripe for theories, which 
had emerged from the minds of development economists like Singer, Rostow and others, to 
become functional realities.  
For Singer, the ‘operational economic concept’ would no doubt still include bilateral 
aid, but now must also include a multilateral element, or what he called the ‘middle ground’. 
By this Singer meant bilateral aid administered in a multilateral framework.356 According to 
Singer, the Committee, in its final statement, also recognized this need by giving the FAO 
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and UN a considerable role in the planning, reporting and technical assistance work 
connected with the expansion of the proposed multilateral food aid program. In fact, Singer 
estimated that due to the continued internationalization of the food aid debate, the discourse 
over the issue had now permanently changed. In a letter to Philippe de Seynes, Singer 
exclaimed, ‘The days of “surplus disposal” seem definitely to be over and the day of food aid 
or surplus utilization for development has begun.’ Singer even advised de Seynes against the 
use of the phrase ‘surplus disposal’ in his own writings and speeches since it was now 
considered a, ‘bad word not only in the FAO but by the current US Administration.’357  
The Kennedy Administration was clearly trying to demonstrate America’s good will 
towards underdeveloped countries at the UN at the international level by endorsing an aid 
initiative which appealed to recipients as much as donors. Kennedy himself had, in a 16 
March 1961 message to Congress on the state of US agriculture, emphasized Third World 
development over surplus disposal. In his speech, Kennedy stated that the policy he outlined, 
‘was designed to move the focus of the US food aid programme from the disposal of 
surpluses to the constructive use of abundance, both at home and abroad.’358 A week later 
Kennedy, in another special message to Congress, called for a comprehensive overhaul of US 
foreign aid describing the current system as not only ‘largely unsatisfactory’ for US needs, 
but also ‘unsuited’ for the needs of underdeveloped countries in the decade ahead.359 
Kennedy then backed legislative amendments to the PL 480 program to allow for more long-
term and development-focused aid agreements—a specific request of underdevelopment 
countries to make more apparent the link between US agricultural programs and US foreign 
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aid.360 Meanwhile, in a 21 April press conference, Kennedy endorsed McGovern’s plan as a 
complement to, rather than a competitor of, the existing US food aid programs.361 Finally, at 
the 34th session of the Committee on Commodity Problems of the FAO, which met in Rome 
from 30 May to 16 June 1961, the State Department instructed Cochrane to make use of data 
on US surplus production to highlight that American productivity should not be viewed as a 
liability internationally but instead as an avenue for emergent nations to achieve long-term 
economic growth.362 
To be sure, Kennedy, McGovern and Cochrane had not forgotten the domestic 
benefits of food aid. They were well aware that US agricultural production had reached 
record high numbers in 1960 resulting in a wheat and feed-grain surplus carry-over of 115.2 
million metric tons for 1961. Moreover, finding outlets for US farm surpluses also matched 
Kennedy’s domestic agricultural policy of keeping food prices stable for an ever-increasing 
urban society.363 Yet in this instance, domestic and international interests for the US seemed 
to dovetail. As John Duncan, the Assistant Secretary at the Department of Agriculture, 
reminded Cleveland—what was really in order was a policy that advocated the expansion of 
US food aid on all fronts.364  
One remaining factor played into Kennedy’s backing of a multilateral food aid option. 
Key to his position was a belief that any future multilateral food aid program would assuage 
Third World member states at the UN who, along with Hans Singer, had spent the better part 
of a decade attempting to establish SUNFED. The Administration was never close to signing 
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on to what Harlan Cleveland called ‘a debtors special’ despite the fact that an Afro-Asia led 
UN resolution passed in December 1960 calling for its immediate establishment as described 
in Chapter Two.365 In fact, Singer was aware that the Administration and other potential 
donor states planned to take an intransigent position at the UN preparatory committee 
meetings meant to draw up SUNFED’s statutes during the spring of 1961. He therefore 
advised the Secretariat to have ready contingency plans that would break up the omnibus 
SUNFED proposal into various piecemeal, specialized and altogether concrete schemes in 
which donor countries would be willing to participate. First among Singer’s suggestions was 
a food aid program based on his recommendations from February. Singer believed this option 
reinforced the view from the Kennedy Administration that the SUNFED resolution, although 
undesirable in its current form, might be more than tolerable if its Third World crafters 
showed a certain flexibility in its implementation.366 Crucially then, both the Secretariat and 
the Kennedy Administration believed a multilateral food aid program could be sold to the 
Global South as a viable consolation prize for SUNFED. 
Altogether the UN Secretariat, the FAO and the Kennedy Administration were 
moving in parallel directions over the question of food aid. On a theoretical level, 
development economists within each underscored the need to direct food aid for scientifically 
modeled, planned and state sponsored economic development in the decade ahead. On an 
operational level, each entity backed the internationalization of food aid by promoting a 
multilateral food aid initiative, ultimately to find its expression in and through the United 
Nations and its Specialized Agencies. Over the course of the summer of 1961, the UN and the 
FAO would utilize various forums to market further and defend the food aid for development 
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approach while demonstrating that both of these international institutions were up to the task 
in administering any future program.  
 Sen’s first opportunity to challenge any dissenters came at the 35th Session of the 
FAO Council, which met in Rome from 19-29 June 1961. Sen cautioned certain delegations 
that proposed to limit an international food program to only emergency relief. While 
promising to start any future program on a modest scale, Sen reminded all in attendance that 
UN Resolution 1496, called for permanent solutions, not palliatives. Sen flatly stated 
economic development was the ultimate objective of food aid and ‘nothing less will do.’ As 
Singer had recently anticipated, ‘surplus disposal’ took on a pejorative quality during the 
Council debate, best exemplified by the Ghanaian delegate’s complaint that his country had 
been a victim of surplus dumping while carefully calling not for more food charity but ‘food 
aid for economic development.’ Meanwhile, the US delegate, Robert C. Tetro, joined the 
majority of states in embracing Sen’s proposals and further outlined US commitments to any 
future program.367  
Then, at the 32nd Session of the UN Economic and Social Council, which met in July 
and August 1961, UN Secretary-General Hammarskjold finally weighed-in on this 
burgeoning topic, having been embroiled in the Congo Crisis for much of the previous year. 
Altogether, Hammarskjold’s statement was symptomatic of the Secretary-General’s mission 
to make economic development the primary focus of an organization increasingly made up of 
underdeveloped states. Crucially, Hammarskjold emphasized that underdevelopment was a 
problem that transcended national boundaries and was the responsibility of the international 
community. For Hammarskjold, the issue of food aid for underdeveloped countries was 
consistent with his view that, ‘to set aside a portion of one’s national resources in manpower, 
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materials, equipment, finance and technical knowledge to assist economic development of 
less developed had been accepted as axiomatic.’368 He was glad that the international 
community asked the UN and its Specialized Agencies to investigate multilateral food aid as 
a means for economic development but was aware of the criticisms this methodology 
provoked. Entrenched divisions of labor between the UN and its Specialized Agencies, 
scattered and uncoordinated initiatives, the complexity of UN administrative procedures, 
were all arguments against strengthening the UN and the FAO’s participation in food aid in 
favor of more homogeneous activities outside the UN framework. Yet, the UN was too 
valuable an organization to allow this challenge to go unanswered according to 
Hammarskjold. A multilateral food aid program would show that the UN family could 
cooperate just as it was proving it could in the midst of the Congo Crisis where it was, 
according the Hammarskjold, preventing an absolute economic and social collapse in that 
failed state.369  
Hammarskjold further explained in a report submitted along with his ECOSOC 
speech that the UN was now poised to act, alongside the FAO, to intensify its participation in 
administering food aid by invoking the talents of its development economists at the UN 
Headquarters, its regional economic commissions and the operations of its technical 
cooperation programs.370 Here, Hammarskjold was no doubt referencing the research of 
Singer and others at the UN Secretariat, but was also emphasizing the UN’s network of 
global field offices headed by UN Resident Representatives serving as ambassadorial-like 
development advisers and administrators to underdeveloped countries. In sum, Sen’s remarks 
were crucial in not allowing emergency aid to overshadow development aid as the primary 
purpose of any future food aid program. Meanwhile, Hammarskjold contributed to the 
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argument that the UN and FAO had the will, the organizational capacity and the necessary 
human resources within potential food aid recipient countries to meet the challenges that a 
multilateral food aid program might pose. Furthermore, Hammarskjold clearly placed food 
aid in context of the UN’s development aid efforts from the past decade-plus.  
The UN World Food Program: It’s Establishment, Impact and Evolution  
The 1961 UN General Assembly proved to be the last step in the creation of a viable 
multilateral food aid program. The Assembly started on a somber note just days after the 
tragic death of Secretary-General Hammarskjold. Kennedy remarked on the grief and the 
challenge accompanying the Secretary-General’s untimely passing, yet attempted to 
encourage a different atmosphere going forward when he stated the, ‘problem is not the death 
of one man—the problem is the life of this organization. It will either grow to meet the 
challenges of our age, or it will be gone with the wind, without influence, without force, 
without respect.’ Speech writers, among them Cleveland and Gardner, then littered the rest of 
the President’s message with initiatives meant to meet the challenges of the coming age and 
breathe new life into the UN, none more remembered than Kennedy’s call, ‘officially 
designating this decade of the 1960's as the United Nations Decade of Development.’371  
The eventual approval of a UN Decade of Development resolution at the 1961 
General Assembly, as food aid scholar D. John Shaw notes, also created an atmosphere 
favorable for further innovations including a resolution to establish a UN World Food 
Program.372 Indeed, the UN WFP would serve as one of the main schemes and lead initiatives 
included as a part of the Development Decade Proposals for Action drawn up by the UN 
Secretariat later in 1962.373 Still, the debate over a food aid resolution at the 1961 General 
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Assembly showed that, despite the positive environment, real concerns persisted among a 
number of UN member states about the role and purpose of any multilateral food aid 
endeavor. A group which included Argentina, Brazil, France and Japan took issue with the 
initial draft resolution arguing that the proposal differed too greatly from the one reached at 
the FAO Intergovernmental Advisory Committee that had met in Rome that past April. 
Whereas the FAO resolution treated food aid for emergency relief and food aid for economic 
and social development with equal importance, the current draft proposal that had fully 
incorporated and reflected the views of Sen and Hammarskjold, emphasized that the primary 
and foremost use of food aid was to promote economic development. Within the group of 
dissenters, made up of food exporting countries and thus competitors of those who engaged 
in surplus disposal, there was a concerted effort to stress the experimental nature of any 
proposed multilateral food aid program and for the inclusion of procedures that would protect 
their interests.374 Furthermore, the composition of this group of indicates that the debate over 
food aid did not divide into the ‘typical’ North-South or East-West schisms so often prevalent 
at the UN. Instead, Argentina and Brazil allying with France and Japan—not to mentioned 
Thailand, Burma and Canada—represented the uncommon coalitions and strange bedfellows 
that formed over food aid compared to more orthodox groupings typical at the UN.375  
In an effort to pass the resolution unanimously, the sponsors of the resolution adopted 
amendments that mitigated a strict ‘food aid for development' approach. The final resolution 
passed on 19 December 1961 with no opposing votes and abstentions from only the Soviet 
bloc. The resolution officially established a World Food Program jointly undertaken by the 
UN and the FAO. The operative paragraphs contained tempered language which underscored 
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the ‘experimental’ nature of the World Food Program and called for no more than ‘pilot 
projects’ involving the use of food as an aid to economic and social development.376 The 
initial WFP resolution was no doubt underwhelming for the likes of Sen, Singer and others 
and certainly fell short of the approach outlined in Development Through Food. Others within 
the UN Secretariat specifically remarked on the gap between aspirations and results. David 
Owen commented that the resolution had not given greater emphasis to economic 
development projects inherent in food surplus and instead accentuated emergency relief. He 
noted the modest budget of $90 million for its first year, would only be a small fraction of the 
resources of big bilateral food aid agreements. Still, according to Owen, the UN and the FAO 
had made a ‘significant step’.377 Similarly, Singer late reflected that the establishment of the 
World Food Program in 1961 was, ‘of momentous significance as a beginning.’378  
 Evidence from the ensuing decades following the establishment of the WFP indicates 
that Owen and Singer were correct—that the changing discourse over food aid had given rise 
to a lasting functional change. What follows, is a brief examination of the effects of this 
change. One telling feature of the nature of WFP aid through its initial decade lies in the 
distribution of its resources. As Mitchell B. Wallerstein has shown, development-orientated 
food aid quickly became the focus for the WFP accounting for roughly 66% of the entire 
program’s available capital which totaled $1.4 billion from 1963-73. Over this period, the 
WFP allocated resources towards land development, land settlement, animal and dairy 
growth, community development, as well as mother and school feeding projects. Moreover, 
many of the projects involved food-for-work schemes that promoted domestic agricultural 
production by employing otherwise idle men in farm-to-market road construction and the 
digging of irrigation ditches and drainage facilities—as opposed to straight feeding 
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programs.379 As Singer has noted, the WFP during its first decade became a leading force in 
the ‘structural evolution of food aid’ and ‘was the only UN agency given a mandate to use 
food aid specifically as a development tool.’ In fact, by the late 1960s the WFP had taken 
over all of UNICEF’s child-feeding responsibilities.380  
Action taken by the WFP in its first decade and beyond also aligned with the 
prevailing desires among the countries of the Global South that any program ought to be truly 
multilateral. From its inception, the WFP placed a large onus of responsibility on recipient 
countries. An equal number of donor and recipient countries which all voted and approved 
specific projects made up the twenty-member governing board of the WFP, known as the 
Inter-governmental Committee. Unlike the World Bank, countries did not vote based on a 
weighted system but on a one-country-one-vote basis, tempering the voting influence of the 
US despite the fact that it often contributed over half of the total resources to the WFP. Then 
as a further means to combat the donor meddling that often plagued bilateral aid, as 
recognized by Singer and others, the delivery and management of WFP aid fell solely on the 
recipient countries.381 These distinguishing marks of the WFP, which are still in place, helped 
to support the idea that the program’s aid was not just bilateral aid in disguise. 
Perhaps as indicative of the shift the nature of food aid, at least during the 1960s, was 
the effect it had on food aid donors outside the UN system. For example, by the end of the 
1960s, NGOs like Oxfam concentrated over 90% of its budget on development-orientated 
projects rather than emergency aid.382 More telling was the restructuring of PL 480 
throughout the 1960s, which continued to be the single largest food assistance program 
during this period and beyond. Initially working in conjunction with, and then fully under, the 
newly created USAID, the PL 480 Program started to reform some of its practices. Starting in 
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fiscal year 1961-62, the Kennedy Administration drastically increased the amount of food 
assistance given under two provisions of PL 480 for the expressed purpose of economic 
development—namely Titles II and IV.383 Likewise, grants for economic development under 
section 104(e) of Title I increased to 32% of total Title I aid in 1961-62, nearly triple the 
percentage allocated under the same provision from 1958-59.384 Similarly, the Johnson 
Administration continued to focus PL 480 on development objectives even as US agricultural 
surpluses declined through the 1960s.385 As historian Kristen Ahlberg affirms, the Johnson 
Administration’s motivation was to use food aid as a means to export the Great Society 
globally and as a bargaining tool for negotiations with countries like India. Specifically, it 
used food aid to compel India to further develop and modernize its agricultural sector with 
American know-how, suggesting that the change in how food aid was perceived did not 
always de-politicalize its use.386 
The World Food Crisis of 1973-74 further reinforced the developmental approach to 
food aid. Brought on by severe drought, production shortfalls, a spike in food prices and the 
first global oil crisis, the food emergency prompted the 1974 World Food Conference. 
Crucially, the final communique of the Conference called for a greater utilization of the WFP 
in ‘rendering development assistance to developing countries.’387 The Conference also led to 
revised food aid policies in many donor states including the US, which restructured PL 480 in 
1975 and again in 1977. Both reforms continued to re-orientate US food aid toward broad-
based development schemes.388 Altogether, multilateral food aid donations remained a focus 
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during this period, increasing to nearly 25% of total contributions by the mid-1970s and 
remained at that level through the early 1990s.389 The push towards developmental food aid 
even prompted one scholar to forecast that the world food aid system was headed towards a 
‘development-first regime.’390 By 1991, the WFP budget had ballooned to $1.6 billion, doling 
out the second largest amount of development aid within the UN system, after the World 
Bank.391  
Ultimately, another dramatic shift occurred in 1993 when Canada, the Netherlands 
and Norway released a study highly critical of the WFP’s performance in development 
efforts. The weighty report had a staggering effect for the WFP, challenging what had 
become the status quo. WFP operational expenditures for development projects fell sharply 
from just under $500 million in 1989-90 to $185 million in 2000. Over the same period, 
emergency operation funds increased to 86% of the WFP annual budget.392 The shift also 
coincided with a general trend, which started in the late 1970s, to direct food aid towards 
least developed and food-deficient countries as humanitarian aid.393 Meanwhile, the phrase 
‘food security’—broadly defined as the effort to eliminate hunger and malnutrition—found 
its way into the food aid lexicon as well as the main operative clause of both the WFP and  
mission statements.394  
Conclusion 
Thus, five decades removed from the birth of the UN World Food Program and food 
aid for development competes with and also works alongside, but generally is subservient to 
food aid as a tool to feed the hungry. Ultimately then, the shift that took place with the birth 
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of the WFP should not be overstated, but neither should it be undersold. What can be said is 
that the restructuring of food aid in the early 1960s matched the rise in the popularity of 
development thinking and practices during the same period. Furthermore, developmental 
food aid did manage to outlast other development-focused schemes—particularly American 
ones like the Alliance for Progress and the Strategic Hamlet Program395—perhaps due to its 
attractiveness among both donors and recipients. In this way, this study challenges a 
prevailing notion among development historians who argue that all development plans from 
the 1960s were doomed to failure in a decade’s time.396 To be sure, food aid for development 
is no longer the primary focus of food assistance programs. Nevertheless, a historical 
evaluation of this topic does bring to light several important points.  
Crucially then, this study provides a functional example of how through the 
internationalization of food aid, postwar development aid took on a global quality. In this 
way, various UN and international forums served as the principal arenas in which competing 
interests and common goals collided and coalesced among state and non-state actors over the 
issues related to multilateral food aid. Furthermore, the UN Secretariat and the Kennedy 
Administration proved to be an important source of ideas for the functional shift in food aid 
from a bilateral liquidation of unwanted surplus stock to an international food aid system with 
a growing multilateral component. Moreover, in the light of the previous chapters, the 
creation of the WFP should be viewed as a culmination of a process nurtured and advanced 
by earlier development aid endeavors pursued at the UN. As with the EPTA, the Special 
Fund and SUNFED, those at the UN ultimately sought to prove with the WFP that the 
Organization was not only up to the task of administrating a large multilateral food program 
but was in fact the preferred instrument to do so as a bridge between donor and recipient 
states. The final two chapters of this thesis will again take up the topic of development aid 
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and the question of the proper role for the UN in this process. Like the previous chapters, 
they will emphasize the formation and evolution of a specific, albeit wide ranging, aid 
program devised by and through the UN. However, the final chapters will focus especially on 
UN aid to a specific underdeveloped country and by doing so will offer a more intense look 
at UN development aid on the ground and in the direct context of decolonization.   
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Decolonization and Development: The UN Civilian Mission to the Congo,  
June 1960-December 1960 
 
Writing to Secretary-General Hammarskjold a month into the Congo Crisis, Guinea 
President Sekou Toure unequivocally stated that the UN intervention in the Congo would end 
in triumph or failure and that the latter, ‘would seriously endanger the future of the 
international Organization and the fate of world peace.’ Toure then concluded, ‘[a]ll the 
African peoples are highly sensitive to the manner in which the United Nations fulfills the 
historic role it is called upon to play in securing victory for freedom and the integrity of 
nations.’397 The message, which almost reads like a threat, underscores the high stakes facing 
not only Hammarskjold but also those taking part in the UN Operation to the Congo—
identified by its French acronym ONUC.398 Overall, the UN response to the combination of 
political, constitutional, territorial, economic and social crises that constituted the Congo 
Crisis of 1960 to 1965 was massive. At its height UN personnel totals included nearly 20,000 
UN troops and some 2,000 civilian aid workers. These figures easily dwarf UN personnel 
totals deployed in the Sinai as part of UN Emergency Force (UNEF) starting in 1956, which 
totaled just over 6,000 military personnel supported by a small contingent of civilian staff. It 
also far surpassed the just under 600 military personnel who served in 1958 as part of the UN 
Observation Group in Lebanon (UNOGIL).399  
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Early scholarship on the UN’s role in the Congo Crisis was largely positive. 
Indicative of this view is the longstanding authoritative work of Catherine Hoskyns in, The 
Congo Since Independence: January 1960-December 1961. She and others emphasized the 
readiness, willingness and ability of the UN peacekeepers to keep the Congo from splitting 
completely and permanently, on the whole applauding the Organization’s efforts as the most 
successful of its peacekeeping enterprises to date.400 Later scholarship was far more critical of 
the UN, questioning its impartiality as it intervened in the domestic political affairs of the 
Congo while collaborating with US policymakers or serving Western interests.401 Moreover, 
these works depict an altogether doomed UN operation that fell victim to classic Cold War 
machinations.402 Most recently new international histories of the Congo Crisis have emerged, 
underscoring the Congo’s Cold War qualities but also the limits of superpower, especially 
Soviet, influence.403 Altogether, the existing scholarship has been overwhelmingly concerned 
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with the military, security, and political aspects of the Congo Crisis.404 This is understandable 
in the light of the violence and political drama that dominates the Congo Crisis narrative. 
Nevertheless, largely ignored are the economic and social development dimensions of the 
conflict, especially as it relates to the role of the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo as a 
component of the total UN operation.405  
In fact, the UN Civilian Operation is absent as a factor in nearly all the major 
scholarly debates where historians have evaluated the success of the UN mission, questioned 
UN impartiality and framed the crisis as a Cold War battleground. The few older works that 
do address the Civilian Mission provide evidence that needs comparing with the larger, more 
recently released, archival record.406 A study of UN Civilian Mission to the Congo raises still 
other questions concerning the nature, purpose and limits of an international organization 
providing multilateral development assistance to a newly independent country emerging from 
eighty years of colonial domination, but nonetheless born into a state of dependence.  
What is apparent over the first six months of the crisis, which this chapter covers, is 
that the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo was an integral part of the overall ONUC 
mission and a vital part of what the UN was trying to accomplish in the Congo. In this way, 
the UN is again shown to be an important autonomous institution—albeit constrained at 
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times. Its tactics and methods show the extent to which the UN was able to provide aid in 
numerous sectors to the Congo state and within its population on an unprecedented scale for 
any non-state actor. Thus UN aid extended into areas relating to health, education, public 
administration, agriculture, communications, transportation, famine relief and much more. In 
almost all cases, this amounted to much more than just emergency relief as the UN’s 
development-minded aid architects drew on many of the Organization’s established 
development aid theories and practices in searching for long-term solutions for the Congo’s 
development needs.  
What is equally apparent are the serious challenges facing UN development aid. In a 
newly independent country not only torn by violence but also saddled by acute economic and 
social woes, an injection of innocuous development aid proved impossible. Altogether, events 
on the ground challenged, changed and competed with established UN ideas about 
international development aid at the level of implementation.407 Specifically, delicate talks 
with the Congolese government over the control of UN aid quickly soured as deep divisions 
grew between Secretary-General Hammarskjold and Congolese Prime Minister, Patrice 
Lumumba. As the Congo tumbled into a constitutional crisis in September 1960, the UN 
scrambled to keep the Cold War and the vestiges of colonialism out of what amounted to a 
near failed state—battling the Soviets and the Belgians over civilian aid exclusivity 
throughout the fall of 1960. In this way, UN civilian aid was one of the true testing grounds, 
and one of the toughest challenges, for the methods and practices of UN aid developed during 
the 1950s and discussed so far in this thesis. Having carved out its place in the global 
development process through the work of the EPTA and the Special Fund, while also turning 
its attention to the African continent on the verge of mass decolonization, the Organization 
now faced the culmination and confluence of these processes in the Congo Crisis.  
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Development and the Belgian Congo 
 Speaking to the Economic Club of New York on 8 March 1960, shortly after 
returning from a six-week tour of the African continent, Secretary-General Hammarskjold 
drew on his recent experience when asserting, ‘We all know the present scope and pace of the 
emergence of African countries and territories into political independence. It is essential that 
African economic growth acquire sufficient momentum to match the pace of political change. 
The early period of independence may in this respect prove decisive.’408 Hoping to serve as 
the midwife to African independence, Hammarskjold and the UN Secretariat did their best to 
anticipate the political and economic consequences of Africa’s emergence into statehood in 
1960 when sixteen African countries gained their sovereignty. Few countries caused more 
concern at the UN than the Belgian Congo whose pace, with regard to decolonization, 
quickened from a stroll to a sprint after the so-called Round Table negotiations between 
Belgian and Congolese leaders in January and February 1960. These talks ended with the 
stunning announcement that the Congo would become independent on 30 June 1960. 
Disturbed by the speed of the Belgian push towards decolonization, coupled with the Congo’s 
apparent lack of readiness, David Owen, Paul Hoffman and Philippe de Seynes met to discuss 
sending a high-level UN official alongside a permanent Resident Representative to monitor 
the Congo’s transition to independence. Ralph Bunche, UN Under-Secretary for Special 
Political Affairs, seemed to be the top choice, not only for his diplomatic acumen but also for 
what Owen believed to be Bunche’s symbolic value for Africa and the UN as the highest-
ranking African-American working at the UN.409 Hammarskjold agreed and sent Bunche to 
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Leopoldville410 in late May 1960 as a witness to the closing stages of a unique colonial 
process started by King Leopold in the 1880s and bequeathed to the Belgian state in 1908.411  
 Historians differ only slightly in describing the nature and qualities of Belgian 
colonialism in the Congo. Hoskyns and others note the horizontal rather than vertical system 
of development used by the Belgians, where the goal was to raise the standard of living and 
education of the Congolese population en masse, rather than cultivate the leadership qualities 
of an indigenous ruling elite. Believing that no African should hold a post until he or she was 
qualified, Belgium relied on immigration from the metropole to run the country. Hoskyns 
estimates there were nearly 10,000 Belgian civil servants alongside some 7,000 missionaries 
in the Belgian Congo by 1958. This solid presence of administrators left many at the time to 
conclude that Belgian paternalism was both enlightened and had resulted in balanced 
development as seen by the Congo’s high literacy rate, health provisions and elementary 
through high school education as compared to other colonial states in Africa.412  
Nevertheless, the basis for the Belgian presence in the Congo was ultimately 
economic exploitation. Seeking to exploit a country endowed with tremendous natural 
resources, Belgian mining, agricultural and other commercial interests dominated the 
Congo’s economy while directing any infrastructural investments in rail, water and roads 
towards maximizing exports. This in turn led to patchy infrastructural development and top-
heavy industrial development.413 Thus, Crawford Young encapsulates Belgian colonialism’s 
fatal flaw as ‘not simply in the predominance of material objectives, but in the failure to 
involve the beneficiaries in any way other than as passive recipients of the largesse.’414 
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Therefore, at independence there were among the population no Congolese doctors, no 
judges, army officers, engineers, top administrators or secondary school teachers. To add to 
the complexity of these challenges, only sixteen Congolese had college degrees.415  
One of the few Congolese university graduates, Thomas Kanza, the first Congolese 
representative to the United Nations, traced the impending crisis to the lack of any ‘mental 
decolonization’ among the colonizers and colonized alike. Kanza noted that even in the late 
1950s, Belgians believed they still had at least a decade more to supervise development in the 
Congo. Meanwhile, among the Congolese, there appeared to be a ‘total lack of any 
leadership…capable of securing power effectively.’416 Here again, the Belgians subordinated 
political developments during most of their rule and it was not until October 1958 that the 
first national Congo political party formed—the Mouvement National Congolais (MNC).417  
Certainly there was cause for hope among the Congolese who believed that the 
country’s economic potential could quickly wipe away any other developmental deficiencies. 
It had some of the world’s most sizable deposits of strategic minerals like copper, cobalt and 
uranium found mostly in its southern-most province of Katanga. It also boasted industrial 
diamond deposits in addition to timber, tin and zinc. By most estimates the Congo also had 
the best economic infrastructure of any country in Sub-Saharan Africa built in large part by 
the Société Générale de Belgique—Belgium’s largest financial group which controlled 
approximately 70% of the Congolese national economy including its mines. Upon 
independence, the Congolese government fully expected to levy taxes and export duties on 
this company and its affiliates, the revenue of which would form the basis of the Congolese 
economy.418  
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Nevertheless, as the Congo approached independence the health of its economy was, 
to a large degree, gilded. According to a UN report, Congo’s independence ‘did not take 
place on the crest of a wave of economic expansion and prosperity.’ Instead, political 
uncertainties, a rapidly growing population and labor force and a subsequent rise in 
unemployment had resulted in lower productivity and stagnant growth from 1957 through the 
first half of 1960. Over this same period, the country lost roughly $300 million in gold and 
foreign exchange reserves despite borrowing $150 million and receiving a grant from 
Belgium totaling $10 million. During this period, its treasury went from the position of a 
creditor of over 5 billion francs to that of a debtor of 1.4 billion francs. Capital flight resulted 
in the loss of an estimated $200 million in 1959 alone and another $40 million in the six 
weeks following independence.419 The US State Department’s report from 10 May 1960 
recognized the same dangerous economic signs. It concluded that ‘[w]hile it is true that the 
outlook for production and exportation of minerals and agricultural products is bright, it is the 
consensus of well-informed observers that there is a great danger, during the next two or 
three years, that the over-all economic situation in the Congo will deteriorate with a fall in 
per capita GNP.’420   
Independence, Mayhem and the Initial UN Response, July-August 1960 
 Despite the economic harbingers that urged prudence, political developments 
following the Round Table negotiations proceeded with extraordinary speed through the 
spring and summer of 1960. In May, the MNC managed to win a precarious majority during 
the Congo’s first parliamentary elections. At the same time, the Congolese ratified their 
constitution (or, Loi Fondamentale), subsequently signed by King Baudouin of Belgium. 
Finally, Belgian and Congolese leaders agreed to a Treaty of Friendship (the signing of which 
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was later disputed) on the cusp of independence which was meant to ensure a strong Belgian 
presence in the Congo—administratively and economically—as the means to cultivate the 
Congo’s development as an independent state while protecting the still enormous Belgian 
corporate investments in the country’s natural resources. 
 The events of the Congo’s oxymoronic ascent to statehood on 30 June 1960 are well-
cataloged by historians. It began at the Congo’s independence ceremony where King 
Baudouin’s speech cataloged the benefits of a ‘civilizing mission’ started by King Leopold II. 
Then the Congo’s newly elected Prime Minister, Patrice Lumumba, in his own speech 
proceeded to lambast the Belgians for decades of exploitation. This was followed by the 
clueless gesture of Belgian General Émile Jassen who scribbled ‘before independence = after 
independence’ on the blackboard of a room filled with Belgian army officers, the news of 
which served as the fuse that sparked the mutiny by the Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC) 
against their Belgian superiors starting on 4 July 1960. The immediate consequences are 
equally well-documented. Starting on 5 July, attacks against Belgian citizens occurred 
throughout the Congo resulting in a general exodus of Europeans from the Congo starting on 
7 July. Hoskyns estimates that of the 8,235 Belgian civil servants in the Congo, some 5,589 
left in July and another 1,129 left in August. Then on 9 July, the Belgian government ordered 
the dispatch of thousands of Belgian troops to the Congo to protect Belgian citizens and 
interests.421 The rapid Belgian departure left executive, administrative and technical posts in 
the administration of the country either vacant or filled by lower level clerks. The same was 
true for other essential services including judiciary courts, customs services, airport control-
towers, the port at Matadi, postal services and telecommunication. Overall, this produced an 
immediate emergency and set the stage for an unprecedented man-made disaster in need of an 
equally extraordinary response.422   
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 Initially, the UN used its existing personnel in the Congo to assess the situation, to 
make contact with the Congolese government and initiate a preliminary response. Besides 
Bunche, who remained in the Congo through the tumult of early July, Hammarskjold and 
Owen had appointed Sture C. Linner as the UN Resident Representative for technical 
assistance in the Congo. Linner, a Swede, formerly served with the Swedish Red Cross in 
Greece during World War Two and had substantial experience in the mining industry as an 
executive vice-president and general manager of the Liberia-American-Swedish Minerals 
Company (LAMCO) in Monrovia.423 Linner noted that when asked by Hammarskjold to 
attend the Congo independence ceremony, the Secretary-General ominously joked that he 
ought to pack for a week or two or perhaps a year—in fact, Linner would remain in the 
Congo for the next eighteen months.424 Linner and Bunche first met with Congolese officials 
on 10 July where the Congo cabinet made its first official request for aid. Their initial appeal 
was for technical assistance generally and specifically military advisers to help pacify the 
ANC.425 The meeting was otherwise important because it resulted in one of the first 
interactions between UN officials and Prime Minister Lumumba. Linner’s impression of 
Lumumba generally fits into the majority of appraisals that show Lumumba to be an 
enigmatic figure.  To Linner, Lumumba seemed intelligent and even well balanced but had, 
‘something in his eye that worried him.’ At this first meeting, Lumumba also expressed what 
Linner described as a, ‘touchingly exaggerated faith in the United Nations’ in which ‘[h]e 
thought we would solve all the problems for him, that we had everything at our command.’426 
Bunche, who would later have major disagreements with Lumumba over this very issue, at 
the time, relayed the request to Hammarskjold who at once returned to New York from 
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Geneva to meet on 12 July with the heads of the African delegations at the UN to discuss the 
nature of this first-response type of aid.427   
Over the next few weeks, aid requests flooded the UN headquarters. On 22 July, 
Bunche cabled Hammarskjold alerting him that existing food supplies in the Congo were low 
and the country would soon have to rely on its emergency reserves if the government did not 
act immediately.428 On 26 July, Bunche sent another set of cables requesting two 
meteorological experts and air traffic controllers for the Congo’s main airport—French 
speaking and preferably from Tunisia, Lebanon or Syria.429 Bunche and Linner made similar 
ad hoc requests with regard to the Congo’s health, educational, telecommunication and 
financial needs. On 25 July, Linner and Bunche reported on the development of a pressing 
financial crisis. Linner learned that the government of the Congo was in danger of failing to 
meet civil service salary payments for the month of August having virtually no cash balance 
at independence. Tax revenues from the provinces had ceased and the Belgians had reneged 
on a promise of financial assistance.430 Worse still, there was literally no one in the Congo 
Finance Ministry to stabilize matters. Of the 150 Belgians serving in the Congolese Finance 
Ministry at independence, all had left by the end of August.431 In the estimation of the US 
State Department, the Congo entered independence with the financial burden commensurate 
to a highly developed European state and now consisted of a government that lacked the 
administrative or financial experience to manage it. Tragically, the only nation best suited to 
help was now its ‘mortal enemy’ and the cause of its ills.432  
 Meanwhile, developments in and outside the Congo deepened the crisis almost from 
the start. On 11 July, Katanga, the southern-most province of the Congo, declared its 
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independence wresting from the fledging state its vast mineral wealth and 60% of its tax 
revenue. The following day, the government of the Congo made its first formal request for 
UN military assistance specifically to extract Belgian soldiers from Katanga and elsewhere, 
many of whom the secessionist province had warmly welcomed.433 Hammarskjold then 
invoked, for the first time, Article 99 of the UN Charter summoning a meeting of the UN 
Security Council that met from 13-14 July. The Security Council then passed a resolution that 
requested the Belgian troops to withdraw, called for a restoration of order and finally 
authorized the Secretary-General to provide military and other technical assistance to the 
Congolese government.434 In response to the latter appeal, Hammarskjold sprang into action 
immediately, appealing to Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Guinea and Mali for troops and 
requesting airlift assistance from the US, Great Britain and the Soviet Union. The first UN 
troops arrived on 15 July, thus giving birth to the UN Operation to the Congo. At this point, 
an estimated 25,000 Belgians and other European civilians had fled the country and some 
10,000 Belgians troops held twenty-three different strategic areas in the Congo including 
airports, shipping ports and key points within all of Congo’s major cities.435  
As stated, most histories of the conflict focus at this point on the security issues 
encountered by this unique force of international peacekeepers soon to number several 
thousand and growing. Nevertheless, mid-July also marked the official start of the UN 
Civilian Mission to the Congo as a component of the overall operation. Hammarskjold chose 
Sture Linner as Chief of Civilian Operations, according to Linner, because of his apparent 
ability to lead extemporaneously while not being fettered by bureaucratic prudence.436 
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Joining Linner and Bunche in Leopoldville was Jean David, a Haitian, who would soon play 
a crucial, albeit controversial, role in securing connections with key Congolese ministers.437 
Staying on as Financial Advisor to the UN Civilian Mission was Robert West, an American 
economist from MIT who happened to be doing research in the Congo when the crisis broke 
out.438 Other top advisors would also arrive soon in their respective official capacities 
forming what was known as the Consultative Group to the UN Civilian Operation.439 In New 
York, Hammarskjold requested the services of Henry Labouisse of the World Bank who took 
on the role as Special Adviser to the Secretary-General. Meanwhile, Hammarskjold’s chief 
adviser on African affairs, Heinz Wieschoff, served as a go-between for Hammarskjold and 
Brussels.440 Acting as Linner’s opposite number and point man in New York was, Sir 
Alexander MacFarquhar—officially the Special Adviser on Civil Affairs in the Congo. 
MacFarquhar was a British national but had been working with the UN Secretariat as a 
Technical Assistance Board Representative. He, therefore, claimed he could sympathize with 
the task set before Linner in the Congo.441  
As the personnel for the Civilian Operation in the Congo coalesced so did its 
rationale. Weighing in on the nature and scope of the nascent Civilian Mission was Henry S. 
Bloch, former deputy director of the financial branch of the UN who in 1944 co-authored, 
Economics of Military Occupations: Selected Problems.442 Bloch sent Hammarskjold a report 
on 20 July that urged the Secretary-General that while the UN could build short-term 
technical assistance aid around its military establishment, he should not delay in developing a 
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strong, comprehensive and separate civilian aid component to the UN presence in the Congo. 
Bloch recognized the uniqueness of the technical aid mission that lay ahead noting, 
‘[n]ormally we plan for a developing economy. In Congo we must plan for a declining 
economy on a “stop loss” basis until, we hope, ascendency can resume.’ Therefore, the UN 
needed reconnaissance to determine the scope and character of services rendered but Bloch 
already recognized acute needs in transportation, health, food, public administration and 
unemployment. Still Bloch remained hopeful, arguing, ‘[r]apid action can save the patrimony 
of the state provided that technical help is injected with a proper order of priorities.’ This 
included a ‘crash programme’ which was adviser-light and manager-heavy since, as Bloch 
warned, the entire program would fail if UN actions resulted in resentment among the 
Congolese population—a portent of things to come.443 Overall, Bloch’s report highlighted the 
seriousness with which the UN Secretariat treated the Civilian Operation in the Congo from 
the outset. It also served as an important conceptual and practical model for the development 
of the UN Civilian Mission.  
Yet for all its insights, Bloch’s recommendations seemed not to take into account 
certain political factors that Hammarskjold was simultaneously considering with regard to 
aid—one of the first indications that the UN was quickly realizing development aid theories 
did not always account for local realities. Hammarskjold voiced his concerns to Henry Cabot 
Lodge in a candid conversation on 18 July. Hammarskjold’s concern was that Congo’s—and 
specifically Lumumba’s—request for aid had not only gone out to the UN but was sent out in 
all directions.444 The Secretary-General’s preference was that the UN should move in with aid 
exclusivity, lest the Soviets offer their technicians unilaterally. However, Hammarskjold 
seemed aware of the danger in this approach since the UN would be administering aid to a 
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country with only the semblance of a civil administration in place, opening the Organization 
up to criticisms of ‘disguised imperialism’. To combat these charges Hammarskjold hoped to 
rely heavily on aid from African states, channeled through the UN. Finally, Lodge noted 
Hammarskjold did not seem daunted by the task ahead but ‘intrigued by the creative role 
thrust upon him.’445  
In another early indication of how events on the ground challenged development aid 
envisioned by Hammarskjold, Prime Minister Lumumba, back in Leopoldville, issued an 
ultimatum to Bunche on 18 July. It stated that if the UN could not expel all Belgian forces 
within forty-eight hours the Congo would appeal for help elsewhere, specifically the 
USSR.446 According to F.T. Liu, Bunche’s Special Assistant in the Congo, the two also split 
over who had ultimate command over the growing number of UN forces entering the 
Congo—the UN or Lumumba himself, who also held the position of Defense Minister.447 
Besides foreshadowing future hostilities between Lumumba and Hammarskjold, one should 
view the urgency displayed by Lumumba in light of Katanga’s secession and the Prime 
Minister’s desire to secure his own position by handling the situation with the utmost speed. 
Undeterred, and seemingly unsatisfied with an additional Security Council resolution passed 
on 22 July, which marginally clarified the Security Council resolution from 14 July, 
Lumumba announced he would travel to North America to seek further assistance. This 
meant, for the time being, the UN’s effort to maximize its civilian aid effort would have to 
wait.  
Rummaging for More Aid: Lumumba in North America  
 Linner described Lumumba’s appeal for aid during the Prime Minister’s trips to New 
York, Washington, and Ottawa, followed by visits to Tunisia, Morocco, Guinea, Ghana, 
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Liberia and Togo as ‘doing one about face after another.’448 In fact, Lumumba’s aid 
sojourn—lasting from 24 July to 1 August 1960—underlines the political complications that 
accompanied the UN’s effort to stabilize aid to the Congo. Lumumba’s first stop was New 
York, where at a press conference he again expressed his desire to dictate the terms and 
length of the UN’s involvement in the Congo.449 Lumumba then met with Hammarskjold on 
three separate occasions from 24-26 July. Despite fears to the contrary, the talks went well 
and the two managed to reach a preliminary understanding on the nature of UN civilian aid 
while prioritizing needs relating to communication and transport facilities, health services, 
schools and finances. Crucially, Lumumba agreed on the creation of a so-called ‘shadow 
cabinet’ made up of top UN advisors specifically in the financial, judiciary, health, education, 
agriculture and public security fields. The group would then advise Linner on further needs 
and recommend personnel to work directly in the various Congolese ministries.450 Although 
UN and Congolese officials would work out the exact parameters regarding UN aid to the 
Congo later in Leopoldville, the initial understanding seemed to have solidified the UN as the 
primary, if not exclusive, aid agent in the Congo. The meeting also represented the high-point 
in the Hammarskjold-Lumumba relationship. From New York, Hammarskjold headed to the 
Congo, with a stopover in Brussels, while Lumumba traveled to Washington hoping for a 
parlay with President Eisenhower.  
Views of the Congolese Prime Minister among the Eisenhower Administration varied. 
Lodge, after meeting Lumumba in New York, reported to Secretary of State Christian Herter 
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that Lumumba might be, ‘a little flighty and erratic but knows what he’s doing.’451 
Meanwhile CIA Director, Allen Dulles, had just days earlier labeled Lumumba as ‘a Castro 
or worse.’452 In either case, there was apparently no interest in letting Lumumba meet with 
Eisenhower and instead Herter ran interference for the Administration. The two met on 27 
July where Lumumba sought a separate aid deal with the US. Herter rebuffed Lumumba, 
affirming the US policy, agreed to at the highest level, that it would channel all its aid efforts 
through the UN. Specifically, Washington recognized the danger in sanctioning ad hoc 
responses to the civilian aid effort in the Congo that would create space for Communist 
infiltration, thus transforming the Congo’s rehabilitation into a Cold War competition. Using 
the UN as the exclusive flagship agency for aid would also permit the US and other Western 
powers to work with the UN, instead of the Congo government directly. Thus, the 
Administration sought to avoid a scenario in which the Congo might try to leverage the West 
off the East, and vice-versa, over bilateral aid packages.453 An intelligence briefing from 10 
August recognized the advantages mentioned above and additionally noted the value and 
efficiency of centralizing the aid effort to the Congo through the UN that could then tap into 
its worldwide resources. However, the report foresaw difficulties arising from UN aid 
exclusivity if Belgian technicians decided to return to the Congo unilaterally, if the US 
wanted to provide bilateral aid at some future date or if other international organizations 
desired to administer assistance.454 The State Department too urged caution, recognizing that 
the Congolese seemed aware of any limitations on their sovereignty, real or imagined, that 
might create a sense that any exclusive aid arrangement might lead to the Congo feeling 
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treated as a UN Trust Territory. In fact, the fear of disguised imperialism was an underlying 
issue the Congo government, the UN Secretariat and the US government all seemed to 
detect.455  
Additionally, the State Department had learned from the Guinean Ambassador that if 
Lumumba came back from his North American trip empty-handed, he was likely to accept 
Soviet aid.456 To hedge its bets, it proposed flooding the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo 
with Americans, Belgians or other allies as they worked in close cooperation with the various 
Congolese ministries. The proposal recommended using at least 200-300 US personnel as 
part of the US contingent within the UN. What the US should not permit was ‘an undue 
reliance on Bloc personnel. In effect, in any operation where Bloc personnel participate there 
should be US or allied persons involved in such a way as to inhibit the Bloc presence.’457 In 
reality, neither the US or its allies were able to dominate the UN Civilian Mission as later 
statistics reveal, due in part to the UN Secretariat’s insistence on using personnel from 
member states within the Afro-Asia group at the UN. It also severely minimized the use of 
Communist bloc personnel in the months ahead. Meanwhile, Lumumba also came up empty-
handed after making appeals for aid to the World Bank and then Ottawa, both forewarned by 
Herter that the Congolese Prime Minister was trying to play the West off against the Soviets 
as he went shopping for aid.458 Therefore, Lumumba left North America, not empty handed, 
but with a message reinforcing the position that all aid, at least for now, would be channeled 
through the UN. 
Formalizing the UN-Congo Civilian Aid Contract, 11 August 1960 
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 On 11 August, the UN and the Congolese government agreed on a formalized civilian 
aid package. The accord, although not specifically disallowing other entities from providing 
aid, revealed just how ubiquitous the UN civilian presence would be in the Congo and how 
unprecedented the control the UN headquarters would have over administering aid provided 
by the larger UN community—namely the Specialized Agencies. Finally, the agreement 
showed that the need for law and security, although important, did not trump all other 
Congolese needs. In describing the Civilian Mission and its role in providing development 
aid going forward, Hammarskjold asserted that it must ‘go beyond the time-honoured forms 
of technical assistance in order to do what is necessary, but it has to do it in forms which do 
not in any way infringe upon the sovereignty of the country or hamper the speedy 
development of the national administration.’459 In other words, in theory the UN was to 
provide maximum assistance while giving a minimum impression of domination or take-
over—a tall tasks in the weeks and months ahead.460  
The aid formula approved by the Congo on 11 August, and in part already 
implemented, delineated two types of civilian aid. The first was traditional technical 
assistance as described in Chapter One, in which experts advised the national government just 
as they would in any other newly independent underdeveloped country where the UN 
operated. The second type of aid included activities where experts would have much higher 
administrative responsibilities—a new method of aid so far untried by the UN. The Loi 
Fondamentale, the Congolese constitution, implied that a Belgian adviser would assist each 
new Congolese minister in managing the functions of his office. With the Belgian civil 
servants having fled the country, UN advisers would officially take on this responsibility. 
These senior experts, or ‘shadow cabinet’, were responsible for aid operations in various 
fields and together formed the aforementioned Consultative Group chaired by Sture Linner. 
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Linner’s rank and authority matched that of the Supreme Commander of the United Nations 
military force in the Congo—General Carl von Horn.461  
Lastly, a critical component of the Civilian Operation were the UN Specialized 
Agencies.462 As indicated in early chapters, the UN Specialized Agencies all coveted their 
functional autonomy from the UN headquarters. In this case, Hammarskjold was careful to 
state publicly that the UN would not interfere with the administrative sovereignty of the 
Specialized Agencies, yet insisted on far greater consultation and coordination with the 
ONUC in the midst of unique circumstances. Therefore, in the Congo each representative of a 
Specialized Agency served in a corresponding role with Linner’s Consultative Group that 
ultimately answered to Hammarskjold.463  
Hammarskjold seemed to have the backing of Washington on this matter as well. 
Earlier in July, Dr. M.G. Candau, Director-General of the WHO appealed to US Surgeon 
General Dr. Leroy Burney for $1 million to kick-start a special aid program in the Congo. 
The Administration reluctantly decided to inform Dr. Candau that it preferred the Secretary-
General to handle the financing and coordinating of Congo aid who would apportion funding 
to the Specialized Agencies as needed. Again, the US worried that uncoordinated aid efforts 
might encourage the Soviets to send aid not channeled through the UN.464 Thus, as the 
civilian aid structure to the Congo coalesced, Hammarskjold formally reigned-in the normally 
autonomous Specialized Agencies. To reinforce its centralized structure, the ONUC ran its 
entire operation, military and civilian, out of a converted hotel, Le Royal, in what became a 
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miniature UN headquarters. In fact, it was the first time all the Specialized Agencies 
contributed to a UN operation under one flag.465 
Shaping the UN Civilian Mission: ‘Administrative Disneyland’, August 1960 
 The day following the UN-Congolese civilian aid agreement, MacFarquhar suggested 
to Linner that his first ‘“shopping list” might well contain some “impact” items’, asking if the 
Civilian Chief could ‘use some American fellowships, some Canadians miners or some 
Russian transportation or tractors?’466 The somewhat light-hearted cable veiled the coming 
turbulence but it did allow Linner to expound on his vision for UN civilian aid going forward. 
The Civilian Chief, who balked at selecting any items from the ‘shopping list’, believed that 
initially Congo’s emergency needs should be the focus of the Civilian Mission before it 
started on any long-term development schemes. Of central concern for Linner was forming a 
competent Consultative Group of ten to twelve international experts in each specific field 
who could establish channels with Congolese ministers. In a practical sense this involved 
members of the Consultative Group approaching various ministries and offering to help 
restore functionality in the various branches of the Congolese government. This proved 
difficult early on since some Congolese ministries lacked a central authority. In other words, 
the shadow government were without an in-the-flesh equivalent.467 Linner cabled 
MacFarquhar, ‘[w]e must, I am afraid, be prepared for many surprises: the cabinet members 
have simply not even the faintest idea of administration (and how could they have?). This in 
combination with the continuous political maneuvering in the Government and with the 
dichotomy at the very top makes this an administrative Disneyland. But we have at least 
arrived at something like organized confusion.’  
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Working alongside Linner to try to make certain the Congolese would not regard the 
UN as an inheritor of Belgian colonialism was the Consultative Group expert in Public 
Administration, Robert Gardiner. Gardiner was a Ghanaian economist who was presently 
serving as Deputy Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa. Linner 
realized immediately how important it was to have an African working on this delicate form 
of aid.468 As argued in previous chapters, technical assistance in public administration was 
one area in which UN officials like Hammarskjold and Keenleyside believed the UN 
approach offered a unique level of sensitivity compared to bilateral options. Gardiner’s first 
task was to make a survey of all the government ministries in the Congo to determine their 
structure and salary scales in the hopes to fill vacant posts.469 Unfortunately, as later evidence 
will show, for the Civilian ONUC the nature of an amusement park-like administration meant 
some UN experts had to run the show while functioning as the de facto government, opening 
up claims that the ONUC was partaking in disguised colonialism. 
The second major task of Linner and the Consultative Group was to form ‘field 
teams’ to engage in reconnaissance, initiate studies and administer emergency aid. In the field 
of education, the Acting Director-General of UNESCO visited Leopoldville from 13-19 
August, met with the Minister of Education, Pierre Mulele and shockingly learned that the 
Congo required an estimated 1,500 teachers for the upcoming school year.470 From the start, 
health related aid remained the domain of the WHO and the International Red Cross, which 
by the end August deployed numerous medical teams across the Congo from eighteen 
countries. Surveys were underway to gauge the general public health situation. They 
                                                          
468 Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 16 August 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012. 
469 Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 6 September 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012. 
470 Progress Report No. 1, 24 August 1960, ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.1), 15-16. 
190 
 
discovered that among other needs, the Congo required experienced pharmacists to staff the 
medical depot stores in the capital.471  
Agricultural related aid was slower in its implementation. The FAO Director-General, 
B.R. Sen delayed in sending large numbers of agricultural technicians, desiring to wait until 
the political situation stabilized.472 Meanwhile, although a preliminary survey by the FAO 
revealed that food supplies in Congo were sufficient to meet the present demand, the 
Congolese Minister of Agriculture, Joseph Lutula, was not so optimistic. He approached 
Linner in early September pleading for UN assistance. He told Linner, ‘I don’t want to sign 
any paper that has not been approved by one of your men—frankly I feel incompetent and 
insecure.’473  
Additionally, finance related aid remained a high priority for the Civilian Mission in 
the early months of the crisis. Swiss banker, Victor Umbricht, aided by the aforementioned 
Robert West, initiated studies on the various financial problems facing the Congo. Their 
initial focus was on the reorganization of the central banking system.474 West, in particular, 
lamented that in the financial field virtually everything required further attention. He 
especially blamed the Congolese leaders who failed to recognize the intricate structure of 
their economy, ‘capable of undergoing a severe financial crisis of modern description’, unlike 
most other African states.475  
As for activities outside the capital Leopoldville, Linner recommended to the central 
government to send a commission to the provinces of Kasai, Kivu, the Orientale and 
Equateur which subsequently led to the establishment of permanent representatives placed in 
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each provincial capital that were directly linked to the Civilian Operation.476 Linner intended 
for these UN officials to advise the provincial leaders on economics, agriculture, health, etc., 
while treading lightly on political matters since, ‘no country likes the idea of having foreign 
political officers work in their midst, and the hypersensitive and ultra-chauvinistic Congolese 
least of all.’ In fact, the closer these advisers and the Civilian Operation worked together the 
better, since Linner believed his area of the overall ONUC mission represented, ‘the really 
constructive part of our activities’ with the longest ranging impact.477  
Linner’s show of confidence was reflective of a blossoming Civilian Mission of an 
unprecedented scale. In addition to the aid categories discussed above, the Mission pushed 
forward in other fields such as transportation, civil aviation, telecommunications, 
meteorology, postal services and labor. By mid-September, the ONUC civilian personnel 
totaled 144 individuals from 24 countries. As an indication of the effort to keep Cold War 
elements out of the conflict, 94 of the 114 civilian aid workers came from 15 non-NATO 
countries. French, Haitian, Swiss and Tunisians, along with Swedes, made up over 60% of 
the civilian staff, no doubt due in part to their native French language skills (with the 
exception of the Swedes). Six Americans served, meanwhile one sole civilian aid worker 
came from the Communist bloc, a Czechoslovakian.478 These and later statistics call into 
question the description of scholars like Elizabeth Schmidt who describe the UN Congo 
operation, and even the UN’s civilian mission as ‘largely an American affair.’479  
To educate this motley crew on what had been a relatively isolated Belgian colony, 
Linner ordered ten copies of a Congo tourism book for distribution among his staff.480 To 
promote their work he swiftly published and disseminated throughout the Congo a twenty-
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two page booklet with text and illustrations on the early efforts of the civilian operation.481 
Meanwhile, ONUC sent copies of Linner’s bi-monthly reports to NGOs and the UN 
Information Centers for worldwide distribution. Finally, these ‘round-ups’ made their way 
back in New York where Hammarskjold referenced them repeatedly in Security Council 
debates.482  
The Hammarskjold-Lumumba Split 
With the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo just underway political and security 
related elements of the Congo quagmire simultaneously arose establishing a precedent 
whereby these factors often stunted and undermined advancements in the civilian aid arena. 
In this case, a day after the civilian aid agreement, the Congolese government and in 
particular Lumumba, took issue with Hammarskjold’s trip to the secessionist province of 
Katanga. Escorting a contingent of 240 Swedish troops serving under UN auspices and acting 
on a third Security Council resolution from 9 August, Hammarskjold landed in the provincial 
capital Elizabethville on 12 August. Hammarskjold meant the gesture as a preliminary step to 
encourage the withdrawal of Belgian troops and specifically did not intend to be a party in or 
influence the outcome of the secessionist conflict.483 Lumumba and several others in the 
government resented the fact that Hammarskjold acted without consulting any Congolese 
authorities and despised the fact that the Secretary-General was taking an impartial stance in 
the Congolese civil war.484 Lumumba responded by canceling a meeting with Hammarskjold 
in Leopoldville on 15 August. At a later press conference, he accused Hammarskjold of 
illegally impersonating the central government by holding talks with the secessionist 
president of Katanga, Moise Tshombe, while ignoring what Lumumba saw as a conspiracy 
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between the Belgians and Tshombe.485 Moreover, Lumumba presaged his growing aversion 
to the UN in a 9 August press conference, two days prior to signing the aid deal with the UN, 
when he railed against those who said the Congolese were incapable of self-governance and 
deserving of a UN ‘guardianship-status’ for another fifteen years. He instead called for 
‘radical Africanization’ and announced his government would secure aid from wherever it 
wished.486 Incensed, Hammarskjold returned to New York where he, according to Kanza, 
‘swayed opinion strongly against Lumumba and his government.’487  
Following the split with Hammarskjold, Lumumba’s next move was to declare a state 
of emergency and appeal directly to Premier Khrushchev on 15 August for transport planes, 
trucks and weapons.488 As Moscow investigated the logistics of making good on Lumumba’s 
request, it also formulated a statement in opposition to the UN Civilian Operation. Scholars 
have made much of the split between the Soviet Union and Hammarskjold during the fall of 
1960 in the context of the General Assembly debate, but so far the literature neglects Soviet 
disillusionment with UN civilian aid efforts and how this was used as another means to attack 
the Secretary-General specifically and ONUC generally. On 20 August, V.V. Kuznetsov, the 
First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, visited Hammarskjold and announced the USSR 
found the 12 August agreement between the UN and the Congolese, ‘completely 
inadmissible’. He charged the Consultative Group with subverting the central government 
while relegating the Congo to the position of a Trust Territory in violation of the UN Charter. 
He also claimed the shadow cabinet, likely to be Americans or other Westerners, ‘will 
possess authorities of ministers and fix the policy of the Congo for the future and the trend of 
the country’s development.’ Kuznetsov lamented the lack of a single expert from the Eastern 
European countries among the 65 postings while 21 experts came from the US or its global 
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allies. Finally, according to Kuznetsov, a vast majority of the 28 advisers from Africa to the 
Congo held second-rate posts, altogether resulting in ‘a new form of colonial enslavery of the 
Congolese people under the disguise of the UN flag.’489  
The growing disillusionment with the UN among the Soviets and Lumumba led to a 
fourth Security Council meeting regard the Congo Crisis. There Hammarskjold, in response 
to some of the accusations from the Soviet and Lumumba camps, announced his interest in 
setting up an ‘Advisory Committee’ made up of countries contributing security and 
peacekeeping personnel to ONUC. However, although admitting the geographic distribution 
of the civilian activities were not entirely satisfactory, Hammarskjold rebuffed accusations 
that the Civilian Operation was intentionally biased in its personnel selection, finding it 
difficult to find technical experts fluent in French and at least proficient in English from the 
Eastern bloc. Citing a report he received just that day, he remarked that from all accounts the 
central government of the Congo welcomed the cooperation with UN advisers.490  
Despite his effort to deflect and stamp out his critics, the conclusion of the Security 
Council meeting brought more ire for Hammarskjold. Joining Lumumba and the Soviets in 
criticizing the Secretary-General were the Congo’s Deputy Prime Minister Antoine Gizenga 
and its UN Ambassador, Thomas Kanza. Gizenga stated, ‘[i]n all conscience, the government 
of the Republic of the Congo and the Congolese people cannot agree to being handed over to 
neo-colonialism in this way.’ For his part, Kanza recounts how his government took 
exception to a comment made by Hammarskjold during the opening the Security Council 
session on 21 August. Hammarskjold’s statement that the UN could help in, ‘the construction 
of the state and the laying of foundations for a balanced political, economic and social life for 
the people’ created a double-standard and smelled of colonialism according to Kanza. For the 
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UN Ambassador, it appeared as if the UN was apparently not willing to aid the Congolese 
government in an impending civil war with Katanga, yet still wanted to show the way with 
regard to the Congo’s political, economic and social future.491   
Meanwhile, back in the Congo, Lumumba’s declaration of a state of emergency 
coincided with renewed attacks on Westerners by mid-August that mimicked those of early 
July. The ANC arrested whites in the streets of Leopoldville not holding UN papers, creating 
a black market for UN armbands. Even so, other reports confirmed UN personnel did not 
escape persecution.492 Linner even remembers protesters outside his hotel chanting, ‘Bunche 
for lunch, and Linner for dinner!’493 For the Civilian Operation in the Congo it all meant the 
UN would have to tread lightly as political and security issues engulfed the crisis. Just how 
did Hammarskjold and the UN operation in the Congo survive this early test? In short, 
Hammarskjold and the ONUC still had the backing of several key players. First, Mongi Slim 
of Tunisia and Sir Claude Corea of Ceylon, representing Africa and Asia respectively on the 
Security Council, were nearly unwavering in support of Hammarskjold and the UN mission, 
fashioning all the previous draft resolutions on the Congo so far passed by the Council.494 
Secondly, the aforementioned Advisory Committee did quickly form, made up of nearly all 
African or Asian representatives (plus some from Canada and Ireland). According to 
Urquhart, from its inception the Committee was reliable, confidential, consensus forming and 
a great asset for Hammarskjold.495 Finally, the US remained a stalwart supporter of the UN. 
A National Security Council report from 18 August concluded the US needed the UN in the 
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Congo despite opposition from its Prime Minister.496 Herter told Hammarskjold on 10 
September that the US was behind him ‘1000%’.497  
Still, many uncertainties remained. For one, the Soviets did manage to intervene 
bilaterally per Lumumba’s request in early September with transport planes, trucks and some 
technicians.498 Next, Lumumba continued to grumble about the fact that all aid, less the 
relatively modest amount from the Eastern bloc, came through the UN.499 Moreover, 
Lumumba now refused to talk with Bunche who the UN replaced temporarily on 30 August 
with Hammarskjold’s Special Assistant, Andrew Cordier. Hammarskjold meant for Cordier 
to serve until the new Congo Special Representative, Rajeshwar Dayal, arrived on 8 
September.500  
Impediments to Civilian Aid: The Constitutional Crisis, Belgian Aid & Soviet 
Opposition, August-October 1960 
In the midst of these developments, new political and financial questions challenged 
the mission, as did unilateral Belgian aid offers and finally acute opposition to the UN 
mission from the Soviet Union. First, however, a constitutional crisis within the Republic of 
the Congo fractured the central government, thus further complicating the UN’s aid efforts in 
public administration. The constitutional crisis started with a coup initiated on 5 September 
when Congolese President Joseph Kasavubu publicly announced Lumumba’s dismissal and 
the Prime Minister returned the favor. According to Linner’s oral testimony, Kasavubu 
approached him just days earlier and asked, as a matter of curiosity, how does one make a 
coup d’état? Linner, believing Kasavubu was joking, answered that one only needs to avoid 
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violence, take over the radio station and treat the deposed leader well.501 Linner’s accidental, 
yet strangely coincidental advice aside, most historians have rightly focused on the part 
played by Andrew Cordier, Bunche’s replacement during the first week in September. 
Historians Carole J.L. Collins and David N. Gibbs are highly critical of Cordier in particular, 
who they claimed made a number of strategic administrative decisions that aided in propping 
up Kasavubu at the expense of Lumumba.502  
One other UN civilian official seems to have perhaps compromised his status as an 
impartial international civil servant during this same chaotic episode. The controversy 
surrounds the activities of Jean David, a Haitian, brought on-board as Linner’s assistant after 
Lumumba complained to Hammarskjold, while in New York, of too many Europeans in top 
advisory roles within ONUC.503 During the constitutional crisis of early September, David 
was highly involved in sensitive political matters between Kasavubu and Lumumba, a place 
where Linner believed he had no business being. The exact nature of David’s involvement is 
unclear from the slim archival evidence but after David continued to ‘“play it” on his own’ 
Linner sent David away on a tour of the provinces to remove him from the temptation to 
‘play politics’, later changing his posting entirely.504  
The fallout from the coup had perhaps even more of an impact on UN efforts to 
establish an advisory role with various Congolese Ministers. In an effort to neutralize both 
Kasavubu and Lumumba, their rival cabinets and Parliament, the Chief of Staff of the 
Congolese Army, Colonel Joseph Mobutu, initiated a successful coup of his own on 14 
September. According to Mobutu, his actions were necessary to allow room for political 
reconciliation. Left without an effective government, Mobutu sought Linner’s advice on how 
                                                          
501 Transcript of Interview with Sture Linner, 8 November 1990, United Nations Oral History Collection, 22.  
502 See, Collins ‘The Cold War come to Africa: Cordier and the 1960 Congo Crisis,’ 245-46; Gibbs, ‘The United 
Nations, international peacekeeping and the question of “impartiality”,’ 365.  
503 Hoskyns, 156. 
504 Cable from Linner to MacFarquhar, 24 September 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012; Cable from 
Linner to MacFarquhar, 11 November 1960, UNARMS, Folder S-075200300012. One can also infer from 
Linner’s comment on David that the Haitian might have been trying to elevate his own role in the Congo in 
anticipation of a future run at the Haitian presidency.  
198 
 
to run the country. Linner rebuffed any thoughts of the UN doing any more than it already 
was administratively and instead suggested Mobutu seek out young educated Congolese, 
already in short demand, who might be able to run the government at least temporarily—
more advice he would soon regret giving. Linner reasoned these individuals might be less 
concerned with holding onto power or not as connected to tribal conflicts.505 Kasavubu, who 
had fared better than Lumumba in the constitutional mayhem of early-September, officially 
installed Mobutu’s ‘College of Commissioners’ on 29 September. With Mobutu’s backing, 
the College used the police to take possession of administrative buildings in Leopoldville 
while asking any seasoned politicians that remained to vacate their posts.506  
Despite his advice, Linner doubted the College’s authority and impartiality from the 
start.  The major issue he had was that the College was in fact mostly made up of Congolese 
students from Lovanium University—the largest of two universities in the Congo. Although 
it included some of the Congo’s brightest young minds, most within the College of 
Commissioners lacked administrative experience and thus turned to their former or even 
current Belgian professors, in Brussels or Lovanium, as policy advisers. Moreover, Linner 
believed the return of any Belgians should only take place circumspectly, not en masse. Thus, 
he bemoaned these developments since they might open the UN up to criticism of helping to 
re-instate the old colonial regime—especially if Lumumba regained power. Overall, Linner 
believed the relentless political crises considerably hampered the task of developing an 
independent and Africanized public administration in the Congo.507  
The use of Belgian advisors by the College was indicative of yet another crisis—
namely between the Belgians and the UN over aid to the Congo. As early as 28 July, just 
weeks after thousands of Belgians fled the Congo, the Belgian Ambassador to the US, Louis 
Scheyven, informed Herter that his government had just ordered many Belgian civil servants 
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back to their Congo posts, noting the futility of trying to replace all technicians with UN 
personnel.508 Even some within the Congolese government, including Justin Bomboko, the 
Foreign Minister, and Ambassador Kanza, also recognized the need for Belgian aid.509 
Claude Carbonnelle, the Belgian Secretary for Economic and Financial Affairs of the Congo 
before independence, and briefly the Director of the Belgian Economic Aid Mission to the 
Congo after independence, ultimately saw the Congo’s lack of qualified personnel as its most 
pressing crisis. According to Carbonnelle the UN could not expect to fill all the gaps, 
whereas, ‘Belgium alone can furnish in a sufficient quantity the personnel acquainted with 
the languages and the local problems.’ Carbonnelle asserted these ‘veterans of good will’ 
should return, ‘to collaborate in the exalted task of the creation of a new country’, possibly 
under the charge of the UN to head off any charges of re-colonization.510  
By late August, Linner was receiving requests from Belgium for updates on security 
conditions and UN financial guarantees offered to Belgian teachers returning to the Congo.511 
The problem for the UN, and for many in the international community was that Belgian aid, 
especially to Katanga, was in fact unilateral and had not conformed to the General Assembly 
resolution from 20 September which Hammarskjold believed gave the UN aid exclusivity. 
Hammarskjold reminded the Belgian UN representative of this fact on 8 October. In a 
strongly worded message, he asked the Belgian government to withdraw its military, para-
military or civil personnel, which were all contributing to the continuing tensions and setting 
a precedent for the allowance of other unilateral aid. Instead, Hammarskjold urged the 
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Belgians to channel all their aid to the Congo through the UN.512 On 19 October, 
Hammarskjold again wrote to Brussels to complain about a recruiting agency set up in the 
Belgian capital whose goal was to increase the number of Belgian officials taking up posts as 
advisers within Mobutu’s College of Commissioners.513 In fact, as Hoskyns notes, ‘an 
atmosphere of mutual hostility developed between these Belgians and their opposite numbers 
in the United Nations Civilian Operations.’514  
The Belgian response to Hammarskjold was defiant. The Belgian representative to the 
UN argued that the UN had no legal basis for removing the Belgians since such an act would 
interfere with Congo’s domestic affairs. Moreover, two-hundred or so UN civilian experts 
could hardly be expected to fill all the gaps in aid and any further Belgian withdrawal would 
surely ruin an already fragile state.515 Tshombe echoed the Belgian stance informing 
Hammarskjold that any departure of Europeans from Katanga, as a result of UN entry into the 
province, would cripple his ‘country’ much like it had the rest of the Congo.516  In reality, 
Hammarskjold privately acknowledged the need for Belgian technicians to remain in Katanga 
not least because Union Minière, the gigantic Belgian mining company operating in Katanga, 
threatened to shut down if the UN forced the Belgians out. Elsewhere in the Congo, 
Hammarskjold deemed the remaining or returning Belgian presence unavoidable so long as 
they operated under the purview of the Congolese, not the Belgian, government.517  
Unfortunately, this meant tremendous friction between the remaining Belgian civilian 
technicians and aid workers, plus those invited back by the College and their UN 
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counterparts. Whereas, the Belgians accused the UN civilian aid workers of ineptitude, UN 
personnel accused the Belgians of re-imposing a colonial status on the Congolese, which 
according to Hoskyns halved the potential aid provided to the Congo during this period and 
limited most endeavors to emergency aid.518 Based on the current archival evidence, 
Hoskyns’ estimation might have been too bleak, since by October, the UN Civilian Mission 
was in fact engaging in substantial long-term development aid, as described below. Still the 
UN was having tremendous difficulties going it alone in a country five times the size of 
France—particularly in financing the largest aid mission in UN history.  
Serious appeals to finance UN operations in the Congo, beyond that which was 
normally budgeted for the EPTA and the Special Fund, came soon after the second Security 
Council meeting solidified the UN’s presence in the Congo for the foreseeable future. For his 
part, Hammarskjold inquired on 4 August if the US was willing to pledge $100 million to the 
Congo government, via the UN, towards its reconstruction. This request also came in light of 
Hammarskjold’s belief that Lumumba might make good on his promise to seek Soviet 
assistance if the US and Canada refused. Herter balked at the figure and the logistics of 
getting the permission of Congress. Eventually Washington approved the figure of $5 million 
in late August to serve as temporary stopgap funding.519 The aforementioned Soviet aid, at 
the request of Lumumba, caused Hammarskjold to push once again for direct funding for the 
Civilian Operation, this time from all UN member states. In his 7 September report to the 
Security Council on the Congo Crisis, Hammarskjold proposed establishing a ‘UN Congo 
Fund’. In some ways a miniature SUNFED for the Congo. Linking the need for the Fund to 
the dire economic situation in the Congo, Hammarskjold argued that providing international 
financial assistance to the Congo, via the UN, was necessary so as not to jeopardize or make 
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void the actions previously administered. According to Hammarskjold, large-scale financial 
assistance would stabilize the public administration, revitalize the business community, 
combat unemployment and, ‘lay the foundation for the future growth of the Congo 
economy.’520 The Security Council met to consider Hammarskjold’s report on 9 September. 
As before, political developments hampered progress and the debate quickly turned towards 
the UN’s role in the ousting of Lumumba just days earlier. By 12 September Deputy Foreign 
Minister Valerian Zorin replaced Kuznetsov and began a verbal barrage by the Soviets on the 
role of ONUC, and the Secretary-General in particular, lasting well into 1961.521 The Security 
Council meeting on 16 September ended with a Soviet veto of a resolution that would have 
established a UN Congo Fund.522 Under UN Charter rules, the US proposed calling an 
Emergency Session of the General Assembly to consider the issue. The General Assembly 
emergency session, the fourth in the history of the UN, met from 17-20 September. It resulted 
in even sharper attacks by Zorin against the Secretary-General and the UN mission. 
Conversely, it also produced a vote of confidence for Hammarskjold by the majority of UN 
member states through the passage of a resolution, sponsored by seventeen Afro-Asian states 
and based on the draft resolution vetoed by the Soviet Union just days earlier in the Security 
Council to establish a UN Congo Fund.523  
Nevertheless, funding the Congo Mission hardly mitigated the drama since the 
Emergency General Assembly vote coincided with the start of the 15th Regular Session of the 
General Assembly where Khrushchev continued to malign the UN Operation in the Congo, 
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called for Hammarskjold resignation and infamously unfurled his idea for a three-headed 
Secretary-Generalship or troika.524 Altogether, the obstacles the UN Civilian Mission faced 
from late August to mid-October were mostly beyond its control. Constrained as it was, the 
next section highlights some of the work the Civilian Mission did manage to accomplish as it 
moved from emergency to development aid all the while serving as one of the major means 
by which the UN justified its presence and proved its worth in the Congo. 
The UN Civilian Mission: Solutions and Problems (October-December, 1960) 
 Referencing a General Assembly speech made by Sekou Toure, Hammarskjold 
quoted the President of Guinea who had earlier stated: ‘“Let us regard the Congo as part of 
the life of our human race and consider the fate reserved for millions of men, women, and 
children. Let there be less discussion of Mr. Lumumba, Mr. Kasavubu, Mr. Mobutu, Mr. 
Ileo525 and others, and let there be serious efforts to find for this problem a just solution 
which will serve the cause of a people who desire only well-being, peace and progress.”’526  
The Secretary-General used Toure’s words to introduce a General Assembly speech of his 
own on 17 October 1960, not on the political turmoil encompassing Leopoldville and New 
York, but on the many nameless individuals working to bring to fruition the aspirations 
enumerated by Toure. Included in this group were those of the UN Civilian Mission to the 
Congo whose work so far and in the future would be of ‘decisive importance’. These 
individuals, according to Hammarskjold, were not there as disguised imperialists but as 
impartial international civil servants. Through their assistance, the essential services of the 
Congo continued to function, thus preventing any foreign power so far from dominating the 
Congo while setting it on course for true independence.527  
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Now three months into the conflict, Hammarskjold was relying on the Civilian 
Operation to justify a continued UN presence and again prove its worth. Moreover, he saw it 
as a crucial means by which the UN could keep the Cold War out of the region and as proof 
for UN impartiality in the whole matter—in other words as a vital part of what the UN was 
trying to accomplish in the Congo. On the ground, the Civilian Operation was a blend of 
compartmental, yet significant, achievements coupled with general uncertainty in less than 
ideal conditions. Here again its worth reviewing just what the Civilian Operation 
accomplished while constitutional crises, military coups, UN gavel pounding and troika 
proposals dominated the headlines of the Congo Crisis during the fall of 1960.  
According to Linner, by November, the UN was engaged in much more than just 
emergency action but embarking upon operational assistance, long-range planning, provincial 
surveying, recruitment and professional and technical training. Linner believed his 
Operation’s work in eleven major fields (health, education, communications, etc.) allowed 
the UN to engage in every aspect of Congolese life.528 He touted, in particular, progress that 
took place in the fields of finance and economics. To start with, the $5 million grant from the 
US, channeled through the UN, arrived in October temporarily alleviating Congo’s treasury 
void that allowed it to pay the wages of teachers, compensate other public service personnel 
and finance various public works projects.529 Meanwhile, the UN and the Congolese 
government collaborated to create a ‘Monetary Council’ responsible for overseeing the 
monetary policy of the Congo until the future establishment of its Central Bank. Victor 
Umbricht and Robert West served as the Provisional President-Manager and member of a 
six-man Council respectively.530 MacFarquhar expected the Council’s presence, ‘to plug 
some of the leaks which must be running at the moment’ and provide a semblance of fiscal 
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responsibility necessary to secure donations to the Congo Fund.531 Then as a part of the 
Civilian Operation, Linner established an economic unit soon to become a formidable 
multipurpose team of agricultural and research economists, as well as, business marketers 
who conducted research and wrote policy papers for use by the Congolese government—
whereas no such policy formation unit existed within the current Congo administration. 
Anticipating any future respite in the Congo’s political system, the unit envisioned UN 
experts to sit on various Congolese governmental committees, to serve as consultants and 
take part in policy decisions. To start with, Linner pulled personnel from the Economic 
Commission for Africa and the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs to work in 
what he later officially called the Economic Analysis and Policy Branch of the Office of 
Civilian Operations.532 By the end of the year, according to West, the UN was able to ‘arrest 
the decline in economic activity and to establish emergency administrative machinery 
capable of exercising control until the fundamental problems of institutional reorganization 
could be undertaken.’533 
 Education provided its own challenges. On 3 October, the date set for the opening of 
the school year, only a few Catholic schools had opened. It was not until 19 October that the 
ONUC reached a provisional agreement with Congolese authorities on the recruitment of 500 
teachers by UNESCO. The ONUC education team simultaneously undertook a study of the 
structure of the Ministry of Education and school system, discovering that the educational 
problems within the Congo ran much deeper. Ultimately, they recommended the overhaul of 
the whole structure, from the curriculum to the training course for Congolese teachers.534 
Moreover, UNESCO aimed to unify the Congo’s fractured education system that, under 
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Belgian administration, had often physically segregated Congolese and European students 
leading to divisions in curricula and levels of education.535 Despite these efforts, difficulties 
arose in recruiting French-speaking teachers to a hostile environment in mid-fall, at the same 
time that the UN was hesitant to allow Belgian teachers back en masse. Finally, further 
complicating the educational landscape of the Congo was the Congolese education 
commissioner who looked to his Belgian counterpart for counsel more than the UN.536  
 As for the Congo’s higher education system, the Civilian Mission was eager to utilize 
the resources at Lovanium University. The private catholic university had formally opened in 
1954. The 600 acre campus contained residential housing, sports facilities, numerous 
academic departments, a hospital and even an experimental atomic reactor—the only one in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. The Ford and Rockefeller Foundations had been instrumental previously 
in developing large research programs in medical science, sociology and economics. Despite 
its impressive facilities, only 485 students attended Lovanium during the 1959/60 academic 
year, 365 of whom were Congolese or African.537 Altogether, the juxtaposition of the modest 
enrollment of Congolese students at a university with state-of-art facilities reflected the often-
bizarre nature of Belgian colonialism. However, it clearly offered a real opportunity to 
expand higher education among the Congolese. Still, as in primary and second education, the 
UN encountered administrative difficulties. L.P. Gillon, Lovanium’s Director, seemed to 
expect ONUC to fill and finance vacant university posts that the university would have to fill 
regardless of the UN presence in the Congo. Gillon appeared to be an opportunist especially 
when a report from Linner indicated that for the 331 current students enrolled for 1960/61 
there were already 120 faculty.538  
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 In the health field one major regional health crisis required immediate attention during 
the fall of 1960. Fighting between the Balubas and Luluas tribes commenced just after the 
Congo’s independence, although tribal tensions had deep roots in the region’s history. The 
strife caused the mass exodus of the Balubas to a notoriously infertile and water-scarce area 
of South Kasai resulting in estimated 250,000 refugees on the verge of famine. When 
UNICEF, WHO and FAO teams responded, several hundred people were dying each week. 
By mid-December, a food distribution program had been set up and agricultural and medical 
units were at work.539 According to Dr. Candau of the WHO, health teams were ready to 
move past emergency medical care outside of South Kasai. Candau wrote to inform the 
Secretary-General on 5 September that he was now prepared to focus on long-term public 
health development. Dr. Candau reported on a three-year program to send some 140 
Congolese medical assistants to France for schooling to become fully qualified doctors. 
Candau also hoped to collaborate with Lovanium University to offer related medical training 
courses. Finally, he hoped to recruit 400 Congolese medical and technical personnel into 
service.540 Some within the UN Civilian Operation recoiled at Candau’s $1.5 million 
estimated expenditures for these long-term aid measures. In this respect, the Civilian Mission 
encountered one of its first difficulties in justifying development aid versus emergency aid. 
MacFarquhar commented to Linner, ‘[i]t is comparatively simple to justify our expenditures 
during the emergency, but now that we are trying, with some success, to move on to much 
longer-term planned expenditures, they [expenditure requests] should be based on some 
statement of case which can, if necessary, be made public.’541   
 Outside in South Kasai, the Civilian ONUC now viewed agriculture aid as a long-
term issue. In the Kivu Province, a UN study showed that large tea and coffee plantations 
were still operating at near capacity while small plantations were, on the whole, abandoned. 
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However, due to the departure of so many Europeans, there were constraints of an advisory 
and training nature.542 Efforts undertaken by the UN and the FAO included advisory support 
for the Central Ministry of Agriculture during this period and those of the provinces. Training 
and education included the creation of an Advanced School for Training in Tropical 
Agronomy at Lovanium University. The UN, working in conjunction with the FAO, also 
made progress towards transferring the function of the Institut National pour l’Etude 
d’Agronomie du Congo Belge (INEAC) into Congolese hands.543 Meanwhile, toward the end 
of 1960, Congolese officials approved plans for the reorganization of the Ministry of 
Agriculture.544 
Still problems arose. Agricultural stock meant for export in Equateur and Orientale 
Provinces bottlenecked due to a lack of security and funds for transport.545 The abandonment 
of small plantations added to the staggering unemployment totals in the provinces that 
reached 23,500, including Katanga.546 Additionally, Linner viewed urban unemployment 
among the youth as a particularly serious concern at the end of 1960. He feared that the large 
number of those 18 years and younger, 49% of the population of Leopoldville Province and 
similar figures for the other provinces, might dramatically add to the social and political 
disturbances if they were unable to find work. As a solution, the Civilian Operation began 
seven public works projects by October to absorb a portion of the Congo’s unemployed.547  
Finally, in the field of public administration Gardiner continued to aid in the 
reorganization of the Congolese civil service, creating the Ministry of Public Services before 
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his departure.548 In November 1960, 178 officials from 16 major governmental departments 
started an accelerated UN training course for senior civil servants.549 At the highest levels, the 
Civilian Operation dealt with two main constraints. First, because of the difficulty and danger 
related to the work, Linner’s Consultative Group experienced a high turnover rate. By early 
November, there were already Consultative Group vacancies in the fields of communications 
and natural resources. New consultants had already replaced former ones in education, 
foreign trade, labor and public administration.550 Secondly, the UN continued to encounter an 
absentee central government or one that nearly directly opposed them. Linner complained 
that from the beginning he had tried, ‘to disassociate Civilian Operations from the confusion 
of the political situation’ yet soon realized, ‘that a scrupulous neutrality cannot create an 
operational basis for a technical assistance programme where a genuinely effective central 
government is lacking.’551 By the time Mobutu’s College of Commissioners was in place, 
Linner’s statement applied more to a lack of cooperation with Congolese ministries than 
actual vacant chairs at top ministry posts. Belgian political advisors served to complicate this 
issue even further and even promoted Congolese intransigence towards the end of 1960 as 
alluded to earlier and also discussed below. 
Aid Politics and Personalities: Dayal’s Second Progress Report 
Weighing in on this and other controversial matters was Rajeshwar Dayal, Cordier’s 
replacement as the head of the entire ONUC operation as of 8 September. Hammarskjold 
handpicked Dayal in early August, having worked with him as India’s former Permanent 
Representative to the UN and as a top official within UNOGIL in 1958.552 Dayal’s second 
official progress report to the Secretary-General, submitted on 2 November 1960, was 
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perhaps the most antagonistic indictment of those believed to be responsible for exacerbating 
the Congo Crisis from any UN official. The report offered a scathing appraisal of Mobutu and 
his College of Commissioners, the ANC, Kasavubu, plus Katangan authorities. However, for 
Dayal, Belgian actions in the Congo seemed to be the linchpin for the UN’s difficulties there. 
Dayal noted that based on well-informed ONUC officers, ‘it may be concluded that a gradual 
but purposeful return is being staged by Belgian nationals, which has assumed serious 
significance in view of the key areas which they have penetrated in the public life of the 
country and the possible effect of their activities on all aspects of ONUC’s responsibilities. 
All too often these developments have coincided with anti-United Nations policies or feelings 
at the various point of impact.’ Belgians were also, according to Dayal, adding to the 
intransigence of the ANC and the Katangan secession.553 In particular, Mobutu’s College, in 
essence Belgian functionaries, had delayed UN technical aid applications or inhibited its full 
use, spread propaganda that the UN was attempting to set up a trusteeship and questioned the 
need for UN aid altogether.554   
The fallout from the report was widespread. Kasavubu called for Dayal’s removal.555 
Mobutu broke off diplomatic relations with the UN, claiming he believed Dayal was treating 
him like a child.556 Foreign Minister Bomboko stated he believed the Congo, or at least the 
ANC, was now effectively at war with the UN by early December.557 Dayal’s report also 
made the West anxious since it not so subtly advocated the return of Lumumba who had been 
under UN house protection since the ANC tried to arrest him on 10 October. By the end of 
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November, Lumumba had escaped from UN custody only to have the ANC capture him a 
few days later as he fled towards Stanleyville and his base of supporters in eastern Congo.558  
More reports of Belgian interference added to Dayal’s indignation. In mid-November, 
the Director of the Technical Assistance Bureau of the International Civilian Aviation 
Organization, or ICAO, E.R. Marlin, voiced his fear that recent ICAO personnel assignments 
by the UN might become redundant by the return of top-level Belgian advisers to the 
Congo.559 Similarly, MacFarquhar reported to Bunche that the return of Belgian advisers to 
the Ministry of Agriculture made the FAO senior consultant and entire FAO mission 
‘extremely uneasy’. Linner recommended limiting the role of the Belgian advisers as much as 
possible so as not to encourage the departure of any of the FAO officers.560 Finally, ONUC 
had to delay its plan to support an accelerated training course for Congolese magistrates and 
judges due to a strong Belgian advisory presence in the Justice Commissariat and the return 
of Belgian magistrates and judges.561  
Disagreements over the influx of unilateral Belgian aid only complicated a situation 
where the UN was now dealing with four governments in the Congo—with none of which it 
was on good terms. By mid-December, two regimes claim to be Congo’s ‘central’ authority. 
The first was Mobutu and the College working in cooperation with Kasavubu and based in 
Leopoldville. The other group claiming to be the central government was that of Antoine 
Gizenga, Lumumba’s Deputy Prime Minister, who, on 13 December, announced he now 
represented the lawful government of the Congo and made Stanleyville his capital. Then 
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there was the Katangan government of Tshombe in Elizabethville and for good measure that 
of Albert Kalonji in Bakwanga, South Kasai, which had orchestrated a Katanga-style 
succession just after independence.  
In a sober set of end-of-the-year exchanges between Hammarskjold and Dayal, the 
head of the UN Operations suggested regrouping UN efforts by possibly withdrawing ONUC 
troops from certain provinces and re-deploying them in fewer areas, specifically to protect 
UN civilian aid personnel. Likewise, he recommended scaling down technical aid to the 
Congo to cover only vital services while asking the Congo to start paying some of the 
costs.562 For his part, Linner postponed a trip back to New York from December until 
January, recognizing the low morale among his aid workers who were suffering from 
harassment and security risks.563 He also suggested delaying the appointment of a UN 
Consultant in the Information and Interior Ministry, even if that selection might circumvent 
some of the misleading and abusive information dispensed by certain Congolese authorities, 
since it would most likely backfire and open the UN up to further accusations of meddling.564  
Hammarskjold remained resolute. He informed Dayal that he was not yet willing to 
consider withdrawing UN personnel and instead preferred a strategy of ‘diplomatic juggling’. 
This included reminding Congolese authorities of the UN’s vital work over the past months 
and in the months ahead. Hammarskjold’s strategy also involved keeping key member states 
like the UAR, India, the US and UK properly informed in the hopes of allowing them to see 
the UN’s worth and exert the necessary pressure on Congolese authorities whose opinion of 
the UN might have wavered.565 In his concluding statement during the Security Council 
debate over Lumumba’s arrest, the Secretary-General reminded the member states that if the 
UN left the Congo, he was convinced that a ‘Spanish-war situation’ would follow with 
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fighting taking place ‘all over the prostrate body of the Congo and pursued for nebulous and 
conflicting aims.’ He continued: ‘These, gentlemen, are the stakes for the people of the 
Congo, and for other nations—in Africa or outside, contributing to the Force or not. These 
are the stakes for the United Nations and what it represents.’ Therefore, for Hammarskjold, it 
was clear that the UN operation must continue. He no doubt gained some affirmation when 
the General Assembly voted in late December to continue to fund the mission, recognizing, 
as Urquhart states, that the nearly 20,000 UN troops still acted as a minimum guarantee of 
security for the Congo while the UN Civilian Operation had done the same with regard to 
other vital services.566   
Conclusion 
The UN Secretariat pursued multilateral civilian aid to the Congo with as much vigor 
and determination as the military component of the mission during the first six months of the 
operation. They would continue to do so in the year ahead. Therefore, the Civilian Operation 
is an important factor in evaluating the role of the UN during the Congo Crisis. Altogether, 
the UN civilian effort was a juxtaposition of prevention and paralysis. On the one hand, it 
was during this period that the Civilian Operation began the process of preventing or 
mitigating certain financial, health, administrative and other such disasters through its on-the-
ground actions. Through these measures, which would last well into 1961 as covered in 
Chapter Five, it believed it was living up to its mandate by laying the groundwork needed to 
prevent the Congo from becoming a fully fledged failed state. On the other hand, paralysis set 
in elsewhere. External opposition from powers like the USSR and Belgium handcuffed the 
full exercise of civilian aid as much as internal political and security issues undermined 
progress in the Congo during this period.  
In this way, elements of the Cold War did affect the Civilian Operation. Moscow, for 
example, used the Civilian Mission as yet another area for it to criticize the Secretary-General 
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for his alleged partiality, accusing the UN of promoting a Western style of development 
while decrying the lack of civilian aid personnel from the Eastern bloc. Washington 
meanwhile, sought to promote UN aid exclusivity, albeit funded in large part by the US, as a 
way to keep out bilateral aid from Moscow. Still, in light of the factors affecting and affected 
by the Civilian Mission, the Cold War component of the crisis should not be oversold. In fact, 
UN action prevented each superpower from pursuing more aggressive measures, both 
militarily and with regard to bilateral civilian aid.  
Lastly, it is probably unfair to apply to the civilian operation, Carole Collins’ 
accusation that UN leadership played the role of ‘manipulator’ and ‘kingmaker’, or David 
Gibbs’ claim that the UN was anything but impartial when it came to the Congo Crisis.567 
Linner was no Cordier or Dayal, if only evidenced by the fact that he far outlasted the two at 
his post as Civilian Chief, pointing to the fact that he garnered respect from most Congolese 
officials. In other words, the cries of ‘Linner for dinner’ were not on the menu for long. 
Nevertheless, the exact and principled terms of ONUC’s mandate as spelled out in a number 
of Security Council resolutions amounted to a non-operational principle for the whole of the 
mission including the civilian side. Thus, promising noninterference in domestic affairs, a 
hallmark of UN aid during the 1950s, proved to be untenable. Clare Timberlake, the US 
Ambassador the Congo, recognized this fact when he remarked that despite the ‘scrupulous 
and patient’ quality of UN aid, it was by nature interfering.568 That being said, an 
examination of the on-the-ground aid efforts directed by Linner, MacFarquhar and others 
within the Secretariat, indicates that much of the UN aid was on the whole politically 
innocuous as it amounted to emergency relief, rehabilitation and some long-term 
development schemes during the period under review. It is also fair to say that the ability of 
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the UN Civilian Operation to provide technical aid in the areas of health, education, 
agriculture, communications, famine relief, etc., established the Organization’s credibility 
with a large numbers of Congolese.  
However, where UN civilian aid faced its most daunting challenge was in the field of 
public administration—an area where its operation could hardly be sensitive enough as it 
intersected with the effects of decolonization. Here, despite taking the stance that ONUC 
officials would collaborate with whoever occupied the ministerial or administrative seat, 
these chairs were too often vacant requiring UN authorities to act on their own. This, of 
course, opened up the Civilian Operation and the Secretary-General to charges of re-
colonization and disguised imperialism by Congolese authorities who now, in some ways, 
perceived the UN as the antagonist in the decolonization process. Ironically then, as Linner 
and others fought to keep the vestiges of Belgian colonialism out of the Congo’s government 
it made itself susceptible to the same accusations. As Chapter Five will show, this issue in 
particular did not dissipate with the coming of a new year which would bring forth a set of 
new crises and challenges for the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo.      
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Decolonization and Development: The UN Civilian Mission to the Congo, 1961 
Writing candidly to his friend and Foreign Secretary of Norway, Hans Engen, 
Hammarskjold observed that by late December 1960 his job had become  
‘“a bit like fighting an avalanche; you know the rules—get rid of the skis, 
don’t try to resist but swim on the surface and hope for a rescuer. (Next 
morning historians will dig up the whole rotten mess and see how many were 
buried). A consolation is that avalanches, after all, automatically always come 
to a stop and that thereafter you can start behaving like an intelligent being 
again—provided you have managed to keep afloat.”’569  
 
To reference another analogy, Ralph Bunche, in a letter to his wife, compared the 
UN’s undertakings in the Congo to providing ‘first aid to a wounded rattlesnake.’570 Both 
comparisons do not exactly illicit a great deal of optimism in the task the UN was ultimately 
trying to accomplish through ONUC. Yet the parallels also elicit a dogged determination that 
kept ONUC pressing forward in the midst of changing and difficult circumstances.  
Much of what was symptomatic about the first six months of the Civilian Mission to 
the Congo was also indicative of the events of 1961. The Civilian ONUC still played a key 
role in what the UN was trying to accomplish in the Congo—namely an effort to bring 
stability to the region by providing technical assistance, training and administrative assistance 
in addition to peacekeeping. It still had to contend with efforts by the Soviets to dismantle the 
whole UN operation while they amplified their call for the grand architect of the mission, 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold, to resign. The Civilian ONUC still had to compete with 
the Belgians for aid exclusivity in the midst of what UN officials viewed as a feigned attempt 
at decolonization by the metropole, especially as Belgium continued to seek out policy 
advisory roles within the Congolese government. The Civilian Mission still received crucial 
and sustained backing from Washington in 1961, albeit from a new administration. Finally, 
political forces at work and security concerns continued to suffocate the full exercise of UN 
                                                          
569 Urquhart, Hammarskjold, 492-93. 
570 Brian Urquhart, Ralph Bunche: An American Life (New York: Norton, 1993), 322. 
217 
 
civilian aid, especially to Congo’s provinces during the first half of 1961. Specifically in the 
areas of health, education, communication and agriculture, UN aid envisioned and passed 
down from New York, encountered numerous impediments to its implementation.  
 Additionally, and perhaps more than at any other time, the Civilian Operation grew to 
be one of the epicenters of friction between the UN and the Congolese government. In this 
case, mounting tension over ONUC civilian aid in the field of public administration, which 
dated back to the start of the operation, came to a head in February 1961. Exacerbated by 
other factors, the result was the deepest schism between the UN and the Congolese 
government in Leopoldville at any point during the Congo Crisis. In short, Congolese 
authorities protested at what they viewed as UN mission-creep, coupled with a lack of 
consultation, leading to the impression that the UN’s aim was to transform the Congo into a 
UN Trust Territory. Candid negotiations during March and April 1961 with Congolese 
authorities in Leopoldville, Stanleyville, South Kasai and Katanga by a UN delegation made 
up of African members of the UN Secretariat, did finally lead to a UN-Congolese 
rapprochement (excluding Katanga). A show of greater sensitivity and awareness of 
Congolese concerns from the UN also resulted in a new civilian aid strategy from June 1961 
onward. Thus, starting in the second half of 1961, UN and Congolese authorities agreed to 
concentrate civilian aid efforts on the training, institution building and the subsequent 
Africanization of the Congo’s civil administration. In fact, these activities remained the 
primary goals of the Civil Operation for the next several years as development aid between 
the UN and the Congo normalized. The now altered UN development aid program would still 
affect nearly every aspect of Congolese life on an unprecedented scale for any non-state actor 
but its new role amounted to the UN acting as a guarantor for Congolese development instead 
of an imperial interloper and a persona (or rather organization) non grata.   
A New Strategy and a New Crisis 
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As of 1 January 1961, Civilian Operation personnel in the Congo totaled 176 
individuals, 105 from non-NATO countries. Altogether, advisers and technicians came from 
26 states. Similar to its earlier composition, French, Haitian, Swiss, Tunisians and Swedes 
made up about 60% of the UN civilian staff. Eastern bloc countries were only slightly better 
represented by the start of 1961—three aid workers from Poland and one from Yugoslavia. 
Meanwhile, five Americans served as part of the civilian mission. The strongest represented 
fields included communications (particularly civil aviation and telecommunication advisers), 
health, public works and finance.571 During a visit from Hammarskjold at the start of the year, 
his first since August, the Secretary-General was amazed at the resilience of ONUC 
personnel. When Dayal asked of any differences he recognized compared to five months 
earlier, Hammarskjold replied: ‘“then we were full of confidence in New York, but things 
here were panicky. Now, we are panicky in New York, but here in ONUC I find a mood of 
confidence.”’572 
A US Intelligence Estimate from early January did not share Hammarskjold’s 
optimism. It stated that despite preventing unilateral interventions in the Congo the UN 
continually found itself in the ‘crossfire of both local and international political struggle, 
where either action or inaction provokes criticism by the participants and their foreign 
supporters.’ It further spelled out the UN’s precarious position by postulating that if the UN 
supported the return of Lumumba and Parliament, the West was sure to grow exceedingly 
anxious. If it opposed Lumumba, its critics would accuse the UN of abetting imperialism. A 
real possibility, according to the briefing, was a conceivable emptying of all civilian and 
military UN personnel from the Congo since, ‘[n]o clear direction of events can be discerned 
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among the countervailing forces and capricious actions which characterize the Congo 
situation.’573  
Another blow came on 17 January—Lumumba’s murder. His assassination, more than 
any other political crisis, would seriously endanger the mere existence of ONUC. Examining 
the culpabilities of various parties involved in the plot to kill the controversial, but 
nonetheless esteemed, Congolese leader goes well beyond the scope of this study. However, 
it is apparent from the most recent declassified documents that Katangan troops and Belgian 
members of the Katangan gendarmerie were directly involved in the murder, while the CIA 
and the Mobutu regime were at least tacitly liable.574 Katangan authorities only made 
Lumumba’s death (which had occurred on 17 January) publically known on 13 February—
and then only blamed revengeful ‘villagers’.575 Nevertheless, much of the liability at the time, 
or at least the suspicion of wrongdoing, fell on the UN and Hammarskjold in particular. 
According to C.V. Narasimhan, UN Under-Secretary for Special Political Questions, the few 
weeks following the news of Lumumba’s death were the gloomiest for Hammarskjold.576 A 
folder of newspaper clippings kept by Hammarskjold in a personal file cabinet in his New 
York office attest that he not only read but cataloged the accusations heaped upon him. From 
the New York Herald Tribune he saved articles entitled: ‘Russians Insist Hammarskjold Must 
Go’, ‘Hammarskjold Rejects Soviet Demand He Quit’ and ‘Lumumba Specter Haunting UN: 
Afro-Asian Group Sees Racism Behind His Death.’577 From the Russian broadsheet Izvestiia, 
Hammarskjold retained an article highlighting the actions of protestors outside the UN 
holding signs that read, ‘UN HQ Is Seat of Murder Inc!’, ‘Murderer Hammarskjold!’ and 
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‘Lumumba’s Blood Stains Hammarskjold’s Hands’.578 He also kept a letter from Khrushchev 
to Nehru forwarded to him by the Soviet Permanent Mission to the UN dated 27 February 
1961. In the letter, Khrushchev called Hammarskjold’s non-interference in Lumumba’s 
capture and murder ‘Pilate-esque’ and ‘tragically demonstrated how inadmissible is the 
situation when a stooge of the imperialists and colonialists heads the United Nations 
executive machinery.’579 Publicly, Moscow called Hammarskjold a criminal, demanded his 
resignation and announced it would not recognize him as a UN official in any capacity. It 
also called for the liquidation of ONUC.580 Meanwhile, the fallout of Lumumba’s execution 
quickly overshadowed other positive political happenings, namely the formation of a 
provisional Congolese government on 9 February in Leopoldville that finally replaced the 
College of Commissioners. It included Joseph Ileo, who the College had earlier forced to give 
way but was now again made Prime Minister. It also included future Prime Minister, Cyrille 
Adoula as the Minister of the Interior. Meanwhile, Kasavubu and Bomboko retained their 
positions as President and Foreign Minister respectively.581 Nevertheless, the murder only 
entrenched Gizenga’s rebel regime in Stanleyville.  
The Security Council met from 16-21 February to discuss Lumumba’s death. Guinea 
and Mali, among the Afro-Asian member states, joined the Soviets in demanding 
Hammarskjold’s resignation. This came after Guinea, Morocco and the UAR had earlier 
announced their intention to withdrawal their countries’ troops from the ONUC peacekeeping 
force.582 Still, at the conclusion of the session, in earlier hours of 21 February, Afro-Asian 
member states of the Security Council including Ceylon, Liberia and the UAR managed to 
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pass a resolution that in fact increased the UN’s responsibility in the Congo. The resolution, 
besides calling for an investigation of Lumumba’s death, also urged the UN to take 
immediate action, if necessary by force, ‘to prevent the occurrence of civil war’ now 
threatening the Congo perhaps more than any time over the past seven months. It once again 
urged the withdrawal of all Belgian and other foreign military personnel and political 
advisers not under UN command. Moreover, the resolution advocated the reorganization and 
discipline of the Congolese army units to prevent their interference in the political life of the 
Congo. The resolution passed 9-0-2 with French and Soviet abstentions. To assuage the 
USSR, the resolution made no specific reference to Hammarskjold’s responsibilities in 
carrying out its provisions.583   
Just how did Hammarskjold and the ONUC manage to pass a Security Council 
resolution on the Congo when the standing of the international organization and its Secretary-
General were at what seemed to be an all-time low? As with other resolutions, Hammarskjold 
and ONUC relied on support from key members of the Afro-Asian group who still believed 
that the UN represented the best option for settling the crisis. Prime Minister Nehru in 
particular, after appeals from Hammarskjold, decided to commit a substantial number of 
Indian troops to the UN Force to bring it back up to maximum strength following the 
withdrawal of contingents from Guinea, Morocco and the UAR.584  
Support was also forthcoming from the new Kennedy Administration despite the fact 
that support from the Eisenhower Administration had teetered in early January. On 10 
January 1961, US Ambassador to the Congo, Clare Timberlake, reported that recent action 
taken by the ONUC civilian representative to the Orientale province caused him alarm. 
Specifically, the UN province chief allegedly accepted without question the authority of 
Gizenga’s government in Stanleyville, Orientale’s major city and Gizenga’s capital, as well 
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as his subsequent takeover of the neighboring province of Kivu. This came despite a 
substantial UN military force in the region.585 Thus, Timberlake seemed to advise against an 
extension of ONUC’s mandate that would only breed Congolese intransigence, especially 
over the maintenance of law and order as an ‘infringement on Congolese sovereignty and 
prelude to UN trusteeship.’586 Furthermore, outgoing Secretary of State Christian Herter left 
office expressing his belief that Hammarskjold, Dayal and thus the UN operation had not 
always advanced US interests in the Congo.587  
Apparently, the Kennedy Administration did at least contemplate a substantial change 
to America’s Congo policy but ultimately decided to follow what had been the general policy 
of the Eisenhower Administration towards the UN since the start of the conflict—backing 
Hammarskjold’s initiatives and his ability to cope with the ebbs and flow of the crisis.588 A 
series of talks between Hammarskjold and Adlai Stevenson, the new US Ambassador to the 
UN, helped reconcile US and UN policy. At a 31 January meeting, Hammarskjold and 
Stevenson agreed that the way forward in the Congo was to ‘neutralize’ the ANC and 
convene Parliament. These policies also made their way into the Security Council resolution 
from 21 February mentioned above.589 With regard to UN civilian aid, Secretary of State 
Rusk advised Kennedy that the US should, ‘seek a greater administrative role for the United 
Nations in the Congo. Our assumption is that, regardless of the government formed in the 
Congo, it will not be able to effectively govern and administer. A great deal of United 
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Nations administrative and technical help is essential.’590 Assistant Secretary of State for 
International Organizations, Harlan Cleveland, echoed this sentiment believing that the UN 
was essential in filling the gap between what decolonized people, like the Congolese, 
expected and what the government can provide. According to Cleveland, the UN was best 
suited to fill this gap. Cleveland believed the UN, if given the capacity to act, could 
effectively assist emerging nations to develop, while offering a type of international aid that 
could diffuse Cold War intrigues.591 Thus, the Kennedy Administration, like the UN 
Secretariat, used the Civilian Operation in large part to justify the UN’s predominance in the 
Congo. 
Arrested Aid: The Nadir of the UN Civilian Mission 
At the same time, on-the-ground aid work in early 1961 reflected the growing 
Congolese antipathy towards the UN and presaged future trouble. Perhaps more than at any 
other time during the crisis the political and security issues profoundly encumbered and even 
arrested the efforts of UN civilian aid workers. February’s Civilian Operation Progress 
Report described the difficulties. The situation in the eastern provinces of Kivu and Orientale 
was much worse now, stemming from the establishment of Antoine Gizenga’s rogue central 
government in Stanleyville. It had resulted in limited civilian aid work, widening security 
concerns and a renewed financial crisis. As a result, UNESCO curtailed plans to provide 500 
teachers to the region—limiting their program to only areas where ONUC troops were 
present. The same was true for UN agricultural teams meant to work in the eastern provinces 
who now found it impossible to travel to their new posts. Health work in these provinces was 
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also at a standstill and by February, most of the doctors had fled Kivu and Orientale. 
Meanwhile, the International Red Cross recalled its team.592  
In Leopoldville, despite warnings from ONUC’s civilian advisers, Linner reported 
that Congolese authorities had failed ‘to pay sufficient attention to the economic situation 
under their respective control’, while ‘no practical measures have been taken so far to check 
or alleviate the danger of further disintegration.’ The Progress Report blamed political 
expediency by Congolese politicians in Leopoldville who raised military salaries that abetted 
Congo’s inflationary woes, adding at least 1,000 million Congolese Francs to the public 
debt.593 Meanwhile, G. Parravicini, who replaced Umbricht in early January as the new 
President of the UN Monetary Council to the Congo, surveyed the provinces in February and 
reported that demands for higher salaries and indemnities, shorter working hours and free 
lodging nearly always followed the process of Africanization throughout the Congo.594 This 
took place while production suffered throughout the country, minus Katanga, due to the 
breakdown of transportation and the abandonment of many eastern plantations. In particular, 
Leopoldville blockaded the Congo River in an effort to thwart Gizenga. In fact, starting in 
early February, all exports from the Orientale and Kivu Provinces ceased, resulting in over a 
50% decrease in foreign trade compared to December.595 In January, Gizenga authorities 
impounded all of the Central Bank branches in Kivu and Orientale Provinces adding to the 
financial turmoil.596  
Prevented from implementing its development assistance goals, the UN focused on 
projects already underway or those that did not require protection by UN military forces. At 
the request of the ONUC Agricultural Mechanization Expert, the UN help to establish a 
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training center at Lovanium University to instruct Congolese to operate heavy farming 
equipment abandoned by Belgians.597 In the field of public administration, ONUC organized 
an in-service training course for senior government employees. It also helped create, with 
support from the Ford Foundation, a National School of Law and Administration for training 
Congolese judges and legal advisers. The course ran from February to July 1961 and started 
with 165 participants.598 The UN also managed to bring the famine in South Kasai under 
control, slowing the death rate and distributing seed among the refugees to plant their own 
crops.599 ONUC also provided substantial amounts of gasoline and diesel oil to allow for the 
transport of food—avoiding a food crisis in the otherwise crippled eastern provinces.600  
Nevertheless, yet another controversy stemming from the interpretation of the 
Security Council resolution passed on 21 February served to overshadow the measured 
progress achieved by the UN Civilian Operation in January and February 1961. Apparently, a 
significant number of Leopoldville and Katanga authorities understood the resolution to mean 
that the UN had the right to use force in disarming both the ANC and Katangan forces. Dayal 
cited an ANC Military Bulletin that circulated the argument that the UN now considered the 
Congolese too irresponsible and childlike to possess arms and repeated the now common 
accusation that the UN planned to turn the Congo into a Trusteeship or colony.601 Because 
Congolese leaders like Mobutu and Kasavubu had by this time refused to work with Dayal, 
there were few opportunities to set the record straight. According to Kasavubu and others, 
they had come to despise Dayal’s ‘Brahmin haughtiness’, as Linner later described it.602  
As a campaign to oust Dayal intensified, anti-UN factions attacked or arbitrarily 
arrested UN civilian personnel throughout the country starting in late February. Since the UN 
                                                          
597 Progress Report No. 8, 1-31 January 1961, (undated), ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.8), 7.  
598 Progress Report No. 9, 1-28 February 1961, (undated), ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.9), 3.  
599 Progress Report No. 8, 1-31 January 1961, (undated), ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.8), 3-5. 
600 Progress Report No. 9, 1-28 February 1961, (undated), ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.9), 23. 
601 Dayal, 212-13. 
602 Lipsey, Hammarskjold, 487. 
226 
 
had little presence in the regions controlled by Gizenga, Leopoldville officials even accused 
UN aid workers of being communist sympathizers. On 28 February in a shocking turn of 
events Tshombe, Ileo and Kalonji signed a military agreement in Elizabethville to pool their 
respective military resources against the UN should it try to disarm the Congolese and 
Katangan armies and a further agreement pledging support to fight Gizenga’s forces.603 In 
fact, fighting broke out between the entrenched ANC soldiers and ‘jumpy’ UN forces at the 
port city of Matadi in early March. Meanwhile the US Embassy in the Congo reported that 
Minister of the Interior Adoula had declared ‘“UN Congo policy bankrupt”’.604  
Next, Leopoldville, Elizabethville and South Kasai leaders met in Tananarive, 
Madagascar from 8-12 March, publicly condemned the February Resolution, and then 
proceeded effectively to lay the groundwork for the establishment of a loose confederation of 
Congolese states.605 The Tananarive Conference displayed just how far some Congolese 
leaders, previously erstwhile UN supporters, had turned against the Organization. In 
Kasavubu’s case, he had written to Hammarskjold at the outset of February’s Secretary 
Council meeting assuring the Secretary-General of the legal Congolese government’s 
commitment to the UN effort hoping, ‘that aid will continue and bring concrete results in 
perfect harmony of views with [the] authorities of [our] country.’ He continued, ‘[w]e also 
hope that you will continue for a long time yet, the action which has been so energetically 
begun and which the member countries as a whole also ratified on many occasions.’606 Then 
at Tananarive, Kasavubu, Ileo and Adoula joined Tshombe in making plans to frustrate any 
effort by the Secretariat to enforce the February Resolution. Tananarive also saw the 
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Leopoldville leaders agree to major concessions in the formation of a new Congo state, 
effectively granting Katanga independence while weakening their own position.  
The UN Delegation: Restoring Faith in the Organization 
Leopoldville seemed to regret its decisions at Tananarive almost immediately, 
especially in the light of Hammarskjold’s decision to recall Dayal to UN headquarters 
effective 1 March 1961. Hammarskjold then wrote to Kasavubu expressing his regret at the 
misinterpretation of the February Resolution and reaffirmed its expressed purpose of 
restoring public order and preserving Congolese independence. To ensure the resolution’s 
implementation, Hammarskjold proposed sending a UN delegation to the Congo to meet with 
other Congolese authorities to clear the air. Hammarskjold soon sent a three-person 
delegation made up of Africans recently recruited into the UN Secretariat. The delegation 
included the aforementioned Robert Gardiner of Ghana, Francis C. Nwokedi of Nigeria, a 
Permanent Secretary in the Nigerian Ministry of Labor and Mahmoud Khiari, a Tunisian 
politician, civil servant and current head of the Consultative Group on Public Administration. 
From 22 March to 5 April, the delegation met not only with authorities in Leopoldville, but 
also with those in Katanga, South Kasai and Stanleyville.607   
Altogether, the talks underscored the delicate issue of administering aid to a former 
colony jealously seeking to protect its sovereignty, yet which was in desperate need of 
outside assistance to prevent its further disintegration. The underlying goal of the delegation 
was to re-establish confidence in the purpose of the UN’s role in aiding the Congo. The talks 
allowed the airing of grievances by Congolese leaders, many of whom viewed the UN as 
either an ineffectual spectator on the one hand or an interloper in Congo’s internal affairs on 
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the other. They also aimed to dispel the various misunderstandings caused by the February 
Security Council resolution. Namely, the delegation made an effort to depict the resolution as 
a way for the UN to help the Congo reorganize the ANC, expel subversive foreign elements 
in Katanga and assist in reconvening Parliament. Thus, the delegation aimed to show the 
resolution was not an attempt by the UN, as it had been portrayed by some, to subvert 
Congolese sovereignty, drive out all foreign personnel from the civil and armed services and 
disarm the Congolese army by force. Crucial to the delegation’s success was the fact that all 
three members were from African countries. In fact, the phrase, ‘an African solution to what 
was an African problem’ was a recurring expression used by all parties.  
The delegation’s first stop was a meeting with Prime Minister Ileo and Minister of 
Interior Adoula representing the central government in Leopoldville. Ileo and Adoula wasted 
no time in describing what they saw as a UN organization which had imposed its solutions 
for the Congo from a great distance without proper consultation and collaboration with the 
Congolese people or government. A major sticking point for Ileo and Adoula was the offer of 
bilateral aid from Belgium. Despite is colonial past, many Congolese saw Belgian aid as 
necessary and far more innocuous than the UN secretary perceived it to be. Meanwhile, the 
UN failed to confer with Congolese officials on the matter while blindly opposing it.608  
Planning to circle back to Leopoldville to meet with President Kasavubu and Foreign 
Minister Bomboko, the delegation moved on to negotiations in Bakwanga with Albert 
Kalonji, the self-proclaimed President of South Kasai, were overall successful. They 
concluded with Kalonji specifically requesting increased UN technical assistance in a region 
where security risks had recently caused a general exodus of UN personnel.609 Things were 
not so cordial in Stanleyville where Gizenga’s Minister of the Interior, Christophe Gbenye, 
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scathingly commented ‘he could see no raison d’être for the Delegation except, apparently, to 
lead the Congo in the direction of UN trusteeship.’ Gbenye used as an example the 
aforementioned National School of Law and Administration which he believed ought to be 
under Congolese not UN control. Gardiner replied, asking if it was a crime to help establish a 
school to train Congolese without using public funds. Furthermore, General Lundula, 
commander of Gizenga’s forces in Orientale and Kivu, lamented the perceived double-
standard over the UN’s attitude towards Leopoldville versus Stanleyville. He noted that the 
UN had done nothing to assist the 6 million Congolese affected by Leopoldville’s blockade 
of the Congo River while it spent millions of francs providing famine relief for Kalonji in 
South Kasai.  
Nevertheless, in a perhaps surprising move the Gizenga government put these 
episodic grievances aside when discussing the implementation of the February Resolution. 
Altogether the delegation was again successful in getting Gizenga to recognize the 
importance of a unified and reorganized Congolese army that included his forces and those in 
Leopoldville. The two sides also found common ground over the withdrawal of Belgian 
forces from Katanga, the reconvening of Parliament and the importance of the UN’s role in 
restoring public services through the recruitment and training of new technical and 
administrative personnel. Where the two sides differed was the order of the above reforms. 
Whereas, Gizenga saw the reconvening of Parliament as paramount, as had Lumumba, the 
delegates stressed that the reorganization of the army should come first. Despite the 
difference of opinion on this matter, the meeting ended cordially with the real hope that 
Gizenga would participate in further actions to unify and aid the Congo.610 
                                                          
610 Notes on meeting with ‘Central Government’, Provisional Government, and other political and military 
representatives at Stanleyville, 28 March 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-25300050001. Like Lumumba, whose 
party won the majority of seats in Congo’s first parliamentary election, Gizenga probably anticipated strong 
support for himself in any future national election and therefore pushed for the reconvening of parliament before 
any other reforms.  
230 
 
Next, the UN delegation met with Tshombe. Here, Gardiner and Nwokedi made a 
futile attempt to convince the authorities in Elizabethville that they were better off with UN 
rather than Belgian assistance. They made further ineffectual attempts to persuade Katanga 
that it ought to consider incorporating its forces into those of the ANC. Tshombe responded 
by arguing that the Katanga army was already organized. In fact, it was more organized than 
those of either Ghana or Nigeria. The meeting ended in an impasse.611  
Finally, the delegation circled back to Leopoldville on 4 April to meet with Kasavubu 
and Bomboko. Bomboko highlighted two unsatisfactory phases of the UN presence in the 
Congo over the past nine months. The first he described as the overt non-interference by the 
UN after Lumumba tried to turn the UN mission into his own operation back in August 1960. 
Then in the second phase, the UN failed to recognize any lawful government, after the 
ousting of Lumumba, leaving Dayal free to employ the UN as a provisional government with 
apparent immunity. In the light of the second phase, Kasavubu urged for the transposition of 
UN and Congolese responsibilities, where the Congo must be in charge of its own country 
while the UN assisted, instead of visa-versa.612  
Nwokedi and Gardiner acknowledged the UN’s shortcomings in actually undercutting 
Congolese sovereignty in its attempt to uphold it. However, they also explained that it was 
still the express purpose of the UN to make certain that no foreign political influences 
compromised the independence of the Congo—essentially upholding the UN standard of aid 
development during the course of the 1950s. Instead, its aim was to help the Congo in the 
‘Africanization’ of its public service going forward. With each side now understanding the 
other’s perspective, the UN and Leopoldville authorities stuck a compromise. Namely, Ileo 
agreed on the reorganization of the ANC. Moreover, the Leopoldville government agreed on 
a program for the Africanization of its government, separating itself from foreign—namely 
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Belgian—intrigue. Meanwhile, the UN delegation recognized the Congo’s right to choose its 
own technical personnel. Thus, the talks in Leopoldville made significant progress in 
restoring confidence in the UN in the crucial field of public administration aid. Gardiner and 
Nwokedi then set out to parlay with the other Congolese governments.613  
Despite Katangan obduracy, Gardiner, Nwokedi and Khiari still managed to convince 
the other Congolese governments to acquiesce into the provisions of the February 
Resolution—reversing the policies agreed to at Tananarive. The mostly successful 
negotiations also made way for the Secretary-General Hammarskjold to kick-start the 
otherwise stalled UN Civilian Operation throughout the Congo, less Katanga. In fact, a draft 
agreement between the UN Secretariat and the Leopoldville government envisioned a 
‘revised and expanded programme of UN technical assistance’ that emphasized the 
Africanization of Congo’s civil service while supplementing any gaps with the recruitment of 
new foreign personnel serving under the UN. The eventual hope was to convert the Civilian 
ONUC into a normal UN technical assistance arrangement similar to those in other newly 
independent countries in Africa. Under the new agreement, it was now clear to both sides that 
the UN could help the Congo obtain more aid workers, but the Congo could seek its own 
outside aid if preferable. Belgians working in the Congolese public service—estimated at 
some 2,300 individuals—could stay on. However, new UN recruits would replace Belgian 
political advisers, numbering around 40.614 Thus, the common goal of aiding the Congo 
trumped the UN’s desire for aid exclusivity.  
The success of the UN delegation also overshadowed the continued attacks by the 
USSR at the resumed 15th General Assembly Session held in March and April of 1961. In 
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Hammarskjold’s estimation the battle started by, ‘Khrushchev’s haymaker’ the previous fall 
had been won by the Secretary-General as witnessed by the USSR now backing down on its 
previous two positions of demanding the UN to quit the Congo and for Hammarskjold to 
resign. Moreover, Hammarskjold surmised the Soviet’s ineffectualness stemmed from the 
collaboration between his own Office and the Afro-Asian group, along with the financial 
backing of the US.615 In addition, Russian historian Sergei Mazov has shown that multiple 
requests for Soviet aid from the Gizenga government never really materialized during the 
spring of 1961 owing to Khrushchev’s analysis of the international risks involved.616 
Hammarskjold specifically credited President Gamal Nasser’s influence on his ally Gizenga, 
since the UAR President had always viewed the unity of the Congo as an essential element of 
stability.617 Meanwhile, recently declassified documents reveal how the CIA managed to stall 
requests by Mobutu for military aid to fight Gizenga during the period, leaving open the 
chance for a Leopoldville and Stanleyville rapprochement.618  
Harland Cleveland from the US State Department summed up the UN achievements 
over this period as having convincingly shown the central Congolese Government ‘that the 
best way to get rid of the UN in the long run is to cooperate with it in the short run.’ Yet 
Cleveland did not short-change the value of the UN operation in the Congo, noting the 
‘unnoticed and unsung’ heroes of the crisis were the UN Congo staff running one of the 
world's largest civilian advisory operations. Cleveland continued: ‘In the Congo the presence 
of a field operation maintained by an international organization has enabled us to move 
forward (by fits and starts, to be sure) precisely because the world community can “intervene 
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in the name of non-intervention” while a single nation, however powerful, cannot.’619 
Cleveland might have overstated the perception of the UN considering that many Congolese 
authorities viewed its actions since the previous fall as an intervention. Still, Cleveland’s 
recognition of the value of the UN Civilian Operation was something that the US, the 
international community and Congolese government now embraced once again. 
Implementation of the February Resolution and Revived UN Aid to the Congo 
The implementation of the February Resolution began on 24 April when 200 
Congolese political leaders met at the Equateur Province city of Coquilhatville. Aided once 
more by Gardiner and Nwokedi, Congolese authorities convened until 28 May, while passing 
twenty-one resolutions meant to construct a new federal state, later ratified by a newly 
elected Parliament. Gizenga chose not to attend holding to his stance that the re-opening of 
Parliament should precede any other action. However, Gizenga did send a delegation of 
soldiers to report back. Tshombe did attend, accompanied by a large delegation including 
soldiers and six European advisers. The conference was not without incident, namely 
Kasavubu placing Tshombe under house arrest for nearly two months. Kasavubu then only 
released Tshombe on the condition that he would later send Katangese representatives to the 
Leopoldville Parliament, which never took place.620 The actions taken at the Coquilhatville 
Conference were a further blow to Tshombe in that they reversed those agreed upon at 
Tananarive a month earlier.  
Direct assistance by Gardiner and Nwokedi in writing a new Congolese constitution 
also signaled a turning point in the UN’s relationship with Congolese authorities. By late 
May, Linner, who now served under the new title ‘Officer-in-charge’, officially filling 
Dayal’s post, requested that UN civilian technical work resume in South Kasai.621 
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Meanwhile, Congolese and UN officials quickly settled an incident that included the arrest, 
beating and imprisonment of three WHO doctors by ‘excitable’ Congolese soldiers in 
Orientale Province. In this case, Linner—to his shock—was a first-hand witness to the 
denigration and beating of the implicated soldiers. Congolese authorities then spread news of 
the punishment throughout the region hoping to stamp-out any lingering anti-UN 
sentiment.622 Gizenga even called on Linner, expressing his full support for the UN and 
expressed his pleasure about the upcoming conference to reconvene Parliament—scheduled 
to take place in July 1961 under UN protection at Lovanium University.623 
 The mending of the rift between the UN and the Congo reinvigorated and revived 
other fields of civilian aid activities. Of highest priority was the Congo’s dire financial 
situation. A UN team headed by Philippe de Seynes, met with Leopoldville leaders during the 
first week of June for frank conversations on budgetary discipline, deficit reduction, bloated 
salaries of public sector workers and military personnel and the resumption of trade in the 
provinces. Kasavubu asked for more technical assistance from the UN to remedy these issues 
which the Hammarskjold agreed to provide, ‘with all due speed’. Then on 12 June, the two 
sides agreed to make available through the Congo Monetary Council the amount of $10 
million for the economic benefit of the entire country so long as it accompanied financial 
discipline. This was the first such transfer of capital from the UN to the Congolese 
government since the previous fall—again a sign of a restored trust by both parties.624 The 
UN-Congo rapprochement also encouraged the US to bolster its aid commitment to the 
Congo. Kennedy agreed to a $5 million grant through the UN to assist in lessening the 
                                                          
622 Cable from Maceoin to the Secretary-General, 31 May 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-035700110004; Cable 
from Linner to Bunche, 1 June 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-035700110004. 
623 Cable from Linner to the Secretary-General, 1 June 1961, UNARMS, Folder S-035700110004. 
624 Letter from President Kasavubu on Conclusion of Agreement on United Nations Economic and Financial 
Aid to the Congo, 10 June 1961, in Cordier and Foote, eds., Volume V, 496-497; Progress Report No. 10, First 
year of operations July 1960 to June 1961, (undated), ODS, (ST/ONUC/PR.10), 10-11. Still, de Seynes in 
particular remained amazed at the ‘half-hazard decision making’ since Kasavubu agreed to accept the funds 
without cabinet consultations. See, Telegram from New York (Yost) to the Secretary of State, 12 June 1961, 
NARA II, RG 59/250/4/21/5-6, Central Decimal Files 1960-1963, Box 2722. 
235 
 
scarcity of goods in the Congo.625 At this time, the US was also contemplating contributing 
an additional $50 million to the UN Fund for the Congo—$15 million to come from the PL 
480 Food for Peace program. A State Department report argued that at this critical juncture, 
the prestige of the UN was on the line and any failure would not only weaken the 
Organization but compromise US interests.626 This policy was in keeping with the view of 
Secretary of State Rusk who informed the US Mission to the UN that, ‘our basic policy 
which, in nutshell, is not to “win” Congo in [the] Cold War sense but to create [a] viable 
independent nation.’627 The Congo took another significant step in this direction when on 1 
August it elected Cyrille Adoula as ‘formateur’ of a new government. Crucially it included 
Gizenga as Deputy Prime Minister and Gbenye as the Minster of the Interior, while 
Kasavubu remained President. Gardiner and Khiari, played an active role in negotiations 
between Leopoldville and Stanleyville to form this coalition government. However, UN 
representatives were unsuccessful in convincing any Katangan leaders to join.628  
 R.J.B. Rossborough, who replaced Linner as Chief of the Civilian Operation in mid-
1961, expressed to David Owen the enormous relief he felt when the Congolese voted in a 
legal government, noting that over the first few weeks these ministers seemed well disposed 
to the UN. Consequently, Rossborough expected a more effective technical assistance 
program in the months ahead.629 The UN Civilian Operations Progress Report for July and 
August reported that with the opening of Parliament, ‘it was now possible to regard the 
months ahead as a time to be spent not merely in preventing a worsening of the situation but 
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in further fostering development. The continuing co-operation between the Congolese 
authorities and the representatives of ONUC gives promise of good results.’630  
Meanwhile, reforms were in the works for what MacFarqurhar termed the ‘new 
shape’ of the Civilian Operation in the Congo going forward. In reality, MacFarquhar’s 
recommendations, presented to Hammarskjold on 7 August, were a blend of longstanding 
aims mixed with a few key modifications. For example, the main purpose of the civilian 
operations still emphasized ‘“decolonization” in practical, unsentimental terms.’ For 
MacFarquhar this meant the rapid development of the Congolese administrative, political and 
technical workers while using UN technicians and advisers in the meantime. Moreover, the 
UN should remain willing to assist the Congo with what MacFarquhar saw as its ‘greater 
competence and goodwill’ compared to any bilateral aid. Indeed, all these goals existed from 
nearly the start of the UN’s involvement in the crisis.631  
Where MacFarquhar’s proposals differed from the past was a greater emphasis on 
extricating the UN from the Congo as soon as possible. Noting, ‘Congolese sensitivities’, 
MacFarquhar recommended the UN adopt a position of ‘reluctant buyer’. This was similar to 
the Organization’s approach when considering UN Special Fund appropriations. Overall, the 
Civilian Mission was to avoid any appearance of being a pushy salesmen. MacFarquhar 
recognized this might result in the abolishment of UN Civilian Consultants in exchange for 
what would in fact be a standard UN Technical Assistance Program over time—albeit larger 
than any other currently operating in the Global South. In keeping with this vision, 
MacFarquhar suggested a greater emphasis on training Congolese to take over the position 
currently held by UN or Belgian personnel.632  
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Operationally, MacFarquhar recommended the establishment of a ‘Congo 
Development Board’ made up of high level officials, perhaps still advised by UN consultants, 
meant to focus on reforming the Congo’s economy and foreign trade policies, as well as its 
agricultural, educational and communication policies with the overall goal to Africanize the 
Congo’s development. MacFarquhar noted this was already taking place as measures were 
underway to transfer the responsibilities of the UN Monetary Council to the Congo to the 
Congolese National Bank. Finally, the UN should move towards a more limited role of 
recruiter, whereas the Congolese should come to view foreign doctors, teachers or other aid 
workers as their own aid workers rather than agents operating under UN auspices. 
MacFarquhar intended for the Congo Advisory Group to discuss his above recommendations 
and translate them into directives for debate within the Congo government.633 At the same 
time, Rossborough wrote to MacFarquhar making a contradictory appeal to take advantage of 
the openings that now existed in the new Congolese government for economic advisers. 
Rossborough was aware of rival advisers soon to be appointed to the Finance Minister and 
proposed instead trying to place UN personnel in these positions.634 Altogether, MacFarquhar 
and Rossborough’s somewhat divergent recommendations highlight the difficulty that still 
existed at the UN in finding a balance between the Organization’s role as mentor to the 
Congolese and the need to shift towards a role of guarantor or sponsor of Congolese 
development.  
 In fact, in the months and years ahead the UN Civilian Mission would move towards 
the latter. On Hammarskjold’s last and fateful trip to the Congo, one of the Secretary-
General’s aims was to meet with Prime Minister Adoula and other Congolese authorities to 
discuss revisions to the Civilian Operation. His aim was to make the operation conform to the 
technical assistance programs in other countries by, among other things, integrating the 
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technical operational budget of the UN into that of the Congo’s budget. They also discussed 
the need to Africanize the Congo’s administration at all levels with all due haste by 
prioritizing and developing training programs and institutes.635   
This had clearly been the goal of the UN since May 1961. For example, in finance, 
ONUC was now providing courses to train Congolese cadres in various economic fields. In 
agriculture, training programs commenced in veterinary care, farm mechanics and 
agricultural assistance. Training also started for Congolese air traffic controllers and 
aeronautical radio operators. In October 1961, a National Pedagogical Institute opened in 
Leopoldville with major UN assistance to train teachers. Meanwhile, a UN Special Fund 
backed program for a teacher training school moved into a further planning stage. Analogous 
schools, programs or institutes began during the fall of 1961 in the fields of meteorology, 
customs, labor, policing, public administration and social work. Additionally, numerous 
Congolese receive on-the-job training by ONUC experts—hundreds in the health care 
industry alone. Finally, various foreign governments granted a number of overseas 
fellowships to Congolese in the areas of foreign affairs, journalism, international trade, labor 
relations, agricultural cooperatives, rural planning, customs administration and finance.636  
In total, the UN Civilian Operation grew to 426 workers by the end of 1961—up from 
258 in mid-June. Meanwhile, 540 Congolese trainees completed their courses during the 
second half of 1961, additionally 1,098 Congolese were undergoing some type of training by 
the end of 1961.637 Altogether, by the end of 1961 the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo 
began to look more like a conventional UN technical assistance program, albeit with an 
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estimated total cost for 1962 of nearly $15 million, by far the largest ever undertaken by the 
UN in one any one country.638  
 Commenting on these developments at a press conference in Denmark in early 
October 1961, Linner, reminded his audience,  
Let us not forget that the main task for the UN in the long run is neither 
political nor military—which are temporary tasks; it is the reconstruction 
work in the civil, agricultural, health and educational fields. The action in 
Congo since July 1960 is the largest collective effort in these fields that the 
UN has ever attempted and organized. It does not get front-page headlines in 
the same way as the sensational problems, but I would be grateful if you 
would keep it in mind that a great reconstruction work has been going on 
since July last year.  
 
Asked by a reporter specifically in which fields the reconstruction was taking place—a 
question perhaps indicative as to just how under-reported the UN civilian work in the Congo 
had been—Linner was unambiguous. He carefully pointed out that from the inception of the 
operation, the UN had trained several thousand Congolese in numerous fields while boasting, 
‘We have kept the whole thing going.’  
Problems would remain, including the well-chronicled Katanga saga that saw major 
military action between UN and Katangan forces from August 1961 to the end of year. 
Tragically, this phase of the crisis would claim the life of Secretary-General 
Hammarskjold.639 Apart from peace and security issues, a mid-November 1961 UN report 
lamented the continued influence of Belgian advisers who greatly outnumbered UN 
personnel in most ministries and retained a decisive voice in policy-making. The author of 
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the report blamed the high turnover rate of UN staff, the unmatched experience many 
Belgians had of the country and Congolese officials for what he called ‘only a partial 
success’ in preparing the Congo for true independence. The report concluded by 
recommending that it might perhaps be time, as the late-Secretary-General had alluded, to 
encourage bilateral aid on a multilateral basis. The alternative was for the UN to supply large 
sums of aid while much of the policy advice remained with the Belgians.640  
Still, as the out-going Linner handed over the position of Officer-in-charge to 
Gardiner in February 1962, the member of the UN Secretariat engaged and entangled in the 
crisis as much as anyone, stated that at his departure UN-Congo relations had never been 
better. Asked for highlights of his eighteen-month term with the ONUC, Linner first 
mentioned his amazement at the speedy and generous response of member nations to answer 
the call for help in the early days of the crisis. Next, he commented on the extra-ordinary 
nature of the aid provided that would ‘have a large place in the history of UN action.’ Finally, 
Linner remarked on his admiration for the Congolese who faced up to their country’s post-
colonial difficulties and eagerly pressed forward.641  
Moreover, Linner’s departure at the end of 1961 took place at a point when the 
majority of the key developments and reforms to the Civilian ONUC had already taken place 
under his leadership as Civilian Chief and Officer-in-charge. Thus, 1961 serves as a suitable 
thematic end date in examining the first major test case of the operationalization of the UN’s 
overall development mission. To be sure, joint UN-Congolese development efforts under 
ONUC would continue for the next several years. However, as mentioned, by the end of 1961 
the Civilian Operation began taking on the attributes of a regular UN technical assistance 
program and starting in 1962, it increasingly fell under the guise of the EPTA and the Special 
Fund. In fact, this transfer was in full effect by 1963 when the EPTA took over many of the 
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administrative tasks from the ONUC Civilian Operation following the reintegration of 
Katanga. Altogether, UN aid allocated by the two main branches of development aid 
remained exceptionally high compared to any other country where the Organization operated. 
For example, in 1964 EPTA funding for the Congo alone reached over $1 million. Requested 
and approved Special Fund projects for the Congo totaled over $1.1 million for 1964 and 
over $1.5 million by 1966. It was also during the mid-1960s when the US became the 
predominant financer of civilian aid through the UN. For example, in 1966 the US paid $7.9 
million of the $8.3 million in aid costs.642  
Meanwhile, civilian aid worker numbers ballooned to over 1,100 by the end of 1962 
and some 2,000 experts in 1963-64, including 400 Nigerian police officers and some 800 
UNESCO schoolteachers. This increase occurred just as the UN military force began to 
depart, having completed their incremental withdrawal by the end of June 1964. The Civilian 
Mission still remained a highly international group, albeit one that prized French speaking aid 
workers. Similar to previous figures France, Haiti and Switzerland provided a large share of 
the civilian aid contingent.643    
Conclusion  
As Arne Westad has described in The Global Cold War, ‘the advent of new, 
independent Third World states began already in 1960 to change the role of the United 
Nations into a more diverse forum’. In particular, he has emphasized how the conflict 
stemming from the decolonization of the Congo transformed the UN ‘from being view by 
many as an arm of US intervention abroad to being an altogether different organization.’ Part 
of the change, according to Westad, was the ‘strengthened position’ enjoyed at the UN 
                                                          
642 House, 201-04, 369-72. 
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among non-aligned states from the Global South.644 Certainly this was seen during the course 
of the Congo Crisis, in which UN resolutions drafted and proposed by Afro-Asian member 
states litter the conflict’s narrative and thus helped to steer the course of the UN’s role. Yet, 
UN executive action in the form of decisions and policies originating from the UN Secretariat 
or disseminating from ONUC, also indicated another change, or perhaps signaled a trend at 
the Organization. Thus, the past two chapters have shown how through the wide-ranging 
work of UN Civilian Mission to the Congo—either as a protagonist or even as a perceived 
antagonist at times—the UN’s role in the Congo Crisis should be firmly stationed at the 
intersection of decolonization and development. 
As the UN heavily engaged with a country whose decolonization process left it 
abandoned by its metropole, at least initially, its enthusiastic response included not only a 
peacekeeping force but also a civilian mission that unreservedly carved out its place in 
Africa’s post-colonial development process. First came emergency relief and rehabilitation, 
quickly followed by a combination of technical assistance, long-term development planning, 
social development programs, education and training institutes and general institution 
building. Stepping back then, the UN effort in the Congo was to a large degree an experiment 
in modernization in the midst of crisis. Sture Linner would describe it as such in a report 
written decades after the Congo Crisis and commissioned by the Swedish Foreign Ministry 
and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA). Linner’s report, 
entitled Disaster Relief for Development, examined the connections between emergency aid 
and long-term development. The report concluded, ‘[t]o prevent disasters effectively, and to 
soften their impact, their causes and cure both need to be seen in a long-term development 
perspective.’645 Certainly this was an underlying goal of the Civilian Chief throughout his 
involvement with ONUC. The result of this effort in the Congo was what journalist Walter 
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Lippmann called ‘the most advanced and most sophisticated experiment in international 
cooperation ever attempted.’646  
In fact, the mission’s international nature was one of its strengths. Paul Berthoud, 
legal adviser for ONUC, recalls his astonishment at the Operation’s ability ‘to live the 
concept of multilateralism in a very concrete situation’ by ‘working together as exponents of 
a community of nations’—not to mention a community of Specialized Agencies. Still, 
Berthoud is careful to mention both the advantages and disadvantages of managing a crisis at 
a multilateral level through an international organization.647 Clearly, the experiment was not 
without its flaws especially made apparent when, through its efforts to develop the Congo’s 
public administration and attempt to free it from the vestiges of Belgian colonialism, it 
opened itself up to accusations of disguised imperialism. This reached its low point in early 
1961, when the Civilian Mission’s development aid efforts stalled—due in large part to the 
fallout of various other political crises. However, following hard-nosed negotiations with UN 
delegates, the UN and Congolese authorities were able to rectify the situation.  
By mid-1961, the UN once again took up more development aid projects in the 
Congo, now with the expressed purpose of hastening Africanization. Nevertheless, the history 
of the Congo is hardly one of a post-crisis transition to a stable state. Instead, it is defined by 
the eccentric kleptocracy of Joseph Mobutu. After the Congo installed its civilian government 
in 1961, Mobutu remained on as the commander in chief of the ANC. Then in 1965, Mobutu, 
who later changed his named to Mobutu Sese Seko and the Congo’s name to Zaire, 
engineered another coup establishing an authoritarian regime that would last until 1997. 
During his more than three decades of rule, Mobutu amassed great personal wealth by 
pillaging his country, brutalizing dissidents, while enjoying significant support from the US 
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for his anti-communist stance. In many ways, he was the archetypical African dictator.648 In 
the end, his misrule laid the foundation for a Congolese civil war that raged during the mid-
1990s and led to yet another UN intervention in the form of the UN Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC).649 
What then can be said of the UN Mission to the Congo—its immediate and long-term 
effects? Richard Gardner, the US Under-Secretary of State for International Organizations for 
President Kennedy, provides a moderate but valuable analysis. He argues the UN did not 
‘bequeath to the Congo a tranquil or easy existence—only a lease on life.’650 In many ways, 
the UN Civilian Mission to the Congo was a vital component of this effort. However, this 
episode is also helpful in examining the first major test of UN development standards and 
practices, shaped and cultivated during the 1950s. In this case, the challenges associated with 
decolonization in Africa confronted the UN brand of aid at the level of implementation.  
More broadly, much of the Civilian Mission’s efforts in the Congo are part of the 
Organization’s turn towards making development its primary purpose. In You, The People: 
The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and State-Building, Simon Chesterman 
defines what he calls ‘transitional administrations’ as state-building activities in which the 
United Nations attempted ‘to develop the institutions of government by assuming some or all 
of those sovereign powers on a temporary basis.’ He goes on to note that these arrangements 
often highlight the tension between the sovereign rights of governments juxtaposed to the 
responsibility of the international community to protect the inhabitants of a troubled state. 
Much of Chesterman’s research focuses on recent transitional administrations established by 
the UN in Kosovo, East Timor and Cambodia. Moreover, he touches on the similar, but 
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altogether vaguer, UN responsibilities in Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, he argues that these 
examples have roots in the UN’s response to decolonization and cites the UN Congo Mission 
as possibly the most complex of transitional administrations. Overall, he classifies the ONUC 
as a watershed in the history of UN peacekeeping with regard to the scale of the operation 
and its responsibilities.651 In this way, the previous two chapters have re-enforced how the 
UN Civilian Mission, as part of the overall ONUC, was a vital part of this turning point and 
legacy that reaches into the UN’s current activities. 
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CONCLUSION 
In his 1966 book entitled, The Arrogance of Power, the well-known US Senator from 
Arkansas, J. William Fulbright, called for the internationalization of development aid to 
convert bilateral economic aid into a responsibility of the global community. Fulbright saw 
this as a means to end ‘the peculiar and corrosive tyranny which donor and recipient seem to 
exercise over each other in bilateral relationships.’ To be sure, Fulbright was correct in 
describing bilateral aid programs of the mid-1960s as often problematical, citing American 
aid to Vietnam as a prime example.652 Nevertheless, his appeal to internationalize 
development aid was also, if anything, slightly short-sighted since the two preceding decades 
of the postwar world had witnessed a number of significant examples of a global effort to 
internationalize economic and social development. In many ways, Fulbright’s naivety, or at 
least neglect, of efforts to pursue development through multilateral channels parallels that of 
the historical scholarship on postwar development.  
It was the aim of this thesis to highlight the internationalization of development aid 
that took place through the United Nations from 1949 to 1961. This began with the 
establishment of the EPTA in 1949 and the Special Fund in 1958—representing the two main 
branches of grant-based development aid at the UN. This thesis has argued that it was 
through technical assistance and pre-investment aid that the Organization competed for its 
share of the global development effort and simultaneously established a UN-brand of aid. In 
doing so, architects of UN aid within the UN Secretariat justified their efforts by promoting 
the Organization’s will, capacity and responsibility to offer a unique form of aid. Why was 
UN aid distinct, if not preferred? This thesis has highlighted several key individuals including 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold, David Owen, Paul Hoffman and Hans Singer who 
packaged UN aid as distinct. Specifically, they made the argument that UN development aid 
was outside the orbit of the Cold War since it was divorced from the political and military 
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overtones associated with bilateral aid. In this way, it operated with greater sensitivity to the 
needs of underdeveloped states. Moreover, they emphasized that UN aid was distinctly 
different from a ‘civilizing mission’ since the recipient country played a larger role in 
determining where to allocate the aid based on their own development plans. Additionally, 
they touted the fact that UN aid came from an organization of which the recipient countries 
were full and equal members alongside donor states. Finally, they drew upon a worldwide 
network of scientific and technical knowledge and in this way were not limited to the 
intellectual capital or technical expertise of one state.    
However, the singularly favored position of the UN, according to those within the UN 
Secretariat, also came up against challenges through the 1950s. One substantial test was the 
preference of the two superpowers, the United States and Soviet Union, for bilateral or bloc 
aid. In this case, this thesis especially focuses on the effort to convince the US, namely those 
within the Eisenhower Administration, to the added benefits of multilateral aid through the 
UN. Therefore, the thesis reveals the ways in which the Organization continually had to 
jockey for relevancy throughout the 1950s as it competed with aid alternatives. The UN 
accomplished this initially, in large part, by riding the wave of postwar popularity for 
technical assistance through the work of the EPTA. Then, by the second half of the 1950s, it 
went as far as to invent a new sub-category of development aid, pre-investment, to ensure 
that high-modernist development efforts bore a UN stamp. Certainly member states played a 
large role in this process, as did the Specialized Agencies, but the Organization itself also 
showed how it could function as an autonomous institution and actor in its own right.  
After surveying how the UN established standards for its brand of aid through the 
1950s, the thesis then concentrated on a period during the late 1950s and early 60s when the 
tempo of decolonization increased concurrently with the demand by newly independent states 
for multilateral aid options. This paralleled a heightened sense of responsibility at the UN 
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headquarters to respond in kind. Prompted by Secretary-General Hammarskjold’s six-week 
tour of Africa, the UN embarked upon a concentrated program to bolster the Organization’s 
development aid to a continent on the verge of mass decolonization. Hammarskjold, in 
particular, responded to this situation by successfully promoting the expansion of the existing 
development aid machinery of the United Nations, namely the aforementioned EPTA and UN 
Special Fund as well as the use of UN Resident Representatives, OPEX and the Regular 
Program for Technical Assistance. By doing so, Hammarskjold hoped to win over the 
continent by establishing a precedent for UN aid in the region.  
Moreover, the thesis shows how this effort coincided with the culmination of a debate 
within various UN forums over capital development aid and the establishment of a billion 
dollar finance facility designed to provide soft loans specifically for newly independent and 
underdeveloped countries of the Global South. Here, this thesis challenges the standard view 
that SUNFED faded to the background following the creation of the Special Fund in 1958. 
Instead, it examines the intense competition between SUNFED and its World Bank 
equivalent, the IDA, in 1959 and 1960. Although in the end, the IDA out-paced SUNFED, 
the thesis argues that this episode served as a marker for the Organization’s pivot towards 
making development its primary function. It also highlights an overlooked aspect of 
Secretary-General Hammarskjold’s tenure—namely his renewed and timely interest in the 
UN’s economic and social development mandate.  
Furthermore, the thesis further extends the study of postwar international 
development by exploring another distinct form of assistance—food aid. Here, this study 
shows how the UN and its top development economist Hans Singer, played a significant role 
in changing the discourse on the nature and purpose of food aid during the early 1960s. As 
surplus disposal to feed the hungry became surplus utilization to spur development, the UN 
established a new aid standard that encouraged more reciprocity between donor and recipient 
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countries. In 1961, this led to the establishment of the UN World Food Program, which 
spearheaded the ‘food aid for development’ approach for the decades to come. Here, the 
UN’s effort to make food aid an additional mechanism to promote development not only 
dove-tailed with the Kennedy’s Administration approach, which led the effort among donor 
states to establish the WFP, but also changed the way in which the US allocated its bilateral 
food aid through PL 480.  
Finally, the thesis concludes with two chapters that look more intensely at how the 
UN attempted to execute its brand of aid under the harshest of circumstances. Just as food 
aid, by the early 1960s, was meant to be more than just feeding the hungry but was also a 
means to sponsor development on all fronts within a society, so too, UN emergency aid at the 
outset of the Congo Crisis was meant to establish a foundation whereby assistance would lead 
to long-term development. At the same time, the pursuit and establishment of a UN-brand of 
aid during the 1950s certainly made possible the Organization’s massive response to the 
Congo Crisis. This amounted to UN personnel encouraging not only a greater use of the UN 
in response to the Congo Crisis but UN predominance over the administration and allocation 
of aid. In doing so, the thesis has examined, in the UN Civilian Operation to the Congo, a 
neglected component of the overall UN response to the crisis and a crucial part of its mission. 
Nevertheless, much of the evidence in these chapters illustrates how accounting for 
local realities fundamentally challenged UN development aid theories, aspirations and 
standards. For the UN, this manifested itself in a competition over aid exclusivity, combatting 
accusations of carrying out disguised imperialism, all the while dealing with a wave of 
political and security crises. These challenges gave new meaning to a statement given by 
Hammarskjold on the eve of mass decolonization in which he indicated that decolonization 
and self-government, despite being principles upheld by the UN Charter, were ultimately 
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processes that newly independent countries and the global community had to ‘survive’.653 In 
the end, the UN operation did survive the first eighteen-months of the crisis but only by 
adapting its aid strategy and learning to become a guarantor, not an interloper, of the Congo’s 
development.   
Overall, the thesis analyzed development and development aid through one of its 
prevailing postwar characteristics—development as a competition. This theme has served to 
highlight a predominant motive for why the UN chose to exert its development mandate from 
the Organization’s founding on through the second half of the twentieth century. Certainly 
the struggle to gain and maintain relevancy—if not achieve aid dominance—enveloped and 
drove the narratives of the EPTA, the Special Fund, SUNFED, the World Food Program and 
the Civilian Mission to the Congo to a large degree. UN action in these areas helped to prove 
its worth, especially among the growing number of member states from the Global South. In 
this way, the UN laid the groundwork for its focus in the field of development aid beginning 
with the First UN Development Decade of the 1960s.  
In assessing the work of the UN and the value of UN development during the period 
under review, it is tempting to offer some kind of final and decisive evaluation for the UN’s 
various ideas and actions regarding development. This kind of assessment proves exceedingly 
difficult when taking into account the numerous external influences which affected UN 
development aid operations. Nevertheless, several studies are helpful in trying to think 
through this issue. By examining the origins and rise of various development efforts at the 
World Bank, the FAO and the WHO in The Birth of Development, Amy Staples surmises that 
the real importance of these international institutions lies in an analysis of their goals and the 
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means to achieve their goals. She concludes that, set against the target of fostering economic 
development, agricultural reform and public health advances respectively, these institutions 
failed to meet their lofty standards. Yet according to Staples, that does not negate the 
historical value and impact of their efforts.654  
In fact, the approach taken by Staples is an example of a new shift in development 
histories. In his 2000 article ‘Development? It’s History’ development historian Nick 
Cullather acknowledged the growing trend and need that ‘treats development as history, as an 
artifact of the political and intellectual context of the Cold War, and makes history the 
methodology for studying modernization, instead of the other way around.’ Cullather then 
placed this approach in the context of the study of US foreign relations, stating: ‘[t]his 
historicist approach offers a way to write about development without accepting its clichés, 
and to see the record of Americans’ cynical, heroic, disastrous, occasionally inspired, and 
benevolent attempts at global humanitarianism in all of their moral and political 
complexity.’655 The result, as mentioned in the opening pages of this thesis, was a re-
examination of postwar development by scholars from a historicist, albeit American-centered 
perspective.  
Moreover, this emerging school was also part of an effort, in the words of another 
development historian—Daniel Immerwahr—to get beyond the ‘moral accounting’ analysis 
of postwar development that followed the birth of the revisionist school of US diplomatic 
history starting with William Appleman Williams.656 Here, historians and anthropologists, 
mostly during the 1990s, took to task development aid efforts of various US Administrations 
and exposed their less-than-righteous motivations and pharisaical hubris.657 James Ferguson’s 
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analysis in The Anti-Politics Machine included international institutions in this critique since 
countries used these organizations to propagate bureaucratic state power.658 This school of 
thought paralleled other scholars who, during the same period, depicted international postwar 
development as an entirely futile, misconceived and debilitating exercise.659 
 Instead of being predominantly motivated by condemning or upholding the moral 
qualities of postwar development, Fredrick Cooper has joined Cullather and others in 
historicizing postwar development and focusing on its complexities. Yet his approach, as an 
Africanist, has been far less American-centered. Moreover, Cooper’s method, again in the 
words of Immerwahr, ‘makes room for the larger contours of international history: 
decolonization, the rise of the international institutions, the multiplicity of developers and the 
rivalries among them.’660 Crucially, this approach allows for the study of development as ‘a 
global phenomenon that was hotly contested.’661  
This has been the perspective adopted here. Thus, this thesis has tried to avoid 
depicting UN development in an ‘ironic tone’662 by dwelling on the gap between the 
aspirations and results of UN development efforts. Similarly, it has tried not to idealize UN 
development as a ‘silver-bullet’ which, when applied correctly, could solve the world’s 
economic and social ills. In other words, the goal has not been to judge development aid 
through the UN from 1949 to 1961 as necessarily good or bad. Instead, the thesis has focused 
on the Organization’s motives, goals, the means to achieve its goals, the resulting competition 
and the subsequent internationalization of development aid. In doing so, it offers an 
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alternative to the characterization of development as exclusively oppressive or predominately 
liberating and, in places, even provides a dialogue between the two views.663  
Similarly, this thesis makes an important contribution to the growing UN scholarship 
that avoids depicting the UN as a victim of classic Cold War machinations. Too many 
histories of this period take this approach by arguing that, to understand the actions of the 
UN, one needs to look no further than Washington, London, Moscow or Paris—and certainly 
not New York. This misrepresents the Organization's agency, particularly during the period 
under review. Instead, this thesis contributes to the study of the postwar decades by de-
centering the nation-state and moving beyond examining both the UN and development aid 
as strictly the foreign policy tools of countries. As an alternative, this thesis shows the UN to 
be an autonomous institution and dynamic instrument for executive action as it promoted its 
brand of development aid while adding to the development discourse of the era. In doing so, 
it played a significant role in affecting and contributing to one of postwar development’s 
dominant qualities—namely, development as a competition. In this way, the UN proved to be 
not just a handmaiden of developed member states, but a type of midwife for the birth of 
newly independent underdeveloped countries. This form of midwifery certainly left the UN 
susceptible to being a party in any complications that arose, as witnessed in the Congo. Yet, 
its station was nonetheless indicative of its pivotal role in the process.  
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Appendix I 
United Nations Operation in the Congo (ONUC) 
Organizational Chart 
United Nations Headquarters, New York  
      
      
      
      
      
            
            
        
 
   THE CONGO 
           
            
  
  
  
  
  
    
SECRETARY-GENERAL 
Under – Secretaries 
Advisory Committee 
Special Advisor on Civilian Operations 
Sir Alexander MacFarquhar 
Special Advisor on Military Operations 
Brigadier I.J. Rikhye 
SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE* 
R. Bunche (US): July-Aug. 1960 
A. Cordier (US): Aug.-Sept. 1960 
R. Dayal (India): Sept. 1960-May 1961 
M. Abbas (Sudan) (Acting): March-May 1961 
Sture Linner (Sweden): May 1961-Jan. 1962 
R. Gardiner (Ghana): Feb. 1962-May 1963 
*Office-in-Charge starting with Linner 
CHIEF OF CIVILIAN OPERATIONS 
S. Linner (Sw): July 1960-May 1961 
M. Khiari (Tun): May 1960-Aug. 1961 
R.J.B. Rossborough: Aug. 1961-Dec. 1961 
 
SUPREME COMMANDER OF THE UN FORCES 
Major-General C. von Horn (Sw): July-Dec. 1960 
Major-General S. McKeown (Ir): Jan. 1961-Mar. 1962 
Consultative Group 
       General Staff 
Technical Advisory Groups Contingents 
Major Fields of Operation: Agriculture, Communications, 
Education, Finance and Economy, Foreign Trade, Health, 
Judiciary, Labor, Military Instruction, National Recourses, 
Public Administration 
Strength:  176 by 31 Dec. 1960, 426 by 31 Dec. 1961, 1,149 
by 31 Dec. 1962, & roughly 2,000 by 1963-64 
Contributors of Military Personnel: Argentina, Austria, Brazil, 
Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Denmark, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Liberia, Malaysia, 
Federation of Mali, Morocco, Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Sweden, Tunisia, 
United Arab Republic and Yugoslavia 
 
Maximum Strength: 19,828 (July 1961)  
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